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OVERVIEW OF STATE ELECTION LAWS

by
Herbert E. Alexander
Director, Citizens' Research Foundation, and
Professor of Political Science
University of Southern California
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Sponsored by
Commission on Government Integrity
State of New York

New York City
October 21, 1987

Since the elections of November 1986, two elements of election reform have been targetted:

the development of public funding programs

and restrictions on political action committees.
Most attention has been directed at the federal level on S.2, the
Boren bill, sponsored by Sen. David L. Boren, a Democrat from Oklahoma.
I call it the Re-Boren bill, since similar proposals seem to come back
year after year.

The bill is a package of PAC limitations and would set

up a voluntary program of public financing tied to a system of expenditure limits.

A stalemate has developed and the chances of enactment

are not promising.
Tending to be overlooked with the interest in federal reform are
numerous developments at the state and local levels.
Alfred Kahn once said:

"Anybody who isn't schizophrenic these days

just isn't thinking clearly."
This line is particularly relevant to today's money in politics
dilemma.

On one hand, the high costs of getting elected exert pressures

on officeholders, resulting, according to election reform advocates, in
contradictions between conscience and contributions.

One the other hand,

the professionalization of politics and the accompanying escalation of
costs are irreversible trends.
The role of money in politics highlights ethical questions which
imply conflicts of values, conflicts which result from the tug-of-war
between constituent and financial pressures, between party and financial
pressures.
Any campaign reforms need to balance the integrity of the electoral
process with rights of freedom of speech, freedom of participation, and
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the right of association of like-minded people to petition the government, through political contributions as well as through lobbying.
There is a clear right for a legislature to seek to protect the integrity
of the electoral process, but just as clearly, certain restrictions on
electioneering would violate First Amendment rights.

One speaker today,

Professor Stephen Gottlieb, will clarify some of the constitutional
consequences of election reform later.
States are laboratories of reform, and efforts to change political
finance laws preceded the Watergate era.

State election laws not only

cover the collection, distribution and expenditure of public or taxassisted funds, but also include public disclosure, contribution limits,
tax incentives, and the establishment of election commissions.
All 50 states require some form of political finance disclosure,
which usually consists of identifying on public reports contributors
above a certain amount -- perhaps $50 or $100 -- by name, address,
occupation, and place of business, plus the amount and date of the
contribution.

Contributions below the threshold amount are required to

be reported in aggregate totals.

Expenditures are also required to be

disclosed.
Reporting requirements differ from state to state, resulting in 50
different systems.

But disclosure alone is not enough.

Not only must

campaign finance data be a matter of public record; they must be accessible to the public.

Translating the reports of candidates and com-

mittees is not alone the responsibility of scholars and reporters.

It

is the responsibility of state governments which must give more than lip
service to the dictum that public disclosure is the keystone of any attempt to deal with the problem of political money.

States as varied as

California, Hawaii, Missouri, New Jersey, Nebraska, Oregon, and Washing-
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ton have demonstrated that state election offices can perform the indispensable task of compiling and summarizing disclosed campaign finance
data in ways that are useful to the press and the public.
Half the states have election commissions that are nominally nonpartisan but mostly bipartisan.

These are agencies that have multiple

roles as judge, jury, administrator, prosecutor, enforcer and magistrate,
yet these functions are all needed to monitor a modern election system.
This afternoon we will hear from a panel of two practitioners, key
staff people at two election agencies -- Frederick Herrmann and Kent
Cooper.
Many states have enacted contribution limits: these vary by state
and level of candidacy.

A total of 23 states have imposed contribution

limits in some fashion, ranging from $250 to $5,000 -- not to mention New
York State's stratospheric limit approaching $150,000.
Corporate contributions are prohibited in some 23 states, and are
limited in about 13 more.

Some additional states permit corporate con-

tributions excepting by those in heavily regulated industries.

For

example, New Jersey bans giving by insurance companies, banks and public
utilities.

In Florida, race track owners are prohibited from contrib-

uting.
Nine states prohibit labor union contributions, while 17 states
limit certain union activities.
Texas and Minnesota limit off-year contributions.

In Texas, cam-

paign contributions can only be given during a 30-day period preceding
the 120 days of the legislative session, for a total of six months out of
the year.

Different limits apply in Minnesota.

For example, during the

election year, a senate candidate can accept $1,500, while during the
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off-year, just $300 is allowed.

These limits are cut in half for the

lower house.
At tomorrow's Forum there will be a panel on PACs and more information about their role and regulation will be considered then.
In order to get some perspective on the current state of reform
laws, consider that twenty states offer some method of public financing.
Public financing is designed to reduce the fund-raising advantage of
incumbents, lessen the benefits of wealthy candidates, provide an alternative to interest group funds, and through contribution and expenditure
limits reduce high campaign costs.
The goals of these programs of limitations and funding are to provide a near-equal financial base for candidates, increase participation
in the electoral process, and reduce corruption or the appearance of
corruption.

Public financing programs, in general, are designed to help

minimize the influence of special-interest groups and large contributors
as well as enable greater numbers of citizens to run for political office.
Two basic public financing systems have been set into place in
various states: tax check-offs and tax add-ons.

A tax check-off desig-

nates a dollar or two -- that the taxpayer would have to pay anyway -to a fund for distribution according to the state's formula.

An add-

on allows a taxpayer to add voluntarily a dollar or two onto his or her
own tax liability.

Add-ons may not be considered true public financing,

since they rely on voluntary monies given by individuals through tax
collections, intending to aid particular parties and candidates.

But in

some cases the monies are allocated according to strict government rules
and with considerable involvement of government, thus warranting their
being designated as public funding.
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The check-off is far superior to the add-on in terms of inducing
taxpayer participation, though the range of success is considerable.
Figures from the 1984 election year show that Hawaii had the best response, with 54 percent of taxpayers contributing.

The worst response

rate was in Kentucky, which posted a participation level of 10.8 percent.
The overall average participation figure for all states the same
year was 20.9 percent, down slightly from the 22 percent average obtained
in 1980.
Add-on participation for the 8 states with such a program is considerably lower, averaging a mere 1.6 percent in 1984.

The lowest par-

ticipation percentage for 1984 was in California, where only .6 percent
of taxpayers elected to contribute, despite its liberal program of allowing filers to add an extra $1, $5, $10 or $25 to their tax liability for
political parties.

\)

With some exceptions, public financing of state campaigns has not\_
had a significant impact on the election process.

The amounts of money

involved have been fairly negligible in some states, and when political
parties receive the money, they tend to use the funds that have been allocated to support party programs and operations.

This diffuses or

minimizes the impact on candidates.
All told, 23 states have enacted some sort of taxpayer supported or
public funding program.

Of the 21 operative programs, 19 raise money

through the tax system.

Just this year Ohio joined the group of check-

off states, with parties the beneficiaries.

Just last year Florida

enacted a public funding program with legislative appropriations.
State elective public funding tax programs vary.

Of the 12 states

with a check-off system, only five allow the money to be allocated to
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candidates.

The rest require the funds to be allocated to political

parties of the taxpayer's choice, with certain restrictions on the use of
funds.

In fact, only four staes -- Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey and

Wisconsin -- generate significant amounts of monies for use by candidates.
To get some notion of the dimensions of one state's program, over an
eight year period, New Jersey has expended some $17 million in public
funds during three gubernatorial campaigns, covering general election
campaigns in 1977, 1981 and 1985, and primaries as well in 1981 and 1985.
Six states provide public funds for primary and general elections,
whereas three limit funding to general elections.

Although some states

fund only statewide candidates for elective office, others such as Wisconsin and Minnesota, extend public funds to state legislative offices.
The states of Maryland, Michigan and New Jersey finance only gubernatorial campaigns.
Eleven states -- Alabama, California, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine,
North Carolina, Ohio, Rhode Island, Utah and Virginia -- make direct
payments to political parties.

Eight states -- Florida, Hawaii, Mary-

land, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, New Jersey and Wisconsin -desposit funds with candidates' committees.
Other selected state election information:
•

The three states with legislative public funding programs are Wisconsin, Minnesota and Hawaii.

Wisconsin and Minnesota have expen-

diture limits without public funding in the primary, with the public
funds being disbursed only during the general election period.
cause the U.

s.

Be-

Supreme Court in the case of Buckley -:!..• Valeo held

that expenditure limits were constitutional only if

prov~ded

as a

condition of the acceptance of public funding, these primary cover6

ages could be the subject of litigation that might find them unconstitutional.
•

But no such suits have been brought.

Six states off er public funding of both primary and general election
candidates:

Hawaii, Maryland, Massachustts, Michigan, New Jersey

and Florida.
•

Florida enacted an innovative measure in 1986.

Since the state has

no income tax, an Election Campaign Financing Trust Fund has been
established.

Monies are coming from legislative appropriations on a

schedule prior to 1990 when the program becomes operative.

It is

estimated that more than $6 million will be paid out to candidates.
Funding will be limited to candidates for governor and six cabinet
seats in primary, runoff and general elections.
•

Virginia offers a tax add-on only to those taxpayers who are receiving refunds.
The numbers of states could change soon.

There are several pending

bills and proposed initiatives, as well as other recent developments,
that are transforming the ways states finance campaigns.
laws have been defeated as well.

Several reform

Here is a brief overview:

A campaign reform initiative was enacted in Rhode Island in November
1986 by a 54 to 46 percent margin.

It directed the Legislature to adopt

reforms before June 1, 1988; since the Legislature failed to agree on a
program in the 1987 session, required adoption by the 1988 session will
delay its operation until 1990.

The initiative mandated that the reforms

include limits on contributions to all state and local candidates, create
a system of voluntary public financing, and set overall limits on spending for gubernatorial races.
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In 1987, the Iowa State Legislature passed a bill to establish a
system of public financing, but Gov. Terry E. Branstad (R) vetoed the
measure.

Branstad found special interest group influence "excessive,

especially in legislative races," but said he could not "accept a system
in which the taxpayer foots the bill for political campaigns."
Republican Governor James Thompson twice vetoed public funding
enacted by the Illinois Legislature in 1984 and 1985.

Governor George

Deukmejian of California also vetoed a public funding bill in 1984.
In California, a coalition of business, labor and public interest
groups narrowly failed to get an initiative on the ballot in 1986.

In an

unusual move, Common Cause has attempted to re-verify previously rejected
signatures for 1986 to re-qualify the same measure for 1988.

The measure

is a full scope program including contribution and expenditure limits, a
well as public financing.

Two campaign finance reform ballot measures

which explicitly ban public financing may be competing with Common
Cause on the June and November California ballots in 1988.

Bob Stern

from California is on a panel with Ruth Jones and will discuss public
funding later.
Expenditure limits are among the most controversial of reforms.

New

Jersey's public financing laws -- like those of several other states
require candidates to accept expenditure limits on their campaigns as a
condition for receiving public funds.

Such expenditure limits, when they

are set too low, tend to favor the better known candidates.

The New

Jersey gubernatorial general election in 1977 illustrates the problem of
finding an equitable spending limit.
Both major-party candidates raised the maximum amount in private
contributions -- about $500,000 -- and received public funds of a little
more than $1 million, which brought them close to the spending limit of
8

$1,518,576.

This gave the advantage to the incumbent, Brendan Byrne, who

was better known.
The limits worked to the disadvantage of his challenger, State
Senator Ray Bateman.

When Bateman wanted to change strategies and revise

campaign themes late in the campaign, he was unable to do so and stay
within the limit.

Low limits in this case rigidified the system.

Sub-

sequently, the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission three
times has recommended that expenditure limits be repealed, stating that
contribution limits guard against undue influence and that expenditure
limits are troubling.

But the State Legislature has not agreed to a

formula of what I call floors without ceilings.
Seven states currently impose expenditure limits.
In addition to tax check-offs and add-ons, some states allow other
procedures for use of the tax system.

Oregon, Minnesota, Idaho, Alaska,

along with Washington, D.C., allow taxpayers to claim a tax credit for
their campaign contributions.

Six states allow tax deductions.

For 14

years there was a federal income tax credit but that was repealed in
1986.
In surveying what states have done in response to money in politics
concerns, several conclusions can be drawn:
1. None of the largest states have undertaken programs for public
funding.

The largest so far has been Florida.

2. Legislatures have been more willing to provide pubic funding, and
the expenditure limits that come with it, for gubernatorial candidates than for their own campaigns.
3. Legislatures have been more willing to provide public funds for
general as opposed to primary elections.
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4. The number of states that have enacted programs designed to benefit

\)G~,y
sf

political parties is impressive, especially since some of these
programs are in states which traditionally have been weak party
states.

Both check-off and add-on tax programs that distribute

money to political parties tend to strengthen the two-party system,
although several states do distribute small sums to minor parties.
A presentation on party renewal will be made in tomorrow's Forum.
5. Low expenditure limits tend to favor the better-known candidates.
If spending limits are too low, or the public funding amounts are
too small, some candidates may decide not to accept the money,
preferring not to be held to the expenditure limits.

This has

occurred in both Minnesota and Wisconsin.
Several cautionary points should be considered.
reform is not a panacea.

First, election

Even the best designed law cannot contend with

every problem inherent in political campaigns, or foresee and foreclose
all efforts to circumvent the spirit of reform legislation.

Experience

with public funding and other restrictive election laws on both state and
federal levels has shown that such laws -- as useful as they were in
curbing campaign financing excesses -- also have unintended as well as
intended consequences.

And those consequences, in turn, bring with them

new problems.
Second, care should be taken in the design, implementation and
enforcement of an election law to ensure both that high-caliber potential
candidates are not discouraged from entering politics, and that creativity and imagination within the political system are not repressed.
means must not be permitted to subvert the ends.

The

Access to public off ice

by qualified candidates without personal financial means remains a key
goal to achieve.
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Third, it is important to avoid the rigidity that marred reform
efforts in earlier eras -- when laws drawn too narrowly often caused as
many problems as they solved; and to encourage flexibility in the electoral system as well.

The local political culture and historic, conven-

tional means of financing also need, therefore, to be given careful
consideration.
In his classic study of money and politics, Alexander Heard outlined
three chief requirements of any campaign finance system for American
elections.

According to Heard, the philosophical presuppositions and

operating necessities of our elections require:
••• (1) that sufficient money be available to sustain the great
debate that is politics, which means to assure the main contestants an opportunity to present themselves and their ideas
to the electorate; (2) that the needed sums be obtained in
ways that do not inordinately weight the processes of government in favor of special interests; and (3) that the system
command the confidence of the citizens whose government officials are chosen through it.
Tomorrow another Forum will be held, when we will discuss in panels
and presentations PACs, political parties, election agencies and local
public financing.
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New York City
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As noted yesterday, states have become the laboratories of political
finance reform.

Apart from public funding programs, much of this activ-

ity has been directed at limiting campaign contributions and restricting
political action committees.
Currently, 23 states impose some sort of limits on campaign contributions.

These limits range as low as $250 and go as high as $5,000.

Corporate campaign contributions are prohibited in 22 states and partially prohibited in several more.
ration may give.

Thirteen states limit what a corpo-

Nine states ban direct labor union contributions, while

17 states impose limits on union activity.

.

/

Some 17 states limit PAC contributions and two -- Arizona and Mon-\
tana -- limit the aggregate amounts candidates can receive from all PACs.
----------

Just how large a role PACs play at the state level has become an
increasingly popular topic of debate.

Given that their role in financing

campaigns has no doubt increased, questions remain as to how to evaluate
this phenomenon.
On one hand, supporters of PACs claim that they are just another
form of public expression and that they are one of the few avenues left
for citizens to get involved in today's modern, hi-tech campaigns.
Critics complain that many special interest PACs represent those who are
already influential in state politics, and their generous campaign contributions only weaken the representation of those who are already
disenfranchised.
Following my presentation there will be a panel on PACs with two
political scientists -- Christopher Arterton and Larry Sabato
cussing them.

1

dis-

!

Statistics from all over the country point to an aggressive role
increasingly played by PACs in state electoral politics.
According to Common Cause, special interest contributions to Florida
state legislators nearly tripled between 1976 and 1982, increasing from
$1.6 million to $5.4 million.

During this time period, successful can-

didates for the state Senate depended upon special interest PACs for
69 percent of their campaign funds.
In Montana, PAC contributions to legislative candidates jumped 442
percent during the same six year time period.

And in Arizona, legisla-

tive candidates saw PAC contributions skyrocket 1,526 percent from 1978
to 1982.
Not only are the amounts of money given escalating, but the number
of PAC participants is also on the rise.

The state of New York has wit-

nessed a 400 percent increase in the number of PACs over the past six
years.
Perhaps one of the most distorting influences of PACs on elections
is their impact on challengers.

While some PACs no doubt still give

because of partisan and ideological considerations, more PACs give mainly
to incumbents for purposes of access.

A 1984 Common Cause study in Cali-

fornia found that the Top Ten PACs gave 96 percent of their money to
incumbents; however, some of that incumbents' money was transferred to
challengers.

In 1986, all incumbents running for re-election in Cali-

fornia won; challengers chances of winning were so dismal that they
raised only half the funds that 1984 challengers could muster.
One of the best case studies of PAC activity at the state level is
Illinois.

Ron Michaelson, executive director of the Illinois State Board

of Elections, has discovered that since the Illinois Campaign Finance Act
of 1974 was enacted, a 1,171 percent increase in the number of PACs has
2
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occurred.

By the end of 1986, Illinois had 445 active PACs.

The number

of PACs tripled since 1979 and doubled since 1981.
To discover just how much impact PACs have had on elections and
public policy, Michaelson studied six PACs which were among the top
givers: the Illinois Association of Realtors PAC (RPAC), Illinois
Education Association PAC (IPACE), Illinois State Medical Society PAC
(ISMS), Legislative Interest Committee of Illinois Dentists PAC (ILCID),
Illinois Trail Lawyers Association PAC (ITLA) and the Illinois Manufacturers' Association PAC (IMPAC).
Michaelson studied all contributions from these six PACs to Illinois
House and Senate candidates and related organizations over three election
cycles: 1976, 1982 and 1986.

(The only exception was the ITLA, which

began operations in 1978).
With the exception of the Illinois Realtors (RPAC), the other five
PACs increased their contributions steadily over the three elections.

In

1986, the six PACs contributed a total of $1.5 million to legislative
candidates, approximately three times the money these PACs gave a decade
earlier.
Michaelson's conclusions include the observations that campaign
costs have escalated along with special interest participation.

While he

does not come to any firm correlation between these two developments, he
reports that PAC participation has increased more rapidly than overall
campaign costs.
Because they prefer winners, PACs are making better use of their
money.

·~oyalty,"

concludes Michaelson, is apparently the concept that

drives Illinois PAC contributions.

More PACs seem to be giving mainly to
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their proven friends' campaigns, whether they be Republican or Democrat.
PACs are pragmatists when it comes to spending their money.
In Pennsylvania in 1976, PACs accounted for 18.5 percent of total
receipts of legislative candidates, a figure that rose to 29.7 percent in
1984.

Ruth Jones has presented data for six states on comparable per-

centages of funds derived from PACs in 1980:

Iowa, 34 percent; Missouri,

30 percent; Nebraska, 24 percent; Washington, 37 percent; Wisconsin, 34
percent; and California, 73 percent.

In Colorado, combining 1982 and

1984, Senate candidates received 48 percent, and House candidates, 52
percent.

In Michigan, percentages rose from 41.1 percent in 1978 to 56.1

percent in 1984.
A study by Jerry Brekke, a professor of government at Northwest
Missouri State University, on Missouri state elections echoes many of
Michaelson's conclusions.

He adds that the debate over how large a role

PACs should play in state politics is marked by concerns that since state
legislatures are not subject to the same kind of public or media scrutiny
as is the Congress, the potential for serious abuses could be greater at
the state level.
A run down of the latest developments on the state PAC front follows:
In Arizona, a campaign finance reform initiative was enacted in 1986
by a 2 to 1 margin.

The unique feature of the new law is its emphasis on

aggregate campaign contribution limits for PACs and other political committees.

Candidates for statewide office can accept no more than $500

from individuals and $2 ,500 from qualified political committees which

cJ.- ,

include PACs, political party committees or other candidate committees.

\/ g/\

The aggregate limit for a candidate to receive from all three types of
qualified political committees is $50,000.
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Candidates other than those running for statewide office in Arizona
are limited to accepting $200 from individuals and $500 from the various
types of political committees, including PACs.

The contribution limits

are waived if an opponent spends $100,000 or more of his or her own funds
in a statewide race.

In other contests, the contribution limits are

voided if an opponent spends $10,000 of his or her own money.
Other provisions of the Arizona law include prohibitions on intercandidate transfers of funds and on the practice of "bundling" campaign
contributions.
Another state with aggregate limits is Montana.
limits apply.

Here, much stricter

A candidate running for the House is bound by a $600 ag-

gregate limit; a candidate running for the Senate must abide by a $1,000
aggregate limit.
In Ohio, Democrat Gov. Richard F. Celeste allowed a bill to become
law although he did not sign it, enabling corporations to pay administrative expenses for PACs out of their treasury funds.

This development

puts corporations on a par with labor unions, which have been able to
subsidize their PACs for a number of years.
Only two states -- Wisconsin and Massachusetts

continue to

prohibit the use of corporate treasury funds to create and maintain PACs.
New Jersey is considering a PAC contribution limit of $2,500 per
election.

I

An additional requirement worth noting is that the proposal

would require PACs to disclose which bills pending in the Legislature
they want lawmakers to support.

In Minnesota, a bill is being considered that would ban the solicitation of campaign funds during the legislative session.
PACs would have to declare their political interests in their titles
in North Carolina if legislation introduced by Rep. Walter B. Jones, Jr.
5

(D) is passed.

The bill also would require referendum committees --

groups established by citizens advocating enactment of specific referenda
-- to disclose their economic and political interests.

The legislation

is modeled after similar legislation passed by the Montana Legislature in
1985.
The Tennessee Legislature is contemplating radical surgery on its
campaign laws after record-breaking spending in the 1986 election.
present, there are no contribution limits.

At

Among the plethora of reform

measures is a proposal that would limit individual campaign contributions
to the following limits:

$1,700 to a gubernatorial candidate; $450 for a

state Senate candidate; $250 for a state House candidate.

PACs would be

limited to giving ten times the amounts: $17,000 to a gubernatorial candidate, $4,500 to a state Senator, and $2,500 to a House member.
PACs in Tennessee would also be required to provide the receiving
candidate with the names and addresses of people who contributed more
than $20 to the PAC.

Patterned after similar provisions enacted in

Michigan, the recipient candidate would then have to disclose these
names to the Secretary of State's office.
Record-breaking expenditures in California are once again heating
reform debate.

All legislative incumbents running for office were re-

elected in 1986 as spending increased by 30 percent from 1984 to reach
$57.1 million.
Since California legislators seem to be stuck in eternal gridlock on
campaign reform, three campaign initiatives are trying to make the June
1988 primary ballot.

All include PAC limitations.

sive expenditure limit and public financing package.

One is a comprehenThe other two

specifically prohibit the use of public funds in campaigns.
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The most

novel approach is the initiative drafted by House Representative Bill
Thomas (CA), which would require candidates to raise 50 percent of

their~·~

treasuries from within their districts.

/

Yesterday, when I introduced the subject of public financing, I
referred to a number of states with income tax check-offs or add-ons
directing the funding to the political parties.

John White will be on

the program later today to discuss party renewal.

Suffice it to say here

that the political parties in New York State and City have had more than
their share of problems, and that parties are indispensable to the
exercise of free speech and free association in a democratic society.

If

the growth of PACs has been dramatic, one way of countering them is
through stronger parties.
I also want to mention that later today we will hear another speaker
on the roles of election agencies, Frank Reiche.
Along with discussion of state reforms aimed at regulating PACs and
strengthening parties, there has been a notable increase in interest in
developing local public funding programs.
The first city to enact a public financing system was Seattle, whose
city council passed the ordinance as an experiment in 1978.

It was in

effect for both the 1979 and 1981 elections before its sunset deadline
terminated the program.
After disturbing trends in contribution patterns emerged during the
1983 election, the program was reinstated in 1984, effective for elections this year.

Alan Miller, who is the Administrator of the Seattle

program, is on the program later today.

He will explain the law but I

just want to point out that it is funded through tax dollars obtained
through a voluntary checkoff that allows an individual to return a four
dollar coupon with his or her electricity bill.
7

The city of Tucson, Arizona modeled its campaign reform ordinance
after Seattle in 1985.
percent plurality.

The Charter Amendment passed by a slight 52

Unlike Seattle, the program is funded with city

treasury funds and private donations.

An add-on on the city's water

bills has been enacted and will be going into effect.
The most recent local funding program to make the law books was
Sacramento County's voter approved charter amendment.

Nearly 62 percent

of county voters endorsed the comprehensive plan in 1986, the first
county program in the nation.
The Tucson and Sacramento laws are very complex and they will be
described following the Seattle presentation.
Here in New York City, both the City Council and the Charter Revision Commission of the City of New York are considering making
recommendations that would provide public funding of campaigns for Mayor,
Comptroller, President of the City Council, Members of the City Council,
and Borough Presidents.

'

If adopted, the City program would by far exceed/ t--(~~

the public funding programs in most states and local jurisdictions.

/

Signals to look out for in the immediate future are how the initiative campaigns emerge in California, the development of laws beyond
Arizona and Montana setting aggregate limits on contributions, and local
reforms such as those being discussed for New York City campaigns.

Also

one might focus on the gathering strength of party assistance in numerous states, with Ohio just added this year.
There is need to consider whether legislation, when offered, should
be comprehensive or piecemeal, whether by legislation or consitutional or
charter amendment where possible, or by initiative where feasible.
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In conclusion, there seems to be a resurgence of reform, or at least
a new interest in it.

The reform movement was popularized in the

1970s, and later suffered a backlash.
to be gaining a new lease on life.
status quo is an ongoing one.

Now, a decade later, reforms seem

Yet the battle between reform and

And once reform occurs, the pendulum may

swing and counter-reform set in until a new wave of momentum results in
further fine-tuning if not major change.
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Dear Mr. Bienstock:
Enclosed, please find a copy of my working paper, "Public
Campaign Finance: Arguments and Alternatives," which I submit in
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Public Campaign Financing:
Arguments and Alternatives*

It is testimony to the slow, incremental nature of policymaking in the U.S. that it took more than seventy-five years to
begin the implementation of significant public campaign financing
programs.

Compromise politics not withstanding, the use of

public (tax) dollars to fund campaigns continues to provoke
controversy.

Over the years, some who initially advocated public

funding have come to question its viability, while others who
initially opposed using public dollars to fund campaigns have
become advocates.

For example, in testimony in 1931 before the

Select Committee on Senatorial Campaign Expenditures, Louise
Overacker testified that "it would be extremely difficult for the
Government to take on the entire job of financing the campaign •••
many serious difficulties present themselves when one tries to
draft such a proposal." 1

But in a 1973 interview, this long

time observer and recognized expert on campaign finance reported
that "I have come to the conclusion that direct public financing
of the campaigns is probably the best [way to get big money in
small sums]." 2
All participants in the debate over campaign finance reform
share common interests in protecting and enhancing the campaign
and electoral process.

Both sides seek to preserve basic proce-

dural and substantive goals long associated with democratic
1
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elections.

Thus, both seek ways to maintain the republican

principle of representation, promote equality of opportunity,
guarantee meaningful electoral choice, facilitate citizen
participation, ensure political accountability and sustain an
open and fair electoral system.
These, of course, are not new goals.

Concern about interest

representation was at the heart of Madison's classic argument
(Federalist #10) during the debate over ratification of the U.S.
Constitution, and American politics has ever been plagued by
the tension inherent in controlling the effects of factions.
Guarantees of the opportunity to compete and to present alternative ideas, policies and candidates through the electoral
process underlie the meaning of democratic elections.

Without

the free flow of competing ideas, the electorate has no bases for
making choices and the casting of
not meaningless.

~

ballot becomes suspect if

Not only is the campaign and election process

the primary means whereby elected officials are held accountable,
to the electorate -- a concept that goes to the heart of popular
government -- it is the accepted vehicle for managing political
change.
Similarly, there is broad consensus that democratic systems
must encourage informed political participation and foster a
sense of efficacy and civic responsibility among the electorate
if the electoral process is to be effective. These concerns

2
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encompass essential dimensions of an open political system which
is not dominated by secret deals or procedures, where the rules
are not arbitrarily written and enforced but consensually agreed
upon and objectively applied, and where both those who seek
election and those who elect them have confidence in the system
and abide by its outcomes.
Although widespread consensus exists on these fundamental
"ideals", there is considerably less agreement on how such goals
should be achieved. Concepts of equity, representation, and
accountability have very different meanings and priorities for
different people.

Thus, for example, the single question of how

best to achieve equity among candidates participating in the
electoral process, or even how much equity is necessary or
desirable, generates a wide range of answers.

It is around such

questions that the controversy over public funding flourishes.
The debate continues to have a philosophical aura in that both
proponents and opponents articulate their_positions in terms of
fundamental democratic values.

But with the winning of elections

defining the reality of politics, the day to day debate focuses
on very specific, real or perceived, advantages and imperfections in existing or proposed legislation.

Although it is

perhaps somewhat misleading, those who advocate public campaign
finance are usually referred to as political reformers because
they seek change, often major change, in the current system.
3
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Opponents of suggested changes are not as readily categorized
by a single label and thus usually are referred to simply as
opponents or "the opposition."
Because public funding programs are products of a political
marketplace in which bargaining, bartering and moderation
dominate, it is not surprising that advocates of public funding
are often as dissatisfied with enacted public funding
legislation as are the opponents of the programs.

Moreover,

those who advocate and those who oppose are not always in
agreement either among themselves or between the two camps as to
the primary strengths and weaknesses or pros and cons of any
given issue before them.

Thus, not all advocates give equal

weight to the various arguments made in favor of public funding
and not all opponents are collectively in agreement as to the
rank ordering of the host of negatives they associate with public
financing of election campaigns.

And the arguments of the

advocates as well as the opponents are not mutually exclusive,
for each public funding program is part of a larger,
comprehensive effort to address broader issues of campaign
financing.

There-fore, detailed arguments over legislation

designed to address a particular electoral situation or policy
priority are not easily summarized and are best dealt with in
discussions of specific programs.

But, if we avoid assigning

priorities to the arguments that have been advanced on either

4
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side, and if we accept the fact that many of the arguments are
interrelated and therefore hard to separate out, it is possible
to identify the most prominent rationales used to attack and
defend the abstract concept of public campaign funding.
The Argument for Public Funding
The general arguments in support of public funding are nine
in number and include assertions that public funding would:
Reduce real corruption and the appearance of impropriety.
Because the costs of campaigns have sky rocketed and candidates
appear to need increasingly large sums of money, campaign
finance reformers fear that misuses or misappropriation of
campaign funds and illegal activities similar to those that
occurred during the 1972 Presidential campaign will become
increasingly more common.

"The huge sums involved create vast

opportunities for abuse, influence peddling and other improprieties.

And they give rise to a substantial appearance of

impropriety, a belief that large contributors receive a quid
pro-guo from those they support." 3

If public funds are made

available, the pressure to raise vast sums will be reduced at the
same time that oversight of campaign financing will be increased.
With less need and greater risk, the temptation to resort to
questionable or illegal activities will be greatly diminished.
Eliminate undue influence of special interests.

Oyer the

past decade, special interest money, primarily in the form of PAC

5
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contributions, has increased markedly.

By 1986, PAC

contribu-

tions constituted more than 40% of all contributions to
Congressional winners and often provided well over half of all
funds to local or state policy maker's individual campaign
budgets. As of 1986 the 100 members sitting in the U. S. Senate
had, as a group, received more than $87 million in PAC
contributions over the 14 years for which records of PAC
contributions are available.
Reformers fear that elected officials at all levels are
becoming dependent on special interest contributions and that
such dependence shapes response to policy issues. A correlate of
this concern is the fact that not all interests (i.e., the rural
poor, low-income consumers, hungry children) are organized and
represented by effective PACs; and even among those with formal
organizational representation, there· is great unevenness in
access to financial resources.

The dissimilarity of campaign

organizations among political interests means that many interests cannot compete on an equal basis(9 assisting campaigns that
are directly dependent on money provided by privileged interests.
The use of tax dollars to help fund campaigns would eliminate
the need for policy makers to establish unduly close ties with
particular interests and thus subsequently would free them to
make policy decisions in the public interest rather than on
behalf of special interest campaign supporters.

6
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constitutionality of Seattle's public funding program, the
Washington State Supreme Court stated: "The Seattle City Council
intelligently and creatively passed an ordinance providing for a
voluntary limit on spending and partial public financing of
candidates so the average person would have some chance of equal
representation in the city of Seattle ••• · ·There is ••• a tremendous
benefit to the general public in a more representative government by the City Council and Major of their city."
Improve the quality of campaigns and governance.

Advocates

of public funding also argue that if a candidate, challenger or
incumbent, does not have to woo special interests and go hatin-hand to those with money, the quality of campaigns (and
therefore the electoral process) will be enhanced.

Under the

current system, candidates spend inordinate amounts of time
raising money.

The cost of the average U.S. Senate campaign ($3

million in 1986) means that a Senator must raise $10 thousand a
week for 52 weeks a

yea~

every year of a six-year term in order

to wage an "average" campaign.

Fundraising activities reduce

the amount of time candidates have to take their messages to the
people, to debate the issues, and to present their ideas and
proposals.

By ensuring an adequate level of financial support,

public funding will permit candidates to focus on the important
issues of the campaign.
It will also enable incumbents candidates to spend more

7

Jones,

R.s.

time being public officials taking care of public business and
less time being candidates seeking funds for their next campaign.
Said one elected official, "It would be a total relief to a
fellow like me who would rather talk about the issues than be out
beating my head in the ground trying to raise money to know my
opponent and I would have the same amount of money."
Contain the costs of elections.

Proponents of public

funding do not necessarily take the position that too much is
spent on elections.

In fact, most would argue that the electoral

process is so central to the maintenance of democratic government that it is impossible to arbitrarily set a dollar amount on
the worth or acceptable "cost" of democratic elections.

However,

reformers see the ever increasing costs of elections as creating
;a campaign and electoral process in which only the rich or those
with ties to sources of wealth will be able to compete.

Senator

Barry Goldwater testified that "Unlimited campaign spending eats
at the heart of the Democratic process .•• It creates an impression
that every candidate is bought and sold by the biggest givers."
To keep the system open, proponents argue that campaign expenditures must be controlled.

The Supreme Court has ruled that it

is unconstitutional to put a limit on what candidates can spend
on campaigns unless public funds are involved.

Therefore, the

only way to prevent uncontrolled and limitless spending· is to
introduce public financing and the expenditure limits that may
8
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legally accompany the use of public funds.

By constraining the

costs of elections, reformers anticipate that the need for funds
will be reduced, the outer limits of spending will be clearly
identified, and the public will not view campaign financing as
the black hole of electoral politics.
Encourage efficient use of funds.

There is ample evidence

that, beyond a certain point, the marginal product of campaign
spending decreases and the law diminishing returns sets in. An
expenditure ceiling would curtain marginal or wasteful spending.
Similarly, if candidates have a limit on what they can spend or
have a fixed amount of funds, they are more likely to develop
campaign strategies that maximize the use of finite funds and
incorporate greater reliance on nonmonetary resources.

Indis-

criminate .or runaway spending for the sake of spending would be
eliminated.
Encourage more good candidates to run.

Most

candidates find large-scale fund raising as unpleasant as it is
time consuming.

Many have characterized seeking funds as a

demeaning, tin-cup ordeal.

Others view it as imposing on friends

or making oneself vulnerable to unwanted influences.

Reformers

argue that each election cycle, many highly qualified, interested and willing citizens never become candidates for public
office because they fear either that they cannot raise enough
money to make a creditable race or that, to obtain the requisite
9
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money involves compromises or negotiations they view as distasteful or unacceptable.

Others begin the process only to

withdraw because the prerequisite funding was not forthcoming.
Under public financing, much of the onerous task of fundraising
would be eliminated and thus a major barrier to recruiting
additional quality candidates would be eliminated.

In short,

public funding can create a level playing field that interested
citizens will view as less hostile and more receptive to new
candidacies and campaigns.
Increase electoral competition. Reformers argue that not
only would more quality candidates run but the overall number of
candidates would be increased as well.

Increased numbers of

qualified candidates would make elections more competitive.
Similarly, if some form of minimal equity,

oft~n

called a

"floor", for ·campaign expenditures is guarantee4 through
i

public funding, al 1 candidates wi 11 be

guar.ante~d

tunity to get their messages to the electorate.

'

the opporAt present it

is quite common for a quarter to a third of all state legislative
races to be uncontested.

Similarly, more than\.90% of U.S. House
\\

of Representatives incumbents who run for re-election
get
\
elected.

These incumbents are very well funded and

dominate the campaign.

posi~Joned

to

~ '\

Indeed, preemptive spending, whe1\~\

incumbents raise large sums and spend early, has become.a ~d~on
\

element in election campaign strategy. 4

When it is succes~fu\ly
\\

\
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used, it often scares away competition and leaves the incumbent
unopposed in either the primary or the general elections.
funding would provide greater equity in the funding of

Public

campaign~

thereby increasing the likelihood there will be a challengers
with the ability to wage a meaningful campaign.

The more

balanced the financing of campaigns, the greater the likelihood
of competitive elections.
Enhance representation.

If public monies provide minimum

floors and expenditure ceilings, then interests in the society
that currently are not effectively represented through the
presentation of candidates and the debate of campaign issues
will have an opportunity to make their positions know.

It will

still be up to the voters to accept or reject those interests,
and equally up to the interests to abide by the electoral
decision. However, with public funds, a fairer representation of
social and economic diversity would be effectively built in to
the electoral process.
Increase citizen involvement and support.

Even before

Watergate and the subsequent publicity on the role of money in
campaigns, reformers feared that citizen interest and
willingness to become politically involved was declining
because the campaign process was so heavily structured around
raising large sums of money.
simply added to this fear.

The current PAC explosion has
Hence, reformers see public funding,
11
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not only as a way to give more responsibility for financing
elections to the electorate, but also as a means of removing a
potential cause of citizen cynicism and estrangement.

When

expenditures are limited and dependence on special interest
money is reduced, advocates argue that rank and file citizens
will respond and will more readily and effectively take on
financial responsibility for democratic elections.

In proposing

an optional public funding program, the New York State-City
Commission on Government Integrity argued that change was
necessary not only "because the current system is both
inequitable and fraught with dangers of corruption, but also
because the erosion of trust in our political process contributes
to the general loss of faith in the integrity of government and
creates a climate for other abuses." 5
The Argument Against Public Funding
The identifiable arguments against public funding of
election campaigns are at least eight in number and emphasize
opposition to public funding because it would involve:
An inappropriate role for government.

Opponents of public

funding argue that campaign financing belongs in the free
marketplace.

The ability to raise money is an established

"test" of candidate viability.

The current system, consistent

with the societal norm of individualism, has served the.country
well for 200 years and government intervention into what

12
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essentially has been a free enterprise system is inappropriate,
"a totally alien idea to American democracy."

Prior to the

Buckley decision, opponents argued that public funding was
obviously unconstitutional.

After the high court affirmed the

constitutionality of public funding, opponents shifted to more
pragmatic grounds arguing that any program involving government
funds necessarily means interference with the free flow of ideas
through the creation of yet another governmental bureaucracy to
impose more governmental regulation.

Opponents view public

funding as another unwarranted step in the direction of
government control, with political control of the campaign
process contrary to the very concept of an open electoral system
based on free exchange of ideas.
Misuse of tax dollars.

Opponents also view public

subvention of campaigns as a misuse of tax dollars, as a raid on
the public treasury.

With finite tax dollars, money allocated

for campaigns cannot be used for more appropriate governmental
programs such as veterans benefits, defense, health or other
fundamental public programs.

The experience of two hundred

years suggests that political campaigns can operate successfully
in the private sector whereas many other social and public
programs cannot be self financing.
misdirects public funds.

Public campaign financing

Political campaigns should remain

self-sufficient and should not siphon off scarce public
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resources for the purpose of advancing individual political
careers.
Violating voter choice.

If tax dollars are used for the

full range of qualified candidates, however defined other than
by the market place, the tax payer runs the risk that his/her
tax dollar will be used to support a candidate whose policy
positions are personally repugnant. Like the electoral process,
the campaign funding process should center around individual,
private decisions not governmentality structured or imposed
alternatives.

If people want to contribute to a political

party, action group or candidate, they obviously are free to do
so and have many opportunities to provide such financial
support.

When the government defines who is or is not qualified

to receive public funding, tax payers become simply the
source of funds not the determiners of contributions.

Under

such a scheme, tax dollars will be allocated contrary to
personal preferences of individual tax payers.
A decrease in the competitiveness of elections.
amount of

Unless the

public funds is unlimited, or at least extensive

enough to reach the point of marginal productive return on
dollars spent, any governmental policy that constrains what
challengers spend actually makes for less competitive elections.
Public funding legislation is frequently labeled an
protectionist act.

incum~ents'

Incumbents enjoy many perks and privileges of
14
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office holding (name recognition, news coverage, office, etc.)
that are effective resources in re-election campaigns.

For

challengers to overcome these built-in advantages, it is often
necessary to outspend the incumbent just to reach parity.
Spending limits attached to public funding often work to the
disadvantage of the challenger and thereby decrease rather than
increase the competitiveness of elections.
Waste and higher costs.

Providing public funds for

campaigns will open the flood gates for candidates--especially
for marginal or fringe candidates. Public money will go to non
competitive parties and candidates that use the campaign
process as a forum for advancing their organization's cause but
with little serious hope of electoral victory.
Not only will non-serious candidates spend the maximum
public money provided, but even serious candidates will be
encouraged, simply by its presence, to spend whatever public
money they have--regardless of how much they actually need. Thus,
the presence of a public trough will encourage indulgence and
excess, more expense and waste.
A change in institutional balances.

If government monies

are made available to individual candidates, "personal" campaigns
in which every candidate becomes an independent entrepreneur
will flourish. Personal campaigns raise practical issuep of
accountability and institutional stability.

15
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if public funds go to political parties, the infusion of tax
dollars is likely to change the nature of the American party
system.

The nationalization and centralization of parties will

occur if money is channeled through the national party
committees; £actualization and institutional independence will
result if funds are distributed to state and local party units.
If third parties are funded, public funds will be ,the vehicle for
the development of a multi-party system; if third and minor
parties are excluded, the means for institutionalizing opposition
and managing peaceful change are diminished.

Thus on a number

of important dimensions the introduction of public funds is
likely to change the current balance of forces in the campaign
and election system in unknown ways with unpredictable consequences.
Depressing citizen involvement.

If the government provides

funds for campaigns, there is little incentive for individual
citizens to contribute to their preferred party or candidates.
Similarly, if candidates have government funding with which to
organize and staff a campaign, the need for volunteer workers and
the opportunities for direct citizen campaign participation is
reduced.

Hence, public subsidies work against the goals of

participatory democracy that require the electorate to take an
active and meaningful role in the campaign process.
Ignoring public opinion.

Opponents argue that public
16

Jones, R.S.

funding is the brain child of certain special interests and
small minorities who feel they are not able to compete successfully in the current electoral system.

There is no ground

swell of public opinion or widespread grass roots effort to
implement public funding.

In fact, opponents provide document-

ation of the absence of support for public funding among the
mass electorate. Opponents reason that if public financing is as
meritorious as proponents suggest, the public would express
interest in and support for adopting such a program.

Absent

public support, public funding should not be enacted.
The proponents of public funding couch their support in
terms of intervention to enhance fundamental principles of
democratic elections: greater equity among candidates, more
1

inclusive representation of interests, enhanced quality and
quantity of competitive campaigns, and greater citizen involvement.

They view protection of the integrity and viability of the

electoral system as the lawful task of government.

Opponents

similarly argue in favor of these same principles but contend
that public campaign financing reduces electoral competition,
interest representation and citizen participation; diminishes the
quality of campaigns; and inherently biases the system in favor
of the status quo.

In addition, they view public campaign

financing as an inappropriate and inefficient use of

ta~

dollars

and a perversion of the traditional American electoral and

17
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economic systems.
These general arguments for and against public campaign
financing are complemented by arguments that focus on specific
legislative proposals and policies.

The federal Presidential

Campaign Fund has been the most visible U.S. program and, with
fifteen year experience, it has·been instructive to state and
local policy makers contemplating changes in campaign finance
legislation.

A few states have followed closely the federal

model but most have developed distinct programs that further
direct the attentions of proponents and opponents to the unique
features of each particular program.
Program Alternatives and Variations
In formulating proposals and policies for public campaign
funding, political policy makers, regardless of political level
(federal, state or local), role (executive or legislator) or unit
(partisan organizations, citizen groups)

must confront basic

questions about how best to structure a public funding program.
Program differences result from the way key questions are
answered: Which offices should be funded?

Which elections? Who

will receive the money? How do they qualify?
allocated and under what conditions?
enforce the law?
come f rorn?

How should money be

Who will administer and

How much money is involved and where will it

These questions provide a useful focus with. which to

begin a description of the U.S. experience with public campaign

18
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financing.

Answers to these particular questions effectively

determine both the framework of various public funding programs,
and the impact these programs have on the campaign and election
process.
Which offices to fund?

The decision to fund one office, a

dozen, or all elected offices determines the scope of a public
financing program, both in terms of how extensively it penetrates
the electoral process and how comprehensive the funding can be.
If only one office is funded, as with the Presidency on the
nation level or the governor in Michigan and New Jersey, resources and attention are narrowly focused and funding can be
reasonably comprehensive.

On the other hand, a public funding

program that extends to statewide candidates, as in Massachusetts
and Montana, or encompasses the entire legislature, as in
Minnesota or Wisconsin, may spread limited resources thinner and
thus play a less central role in the financing process.

A

program such as Hawaii's which extends public funding to a wide
range of elected offices (mayor, school board, tourist commission, etc.) in theory casts an all encompassing net, but in
practice, it can at best be expected to have limited impact on
altering existing patterns of campaign financing. Pragmatically,
reformers must choose between providing more money to fewer races
or less funding to many races. The reformers ideal has ·tended to
be to fund as many elections as possible.

19
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be made that limited coverage creates stronger programs, opponents tend to seek to limit both the number and extent of
funded campaigns.
Which elections to fund?

Whether public funding is concen-

trated on the general election or extends to primary elections
also helps define the scope of the program. The theoretical
argument for primary campaign funding is a powerful one: many
elections are in fact decided in the primary.

In one-party

dominant areas, the only meaningful choice presented to the
voters is within the party primary.

If primaries were to be

included in the comprehensive public funding program, in some ten
percent of the Congressional elections and up to 25 or 30 percent
of some state legislative races, where there currently is no
competition, the expectation! is that new candidacies would emerge
to create a more competitive campaign.
If the arguments in favor of public funding have merit, then
significant primaries would seem as worthy of funding as are
meaningful general elections.

Yet, the practical arguments

against funding primaries are persuasive.

Primary financing may

more than double the "cost" to the public fund because each
party may have several candidates vying for the same office.
Politically, incumbents will have to enact legislation and few
are secure enough, or altruistic enough, about their electoral
future to encourage opposition--let alone opposition in their
20
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own party primary.

Political party officials generally resist

efforts to fund primary elections because they see it as
potentially divisive.

If funds are available to encourage

intra-party factions, public funding could inadvertently lead to
greater party factionalism.

These arguments not withstanding,

the Presidential Election Campaign Fund provides money for both
primary and general election candidates as do the New Jersey and
Michigan gubernatorial programs and the Hawaii, Florida, and
Massachusetts state-wide programs.

It is noteworthy that the

three local-level public financing programs (Sacramento County,
Ca.; Seattle, Wa.; and Tucson, Az.) provide funding for both
primary and general elections.

The general rule, at the state

level, however, is to allocate~ public funds for general
election use only.
Fund Parties or Candidates?

Most experience with public

campaign financing has been in Europe where the emphasis is on
funding political parties.

Although the U.S. has a long history

of partisan elections, the American electoral system has gone
through a period that has been largely candidate centered, with
parties playing a diminished role in organizing individual
campaigns. Whether or not the subsequent increase in party
activity continues, debate over whether to fund parties or
candidates turns on the perceived value and role of political
parties.

Those who feel political parties are essential to the
21
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success of twentieth century participatory democracy view public
funding as a way to revitalize party organizations and strengthen
them as agents of representation and accountability vis-a-vis
the presentation of candidates for public office.

In contrast,

others recall the long history of corrupt party machines and
political bosses and resist any effort to increase the power of
political parties in the electoral process.

Nevertheless, to

date, twelve states out of 23 with some public funding program
have designed programs that allocate funds exclusively to party
organizations.
The alternative to party funding is candidate funding.

In

addition to satisfying the concerns of "weak parties" advocates,
the funding of individual candidates is championed as a vehicle
to enable "outsiders" to break in to the system.

With public

funding available to candidates, individuals do not have to work
their way up through the party ranks, become aligned with particular powers within the party, or establish a dependence on or
obligation to party leaders or other sources of special interest
support in order to wage a successful campaign.

Therefore, in-

dividual opportunity is enhanced and general interest representation can be maximized under individual candidate funding.
However, when the individual candidate becomes the focus of
election campaigning, institutional accountability and governmental coalition building may be jeopardized.
22
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ing with the programmatic concerns of a persistent party organization, individually funded candidates may become private
entrepreneurs, free to pick and choose allies and policy
positions at will.

These concerns notwithstanding, nine

states~.

have opted to fund individual candidates rather than politic~
parties.
With the exception of North Carolina and Oklahoma, states
have opted to fund
funded both.

either parties or candidates' but have not

Local governmental entities have chosen to fund

candidates, not parties. Finally, the Federal presidential
program strikes something of a balance in that primary and
general election support goes directly to individual candidates
but each major party is given funds ($8.9 million in 1988) to
finance the national nominating conventions.
Eligibility for Public Funds. Efficient use of public monies

is a goal shared by both advocates and opponents of public
funding.

The specification of eligibility for public monies has

become one way to guard against the capricious use of public
funds. Establishing eligibility for use of campaign funds,
however, requires a delicate balancing of goals. On the one hand,
criteria must be established to protect the public funding
program from unrealistic and excessive demands as well as from
the onslaught of hordes of frivolous candidates.

On the other

hand, the desire for free exchange of ideas and meaningful
23
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electoral choice requires that legitimate candidates and parties,
even those with unpopular or unconventional messages, have a fair
chance to compete.

The more open the system (i.e., the easier it

is to qualify) the greater the number of parties and candidates
expected to call upon public funds and the more costly the
program.

Conversely, the more rigorous the qualification

criteria, the more limited the number of groups and candidates
eligible to receive public funding and the less likely the
achievement of some stated goals.
The presidential campaign fund has three well known sets of
qualification requirements: one for primary candidates, one for
political party convention funding and a third for general
election funding.

To qualify for funding in the primaries,

candidates must formally declare their intent to contest the
presidential nomination, and they then must raise $5,000 in
twenty or more states in individual contributions that do not
exceed $250.

Once this initial $100,000 is raised, candidates

remain eligible for public funds as long as they receive at
least 10% of the primary vote in two consecutive primaries in
which they run.
Major political parties automatically qualify for public
funding for national nominating conventions; minor and third
parties receive convention subventions based on the proportion
of votes their candidate received in the past election.
24
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Finally, the nominees of the major political parties are, by
definition, eligible to receive public funds for the general
election campaign.

Minor party candidates and independents

receive a proportion of full funding based on past election
returns or they may qualify for retroactive funding by obtaining at least five percent of the vote in the current election.
States that allocate public funds to political parties
generally employ the standard statutory requirements for a
"political party" to gain access to the ballot as the criterion
r·····-. .

/on

~or

qualification for public funds.

Thus, in Iowa, Maine,

Idaho, North Carolina, and Rhode Island, state party organizations that qualify to field candidates on the state ballot and
voluntarily agree to take public funds automatically receive
public funding. In Utah, Kentucky

and Oregon, county as well as

state party organizations are qualified recipients of public
funds.

Unlike the federal criteria for national party accep-

tance of public funds, no state program ties acceptance of
~·-·······~·······-·-~··-·-~·····~·-····~~·····-~-••...
public financing to overall ceilings or limits on the amotlnt that
parties may spend in the course of··~·;;··;].";;<;l:Tcnr campaign.
States and lo;;~i~;:;;;t_~~.,.,Enat al locate funds to individual
candidates follow the presidential primary funding model in that
agreement to comply with mandated contribution and expenditure
reporting or disclosure regulations must be a matter of .public
record before funds may be obtained.
25
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amount of money must be raised prior to receiving public funds.
Ideally, this financial "threshold" is low enough to include all
candidates whose campaigns will enhance the competitive nature
of the electoral process but high enough to eliminate non-serious
candidates lacking visible public support.

For example, the

Michigan and New Jersey programs require that gubernatorial
candidates seeking public funds in the primary raise $50,000
under specific guidelines similar to those of the presidential
program before receiving any public money.

Once the major

parties' gubernatorial nominees in these two states are selected,
they automatically qualify for public funds.

Minnesota and

Wisconsin legislative and statewide candidates also qualify for
public funding once they are certified as the candidates of their
respective parties for the general election and sign the
appropriate agreement forms. Whether statutory definition,
financial threshold or electoral status is used, every public
funding state sets clear eligibility requirements as well as
specific rules for public funding. Only Montana and Massachusetts
do not tie individual candidates' receipt of state funds to
direct campaign expenditure limits, and in each case, the total
amount of "public" money involved is exceedingly small.
Formula for Allocation.

Once the qualification criteria are

established, there must be some agreement on a formula for
allocating money to all qualified applicants. Generally funds are
26
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allocated to political parties at some predetermined flat rate
as in the federal program, or based on a proportion of past
votes (as in North Carolina and Rhode Island) or in accord with
specific partisan designations indicated during the collection
process (as in Iowa, Idaho, and Kentucky).
The most popular options for funding individual candidates
are the use of a "matching" formula or a flat grant of a predetermined sum.

For example, the formula for Presidential

primary candidate funding is a dollar-for-dollar match for
individual contributions up to $250 per contributions, but the
candidate's total share of public funds cannot exceed 50 percent
of the national spending limit for the primary campaign ($ 22.2
million in 1988). In the general election campaign, the
Presidential candidates of the major parties receive a flat grant

($ 44.5 million in 1988 based on the original formula of 20
million plus COLA).
The Michigan gubernatorial program is much like the presidential program (dollar-for-dollar match in the primary and a flat
grant in the general) whereas the New Jersey and Massachusetts
programs specify public funding based on matching formulae in
both the primary and general elections. Minnesota has a dual
allocation system whereby qualified candidates automatically
receive a pre-determined amount of public funds when
their party's primary nomination.
27
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5% of the vote for a statewide office (or 10% for a state
legislative) in the general election, a further public allocation is made.

In

Wisconsin, qualified candidates receive pro

rated flat grants only for the general election campaign but
they must agree to accept expenditure limits in both the primary
and general election.

The qualification and allocation proce-

dures are closely related and both have become sources for legal
challenges and partisan conflict because each specific arrangement carries potential if not actual bias in terms of how public
funds may alter traditional funding patterns.
Administration and Enforcement.

With many features of

public funding programs subject to interpretation, challenge and
debate, legislative provisions for the administration and
enforcement of new financing policies are central to the impact
public financing has on campaigns and elections. ·Campaign
finance reformers argue that unless the infrastructure for
administration and enforcement is carefully designed and fully
supported, the intent of new policies will be negated.

Hence

they argue for well funded, independent agencies with full
administrative capacities, law enforcement powers, and strong
leadership.

Conversely, opponents of campaign finance reforms

see the creation of a campaign finance bureaucracy as unnecessary
and the designation of a campaign finance "czar" as dangerous.
Opponents thus often suggest that established governmental
28
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agencies are sufficient to insure that the laws are faithfully
executed.

At both the

st~te

and federal level, the physical

control over and transfer of public campaign monies usually
remains in the revenue or treasury department which allocates
funds upon certification by the designated administrative agency.
Hence controversies over administration/enforcement are shaped,
not ·by concerns for fiscal management but rather by political
and partisan goals and preferences.
The two key policy decisions involve who will be in charge
and what can they do.

As a general rule, programs that allocate

monies to candidates require more extensive administrative
infrastructure than programs that allocate money to parties; and
the broader the scope of the program, the greater the demands
for administrative involvement.

However, because public funding

is usually but one aspect of a broader campaign finance package,
the administrative responsibility for public funding is determined in the course of assigning institutional responsibility for
the full array of campaign finance legislation.
Policy makers generally select one of three popular models
of campaign finance administration.

The "reform model" involves

the creation of a new, independent agency whose impetus and
function is specifically related to campaign financing issues.
For example, agencies such as the Federal Election

Comm~ssion,

the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission, and the Iowa
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Campaign Finance Disclosure Commission are independent units
engaged almost exclusively in campaign finance reporting, disclosure, regulation and enforcement matters.

A second model

assigns administration of campaign financing to an already
established, but independent generic unit such as the State
Election Board (e.g., Wisconsin, North Carolina, Rhode
Island and Virginia) where public funding matters are combined
with other agency responsibilities related to elections. The
third model assigns responsibilities to subordinate divisions
within a traditional state agency--usually the Office of Elections or the Office of the Secretary of State--as in Michigan,
Alabama, and Oregon.

There may be more idiosyncratic arrange-

ments, such as those in Montana where the Commissioner of
Political Practices isecharged with overseeing campaign finance
matters or as in Utah where the assignment of campaign finance
administration is lodged in the Office of the Lt. Governor.
Political wisdom suggests that specialized independent
boards tend to be populated by bipartisan political appointees
who have set terms, operate under norms of objectivity and
public regard, and are actively involved in implementing,
monitoring and enforcing new campaign finance policies. When
responsibility is assigned to generic independent boards, the
norms of bipartisanship and objectivity prevail, but, because
campaign financing is only one dimension added to a long list of
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existing responsibilities, the approach to administration and
policy implementation is generally routine and bureaucratic.
When the administration of campaign funding falls within the
purview of elected state officials with clear patronage powers
and electoral interests, the general modis

~perandi

is to

maintain a low administrative profile and emphasize routine
procedures rather than aggressive policy implementation.
The location of institutional responsibility for administration combines with the resources allocated to the unit to
influence the overall impact of campaign finance reform. Key
resources include personnel and funds with which to administer
as well as legislative authority to enforce the law with great
rigor.

In most instances where public campaign finance has been

added to the duties of existing agencies, new staff and financial
resource allocations have not been commensurate with the added
tasks and responsibilities.

When new Commissions or Agencies

have been established, it is frequently (but not always) the case
that more attention has been given to the administrative demands
that accompany campaign finance reform.

The obvious example is

the FEC which in 1986 had a staff of 230 and a budget of $11.8
million.

No single state rivals the FEC, but the California Fair

Practices Commission in 1986 had a staff of 55 and a budget of
$3.4 million and the New Jersey Election Law Enforcement Commission had a staff of 30 and a budget of approximately $1 million.
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More common are smaller agencies such as the Minnesota Ethical
Practices Board with a staff of 6 and approximate budget of
$211,000 or the Hawaiian
Campaign Spending Commission with a staff of 4 and an $150,000
budget.
As

v.o.

Key pointed out in a 1956 discussion of administer-

ing state politics, not only "who is to do the administering
[but] those factors that condition their work once they are
chosen" is important for understanding state-level .politics. 6
Enforcement activities depend on legislative authority as well as
staff and budgetary support.

Although most perceptions of

campaign reform enforcement are shaped by publicity given to
large fines and litigation that accompany sensational cases of
corruption or financial misconduct, most enforcement activities
involve far less glamorous, behind-the-scenes attention to detail
and procedure quite distant from events that shape policy
decisions.

For example, only three-fourths of the public

funding states give campaign finance agencies the power to grant
even advisory opinions.

Fewer than half of the agencies have

the assistance of in-house legal council, and in only half a
dozen public funding states do agencies have the authority to
file independent court actions.

Prosecution for violations of

the campaign finance laws most often is the task of the.states'
attorney generals or county prosecutors.
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It is difficult to disentangle specific administrative and
enforcement proscriptions and arrangements for public funding
from the general administration and enforcement of other aspects
of campaign finance regulations. Yet both the structure and
authority provided to implement and monitor campaign financing is
important for the role public financing plays in the overall
campaign and electoral process.

It is probably not coincidental

that states with independent commissions to oversee public
financing of individual candidates tend to have the greatest
enforcement authority.
Source of Funds.

Ideally, once consensus is reached on the

desirability of a public funding program, the goal becomes
formulating the best possible program.

In practice, however,

what a program costs and how it will be funded are always basic
dimensions in policy formulation.

In fact, specific public

funding programs are most often shaped, not by first answering
fundamental questions about program scope, breadth, eligibility
or administration, and then determining how much is needed to
fund such a program but rather the process is reversed. First a
funding mechanism is agreed upon, then an estimate of projected
revenue is made and finally the policy is structured to fit
within specified funding constraints.

Advocates of public

funding argue that public financing can be successful
is adequately (read "well") funded.
33
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if they lose the initial battle over enacting public financing
they can stil.l effectively win the war by keeping program funding
at a minimum.

Hence, campaign finance reformers seek full

funding programs with independent institutionalized administration and rigorous enforcement, even if they must sacrifice the
scope or breadth of public financing.

Opponents, on the other

hand, seek to keep the program at a minimal level, either through
limiting how much money will be available 9r by specifying that
it must be spread over a large number of off ices and campaigns
thereby reducing the overall impact limited public resources
might have.

In addition, they often seek to limit funds for ad-

ministration and enforcement.

Therefore, decisions on how to

obtain funds for various programs are fraught with conflicts
involving theoretical ideals, budgetary constraints, and

politi~

cal considerations.
The four recognized alternatives for funding public
financing programs are the voucher system, direct legislative
appropriation, voluntary tax add-ons and the income tax
check-off.

The voucher system is advocated by those who fear

that alternative funding programs either will not provide enough
money or will involve inherent biases that conflict with basic
precepts of an open participatory electoral system.

Voucher

proposals vary considerably in detail but basically invplve tax
payers earmarking a portion of their owed income tax for politi34
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cal campaign support.

In return, the taxpayer receives a

voucher statement or script that can be given to his or her
preferred candidate or party. The candidate or party then
redeems the voucher at its predetermined face value.
One presumed benefit of a voucher plan is that, although it
uses tax dollars, the decision about who to fund remains with
the individual voter.

It is also assumed that the opportunity

to make a "free" contribution will serve as an incentive for
voters to become more actively involved financing campaigns.

A

criticism of voucher plans is that an extensive administrative
apparatus is required to verify a voucher request, issue the
voucher and ultimately process it once the party or candidate
cashes it in.

One estimate was that it would cost $40 million to

distribute $180 million under a federal voucher system. 7

More-

over, taxpayers may request a voucher but not follow through with
allocating it thereby wasting the bureaucratic effort required to
verify and issue the voucher.

A second significant concern about

vouchers is raised by critics who argue that the opportunity to
obtain free-floating vouchers invites heavy-handed solicitations,
vacuous appeals to unwary tax payers and even outright corruption
and deceit in obtaining vouchers.
The critics of voucher plans seemingly have been persuasive
in presenting their arguments; no public campaign

finan~e

program currently is funded through vouchers. The state of
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Alaska, however, has experimented with a reverse voucher plan.
Under this program, taxpayers make independent, personal political contributions and then declare the contribution for a refund
when they file their tax returns.

Taxpayers are eligible for a

cash refund equal to the political contribution but not to exceed
$100. Although it appears to be relatively straight forward, the
program has not been without difficulties and no other state has
adopted a comparable plan.
Funds for public campaign financing can, of course, simply
be appropriated directly by the Legislature as are funds for all
other public programs.

The attractive feature of direct appro-

priations funding is that the procedures are already in place
and familiar to everyone; no additional bureaucracy or special
education or publicity programs are needed. The drawback of the
simple appropriation system is that it is highly political and
makes the public funding program vulnerable to intense political
pressures.

Because campaign funding is viewed as central to

personal as well as partisan electoral success, advocates of
public campaign financing fear that programs dependent on
legislative appropriations will be political footballs during
each legislative appropriations battle.

The uncertainty and

continued politicalization this creates would threaten the integrity and stability of the program.

Legislators, on the other

hand, resist using the regular appropriations process to provide
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funds for campaigns for personal political reasons.

When

pressures are great to fund established programs such as education, health care and public safety, .casting legislative votes
-~~

to allocate funds for campaigns appears at best self-serving.
Only the state of Florida, the city of Tucson, Arizona and
Sacramento County, California have programs that rely solely on
direct legislative appropriations.

The New Jersey statute

stipulates that if the campaign fund is deficient, the legislature may appropriate funds equal to the shortfall.

More common

than provisions to make direct appropriations, however, are
prohibitions, similar to those found in the federal legislation
against direct legislative appropriation to supplement or enhance
the campaign fund.

0

In contrast to direct legislative appropriation is funding
that involves no tax dollars but relies solely on voluntary "addon" contributions that are collected by the state at the time

taxpayers file their income tax. In large part, programs that
rely on taxpayers adding a political contribution when they
write a check to cover their state tax liability are only
marginally "public funding" programs.

These "add-on" programs

are more accurately categorized as indirect governmental
assistance (rather than public funding) since the state simply
permits the state tax process to be used as a vehicle for
personal contributing and no tax dollars are involved.
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add on programs depend on taxpayer's willingness to increase
their tax liability or reduce their tax refund by $1, $2, $5, or
more dollars, the amount of funds available to fund campaigns is
always very limited.
Add-on programs are included in discussions of public
funding, however, because they frequently are the result of
legislative stalemates over public funding.

Opponents of public

funding see add-on programs as a reasonable compromise: state
resources are used to encourage private contributions but no tax
dollars are involved.

Advocates of public funding argue that to

rely solely on voluntary tax add-ons as the source of funds is
to engage in symbolic politics -- appearing to create a program
that meets the goals associated with public funding while at the
same time ensuring that the program will be ineffective because
it is not adequately funded. Six states ( Alabama, California,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, and Virginia)

legislated add-on

systems as the means by which to facilitate the financing
of political campaigns, Iowa has included an add-on option to
supplement the original income check-off system used to provide
funds for campaigns and Montana and Oregon switched to an add-on
after initial experiences with tax check off systems.
The income tax check-off is by far the most popular means of
providing money for public campaign financing.

Unlike the

add-on programs, the check-off provides a means by which tax
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payers can earmark a small portion of their tax liability to be
used for campaign purposes.

The check-off has been used to

secure funds for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund as well
to finance the public funding programs of fourteen states.
Proponents of the income check-off see it as a means through
which public funds can be allocated for legitimate campaigning
while at the same time enhancing the concept of individual and
voluntary contributing.

Critics resist the use of any tax

monies, however collected, for campaign purposes but view the
check-off as less repugnant than direct appropriations.

Use of

the check-off is voluntary and only the amount of money equal to
citizen designations is transferred from the State's general
fund.

If a large number of taxpayers choose to use the check-

off, considerable amounts will be available for campaigns; if few
taxpayers use the check-off, more tax dollars stay in the general
fund.

Check-off systems vary somewhat in actual implementation.

Most permit each taxpayer to earmark a single do)lar.

~two

?n,a

joint return) for campaign funding although Hawaii, Kentucky,
Michigan, Minnesota and Rhode Island permit a check-off designation of $2 per taxpayer ($4 on a joint return).

Many of the

states that fund political parties list all eligible parties and
permit taxpayers to designate which one should receive their tax
dollars; others have a general fund check-off that is allocated
to the parties according to some per-vote or registration Jones,
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formula.
The tax check-off is the most popular means of raising money
for campaign financing whereas the seemingly attractive voucher
plans have been almost totally ignored.

The political nature

of direct legislative appropriations has diminished support for
dependence on the appropriation process whereas add-on systems,
generally viewed as unsatisfactory by both opponents and
proponents of public funding, are primarily symbolic.

Numerous

alternative quasi-public funding programs have been suggested
such as Indiana's kickback of county license fee profits to the
party in power and an equal division to the two major parties of
the revenues gained from the sale of vanity license plates or the
practice in Florida where the political parties receive the
profits from candidate's filing fees.

However, these schemes

generally have been viewed as remnants of machine, partisan
politics rather than reforms of modern campaign financing.
Specification of Constraints.

No matter how }egislators

resolve questions of structure and funding of campaign finance
programs, all share a desire to specify the use and abuse of
public funds.

Obviously, the expectation is that public funds

will be used in lawful ways for legitimate campaign purposes.
Hence programs require strict accounting procedures, detailed
record keeping and public disclosure.

Parties or candidates

accepting public funds must identify who is responsible for the
40
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funds, designate bank accounts specifically for public funds
and/or sign documents in which they agree to abide by all regulations that accompany access to and use of public funds.

No

legislature issues a blank check with which to fund campaigns.
This basic commonality not withstanding, there is variation
in the specification of how funds are to be used.

Some programs

narrowly limit the acceptable uses for public monies.

Rhode

Island, for example, specifies that no public monies can be
spent on political communication whereas the New Jersey program
identifies spending on communication as the only legitimate use
for public funds.

The North Carolina program requires that a

specific portion of the check-off money raised each year must be
put aside for use during a Presidential election year whereas the
'remainder is divided according to whether it is an off year or an
election year.

Kentucky parties must use check-off funds for

maintaining party headquarters or supporting the parties' general
election candidates but cannot make direct contribution to
candidates whereas the North Carolina law specifies allocation to
candidates for particular offices.

Other programs follow the

Federal model with a generic "qualified election expense " or
"legitimate campaign purposes" proscription for the use of
public funds. Although the particular constraints written in to
each law are important for the impact that the public tunding
program can have, for the purposes of an overview of programs,
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they are primarily noteworthy as examples of the latitude policy
makers have in shaping public funding programs.
In spite of the range of alternatives available for
structuring public funding programs, it remains true that the
fundamental goal of campaign finance reformers is to establish
programs that will enhance the participatory democratic system of
competitive elections that is central to the maintenance,
stability and success of American politics.
Lessons From Experience
We now have fifteen years experience with public funding in
the U.S.

It is reasonable for those contemplating campaign

finance legislation to seek instruction and enlightenment from
the diverse set of experiences at the federal, state and local
level.

What ,has been the impact of public funding?

ful has it been?

Which program is best?

How success-

Which programs seemed

to have worked?
It is difficult to answer the question of which program is
best because what is "best" depends on the goals and values of
those asking the question.

Similarly, how successful a program

is judged to be is a function of what one hoped it would accomplish. The question of impact, on the other hand, is less
dependent on prescriptive or normative judgments and more amenable to empirical inquiry.
Unfortunately, our research, individually and collectively,
42

Jones,

R.s.

has not reached the stage where we can provide concise, direct
and comprehensive answers to questions of impact.

In part, the

constraint on our ability to respond satisfactorily to questions
of impact is a mundane methodological fact: there.is no equivalent of the FEC at the state and local level to serve as a
repository of campaign finance data.

Thus the task of collecting

basic data from 23 different states is one of enormous proportions.

Even more, there is no uniform system of reporting across

those states, and the unique features of each state system make
development of a database for comparative analysis impossible.
It is also true that public funding programs are enacted along
with a host of related campaign financing measures, and the
interrelationships among the various dimensions of reform make it
difficult to isolate any singular impact of public funding.

And

most significant for analyzing impact, we have little baseline
data from which to measure change, and we cannot engage in social
engineering to create controlled experiments as a substitute.
Thus, we must be extremely cautious about inferring that change
has occurred and about attributing it to the presence of public
funding.

The absence of a database that will permit extensive

systematic comparison limits our ability to generalize about the
desirability, success or impact of the programs we have observed
and studied.
Nevertheless, although we cannot at this time provide the
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documentation we hope ultimately to provide, we are prepared to
make a few general statements based on our observation and
preliminary synthesis of the data we have assembled.
The first is that public funding programs have been neither
the cure of all evils the reformers promised nor the deathknell
of free and competitive elections the opponents predicted.

The

reformers expected too much; the opponents did not recognize the
core stability of our electoral processes and the incremental
nature of institutional change.
Second, the experience of each program have been somewhat
different because the programs are sometimes very different or
are implemented in particular political cultures and environment
that are dissimilar.

In every case, however, it is safe to say

that not all intended change has occurred but some unintended
change has.

Similarly, it is possible to identify impacts that

are a direct result of public funded and changes that are
indirect results of the public funding program.

For example, the

original Oregon program funding state and country political
parties.

Democratic party leaders sought to use the funds, as

intended, for party building activities.

However, a handful of

legislators wanted funds allocated to their individual campaigns.
Although the intended result of strengthening party organization
did occur, an unintended consequence was dissatisfaction among
the legislative delegation.

The indirect consequence was that

44

Jones, R.S.

during a sunset review Democratic legislators helped kill the
public funding program that Democratic leadership had fostered.
Another general observation is that both the advocates and
the critics of public funding frequently lose sight of the fact
that public funding is generally part of a larger package of
campaign finance reform.

Credit or blame is often laid at the

feet of the public funding program when it more appropriately
should be assigned to the totality of the reform package or some
specific dimension of the package other than public funding.

For

example, complaints about the "bureaucracy" created to administer
public funding are largely complaints about the formal organization, regulations and administrative activities accompanying
campaign reporting and disclosure which exist in non-public
funding states and locales as well.
Demand for campaign finance reform has usually been triggered by scandal and by exceedingly high election campaign costs.
Public funding is proposed and often initially viewed as a
radical experiment that represents a sharp break with traditional
ways of doing things.

Once implemented and permitted to operate

for a reasonable period of time,

candidates and rank and file

citizens--even newspaper editors and citizen activists--come to
terms with the program, and fine tuning to improve rather than
attacking to destroy becomes the focus of critical
activity.

poli~ical

States go through a maturation process vis-a-vis
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public funding, but once the program has stood the test of time,
the general rules of incremental policy making that characterize
other public programs come into play.

As public policy it is not

nearly as dramatic or unique as feared.
The post-Watergate rush toward public funding is over.

Yet

public financing continues to be a part of the game plan of many
political activists and policy makers and remains, albeit not
always at the top, on the agenda of a great many legislative
bodies.

Like other controversial policies, public funding is

susceptible to the vagaries of political winds and its short-term
fate is not always predictable.

Sometimes, a legislative body

will give serious consideration to public funding year after year
without ever enacting a program.

At the other extreme, a state

that has little "serious" public funding history suddenly may
pass effective legislation.
The sense one gets is that neither proponents nor opponents
have done a very good job of explaining public funding as concept
or as a political strategy to rank and file voters.

A

Surveys

have repeatedly shown that the majority of Americans are disturbed about the sky-rocketing cost of elections at all levels,
and by the appearance of "bought" elections.
see some corrective measures put in place.

They would like to
Yet, for both

philosophical and practical (economic) reasons, there is resistance to funding politicians from tax dollars.
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the average voter to understand how the Buckley decision shapes
our choices for addressing these problems.

And so public

funding--as a concept and as a policy -- is a difficult one for
rank and file citizens to place in the context of what they want
done and what can be done.
A few efforts have been made by different jurisdictions to
send out press releases and to encourage support and involvement·
by citizen groups such as the League of Women Voters or the
Association of Tax Accountants, but these efforts have been too
limited and too sporadic.

The ethos of fairness and equity that

public funding embodies lends itself to creating citizen expectations that candidates will play by the "rules" that make for the
fairest game.

When the public lacks information and understand-

ing, it is easier for candidates to ignore these norms because
there is no visible set of citizen expectations that puts the
candidate at risk if he or she ignores them.
These fifteen years of experience have also identified
loopholes and pit falls in different configurations of public
funding programs.

For example, we learned from the Minnesota

experience that when the expenditure limits were set low and the
amount of money available to gubernatorial candidates was
modest, the public funding program was not attractive to the
better-funded candidate and the lesser-funded candidate .was
disadvantaged because there was no remedy or release mechanism
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being but one--to address concerns about escalating cost of
elections and the dominance of money in the campaign process.
Perhaps the most interesting current activities are those at the
state and local level.

There governments have shown a willing-

ness to experiment; to back-off when things go amiss; to modify
when change is in order, and, through fine-tuning. maintain
policies that appear to be addressing satisfactorily the issues
they were design to confront.

It may well be, when historians

review the changes in campaign financing that occurred in the
last quarter of the twentieth century, the most effective and
long-lasting attempts to deal with the issues surrounding money
in political campaigns will have occurred at the state and local,
not the federal, level.

The willingness and ability of state

governments to tailor specific campaign finance policies to fit
unique state needs is indeed testimony to the continued viability
of our federal system of government.
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Remarks of Robert M. Stern to the State of New York
Commission on Government Integrity
It is a pleasure to be able to share my ideas with you. Although I am
most familiar with the campaign finance problems in California and the
laws of 50 city and county jurisdictions which have adopted a variety of
campaign reform laws, I believe that California's experiences are not
unique.
First, I will describe the problems as I see them, then I will discuss
the potential solutions. Finally, I will suggest some remedies that should
be used to enforce any campaign finance or ethics laws.
Three basic problems need to be solved by any campaign reform
proposal: excessive spending, incumbent advantage and the influence of
money on the governmental or legislative process.
First, excessive spending. I was unable to obtain spending figures
for New York state races, out I assume that spending in New York
parallels experiences elsewhere. For example, campaign expenditures for
100 legislative races in California has risen from $1.4 million in 1958 to $57
million in 1986, a 4000% increase. Even if inflation is factored in, the
increase is nearly 1000%. And the California Commission on Campaign
Financing predicts that if nothing is done to change this trend, the 1990
legislative races will cost $100 million. Million dollar contests are now the
norm in any competitive election for the California state legislature. In a
recent special State Senatorial election in Los Angeles--a district of 600,000
persons--almost $3 million was spent by the two competing candidates.
You may not have had the same explosion in spending in New York.
But I would predict that most people believe that too much money is being
spent on both legislative races and statewide contests.

2

Why is so much money being spent? I think the main reason is fear:
fear of being outspent and fear of losing the office or the party's position in
the legislature. In addition, the legislative leadership of both parties fear
the loss of their power.
A former legislator told us why it costs so much money to run for
office. He told us that it would cost him $500,000 to run for the legislature.
When asked why, he responded: "Because that is how much my opponent
would spend." When asked about the impact of an expenditure limit of
$250,000, he expressed relief, saying that amount would be plenty of money
to get his message out to the voters.
Another factor affecting spending is that much of the money goes for
expenses which never reach the voters. Campaign expenditures may not
made for personal purposes, but the definition of personal use of campaign
funds is very liberal. And I know that this is a problem in a number of
states.
Incumbents are using campaign funds for non-campaign purposes.
Some examples include: payment for a vehicle, rent of apartments in the
state capitol, gifts, tickets to football or basketball games, charitable
donations, lavish dinners, travel to other states or foreign countries. Let
me emphasize that none of this is illegal. But is it a proper use of campaign
contributions which are given to candidates presumably for the purpose of
convincing the voters to elect them?
What are the consequences of excessive spending? The high cost of
campaigning keeps talented newcomers from running for legislative office.
The number of candidates running for office has declined, particularly the
number of challengers. Furthermore, candidates are forced to spend more
and more time raising money. Finally, there is the temptation to receive
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huge contributions from those who have legislation pending, thus giving
the impression that the legislative process is influenced by campaign
money.
The second problem with our system is incumbent advantage.
Incumbents are now able to outspend their challengers by enormous ratios.
In 1976, legislative incumbents in California outspent their opponents for
State Assembly races by a ratio of 3 to 1. By 1986, this had increased ten fold
to 30 to 1. And in the State Senate, the spread was 62 to 1.
In addition, incumbents are raising enormous sums in the nonelection years. In 1985, California legislative incumbents raised $1 7
million--even though some of them were retiring and others would not be
faced with any meaningful opponents in 1986. One state senator wrote a
letter to his contributors saying that he wanted $500 ,000 in his account by
the end of the year (a non-election year) so that he could scare away any
serious opponents in either the primary or the general election. In 1985,
while incumbents were collecting their $1 7 million, all challengers raised
less than $100,000.
What are the consequences of this tremendous disparity between
incumbents and challengers? In 1986, for the first time in 34 years,every
single incumbent running for re-election in the California legislature won.
Not a single challenger was able to oust an incumbent legislator.
Finally, there is a widespread perception that campaign money buys
legislative votes or at least legislative influence. One reporter stated:
"Thoroughly institutionalized corruption permeates the current system of
politics and government because of the skyrocketing costs of political
campaigns." One legislator lamented: "We have widespread corr.uption.
We have had the purchasing of votes with campaign contributions. I think
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that's reprehensible."

My colleague, Professor Jones has commented:

"Saying the cascade of special interest contributions only buys access is a
most charitable interpretation. No one that I know of give money, energy or
time into the system without some kind of reward."
Professor Dan Lowenstein at UCLA Law School argues that giving
campaign money to influence legislation or even to gain access to a
legislator's time is bribery. However, his theory has not been tested in court
since no one has been charged with the crime of making campaign
contributions in return for access or influencing legislation.
Now let's turn to the possible solutions. There are three potential
solutions. The easiest answer is to do nothing. Let campaign disclosure
bring sunshine onto the situation. If the voters don't like what they see,
they will vote against the candidates or the incumbents. That is what we
have in California. Only the incumbents seem to be happy with that
solution.
In fact, one of the legislative leaders told me a few years ago, "This is
a terrible campaign finance system, but we are the victors under this awful
system. The reform you are suggesting is excellent, but under your
proposal we may become the victim. Why should we vote for a change?" I
assume that any change you suggest will be met with the same skepticism
by those who are the ones who will vote for or against any proposal.
However, in California and in many states, we can resort to the initiative
process which serves as a way to obtain reform even without legislative
approval.
In the State of New York you limit contributions. But where only
=-----------

contribution limits have been imposed, contributor influence over.
government decisions has

conti~.

-

In Congress, where there are strict
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limits, few would argue that the governmental process is not affected by
campaign money. In San Diego, which has the strictest contribution limits
in the country, the mayor has proposed additional reforms to cut down on
the influence of development campaign money on the city council.
A contribution only plan will not significantly affect the other two)
problems: excessive campaign spending and incumbent advantage. In
fact, incumbent advantage will probably be worse if they are adopted.
We know, as a matter of fact, that contributions limits by themselves
have very little impact on campaign spending. I can give you two examples
in California. Last year we had the most expensive U.S. Senate race in
California history: Alan Cranston and Ed Zschau, his Republican
challenger, spent over $22 million despite the fact that both were limited in
how much they could receive. In fact, the federal contribution limits are
far more severe than contribution limits in New York. No corporate or
labor contributions are permitted and contributors are limited to only $1000
per person per election and $5000 per PAC per election. In San Francisco,
which just lowered its contribution limits in half, from $1000 to $500, the
first candidate in San Francisco history will spend more than $1 million.
What is the solution? I believe that only a comprehensive measure 1s
the answer. I would suggest the following Model Code:
--limit expenditures in both the primary and the general elections
--ban transfers (contributions from one candidate to another)
--limit contributions to candidates
--ban non election year fundraising
--provides partial matching funds to serious candidates who are
faced with serious opponents.
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In my view expenditure limits are the most important part of this

___

proposal.
......., Many political scientists oppose expenditure limits because they
fear that such limits will benefit incumbents and harm challengers. But if
the limits are high enough, some political scientists do accept them. Thus,
if you recommend limiting expenditures, don't make the limits too low.
As you know, the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that expenditure
limitations are unconstitutional unless some form of public funds is offered
to those candidates who voluntarily agree to limit their expenditures. But
some people say that the partial public financing provisions will be the kiss
of death to any proposal. I would respectfully disagree. The people
overwhelmingly support expenditure limits and they also support
comprehensive proposals which contain partial public financing.
Sacramento County in California last year voted by a 61 % margin for such a
plan, as have the voters in the city of Tucson and the state of Rhode Island.
And I need not remind you that the Presidential system contains
essentially the same provisions and has been in operation for 12 years.
Only one Presidential candidate has declined the public money: John
Connally who received one vote at the convention. Ronald Reagan, each of
the three times he has run for office, has accepted taxpayers money.
Our plan contains some innovative features that ensure that public
money only goes to serious candidates.
Only candidates who are serious and raise a certain threshold are
eligible to receive funds. But in addition, they must be faced with a serious
opponent before anyone can receive funds. Thus, candidates in non
competitive districts probably will not receive any public funds because no
one is going to seriously challenge them in either the primary or
general election.

~he

Finally, we encourage in district fundraising by giving a
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higher match for those contributions raised from district residents. We do
not penalize, rather we reward.
Only money from a taxpayers checkoff can be used. If the taxpayers
decide not to support the plan through the income tax checkoff, candidates
get less money since the legislature may not appropriate any money from
the general fund.
One of the most important aspects of any reform concerns the
question of how the plan will be enforced. It is my belief that criminal
penalties rarely work if they are the only penalties available. Your
experiences this year are rare because most district attorneys are reluctant
to prosecute white collar crime.
So, in addition to the necessary criminal penalties, I would suggest
two additional enforcement remedies. First, I would recommend that
citizens be permitted to file civil actions against persons who violate the
laws. In California, after giving the enforcement authorities the
opportunity to file such an action, a citizen can sue and collect up to half the
penalty imposed by the court.
Second, I would urge the establishment of an independent
commission which can issue regulations and bring administrative
enforcement actions. I have worked for both an elected Secretary of State
and such an independent agency. Whenever the Secretary of State's office
filed a suit, it was charged with ulterior motives since the Secretary of State
had political ambitions. On the other hand, a bipartisan commission has
more credibility with the public. But do not pattern the structure of such a
commission after the Federal Election Commission. Congress deliberately
ensured that the FEC be as weak as possible. It has a rotating
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chairmanship and an even number of members so that it takes two thirds
of the members to make any decision.
Finally, I would like to suggest that any solution be as specific as
possible. The great majority of candidates and public officials will comply
with the laws as written if these laws are clear. But laws which are vague
or difficult to understand may be evaded unintentionally. Further, it is
extremely helpful to give a governmental agency the power to interpret
these laws through regulation and opinion. Thus, those who attempting to
comply with the rules can ask questions before they act or get into trouble.
I can't guarantee that my solution or any answer is perfect. But my
recommendation does attempt to address the problems which are affecting
both the election and governmental processes. It is a comprehensive
response to a complex set of problems which will only get worse if no
solution is adopted. I would be pleased to answer any questions or
comments you may have.
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THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND CAMPAIGN FINANCE
Stephen E. Gottlieb
Albany Law School of Union University

The first amendment analysis of campaign regulation is a very volatile
field.

The first amendment of course is nearly two hundred years old.

The

federal courts have been applying it to the states for better than half a
century.

Nevertheless at the time that Congress passed the Federal Election

Campaign Act this field was almost barren by contemporary standards.

Prior to

the passage of the F.E.C.A., enormous regulation of p'Olitical parties had been
accomplished virtually without first amendment analysis.

(See my Rebuilding

the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a Test Case, 11
Hofstra Law Review 191, 194-208, 223-237 (1982).)

By the mid 1970s, text

writers had begun to question whether parties were public rather than private
entities.
When the FECA was reviewed in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the
Court justified a complex body of law on the basis of what it might do to
alleviate the appearance of corruption.

The notion that the appearance of

evil is sufficient to override first amendment protections is hardly
consistent with belief that the amendment can carry teeth.
In the decade since Buckley the Court has virtually reversed that

neglect.

Political parties have rights of association few could have dreamed

of at the time of Buckley.
developing rapidly.

Our understanding of campaign finance has been

A corporate right to election related speech has been

expanded dramatically.

Those developments make it difficult to peg any

discussion of the first amendment treatment of election finance at the
appropriate level.
eternal.

A descriptive treatment would make existing rules seem too

A theoretical treatment might make them seem to insignificant.

The material that follows is designed to begin with those fundamental
propositions of first amendment analysis that appear reliable.
consequences in which we can place some confidence follow.

Some of the

Following are

materials that highlight some of the questions posed by the rapid developments
in this area.
The first amendment to the United States Constitution proscribes any law
"abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government fora redress of
grievances."

As ratified in 1791 the amendment related only to the activities

of the federal government.

The fourteenth amendment, however, makes the

provisions of the first amendment applicable to the activities of the states.

Robust marketplace of ideas

It is fundamental to the first amendment that there is no fixed innnutable
truth, no one position that voters may be required to accept, no officially
favored candidate or doctrine.

The public must be free to reexamine

continually its needs from the political system.

Hence any legislation which

constricts the speech process impoverishes public discourse.
2

Several fundamental conclusions follow from that proposition.
First, one cannot limit campaign speech to the candidates themselves.
do so cuts off the expression of other viewpoints.

To

Thus in FEC V. National

Conservative Political Action Committee, 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985), the Supreme
Court held that a limitation on campaign spending by a group unaffiliated with
either presidential candidate was unconstitutional.

In Buckley v. Valeo, 424

U.S. 1 (1976) the Court had reached the same conclusion for non-presidential
federal campaigns.
Second, more broadly, protection for a robust marketplace of ideas
prohibits the exclusion of independent speech from political campaigns.

In

Buckley the Court struck provisions of the federal statute which would have
prohibited all campaign expenditures by any person or group other than the
candidate, the press and the parties.

424 U.S. 39-51.

The federal statute

was subsequently amended to define an "independent expenditure" as the
spending of anything of value to aid the election or defeat of a candidate
made "without cooperation or consultation with any candidate" or agent and not
at their suggestion or "in concert" with a candidate.

2 U.S.C. 431 (17).

Such expenditures are not limited by the Act.
Third, one cannot subject speech to campaign regulations when that
speech, while relevant to campaigns, is not explicitly for or against a
candidate.

All discussion of public issues is relevant to campaigns.

The

more controversial the issue, and the more public figures have taken
positions, the greater the effect of commentary on the electoral chances of
those who have taken positions or acted on those issues.

But the Constitution

as the Court has interpreted it does not permit us to impose the financial
limitations and disclosure requirements, approved for campaign regulation, on
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speech which touches on such issues as the Bork nomination or the wars in
Central America.

Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 79-80 (1976).

See also id. at

41-44; FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 616, 623
(1986); FEC v. Central Long Island T.R.I.M., 616 F. 2d 45 (2 Cir. 1980); ACLU
v. Jennings, 366 F. Supp. 1041 (D.D.C. 1973).
The rejection of these provisions by the Court in Buckley and its progeny
are firmly rooted in fundamental first amendment principles.

The checking value in first amendment analysis

A second fundamental proposition of first amendment law is that a major
purpose of the first amendment is to prevent governmental restraint on speech
in order to cover up or prevent criticism of government itself.

Those in

power cannot arrange the process of discussion to prevent their dismissal from
office.

See generally Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory,

1977 Am. B. Found. Res. J. 521.

Equality/neutrality

Both propositions -- that the first amendment protects a robust
marketplace of ideas and that the first amendment condemns self-serving
governmental regulation of speech -- produce a major corollary: government
must treat speakers and political organizations neutrally; favoritism is
forbidden.

Police Department of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).

The

same result is achieved by the fourteenth amendment which prohibits the states
from denying ''any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
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laws."

Together the first and fourteenth amendments, intertwined in relation

to campaign finance laws, reinforce the requirements of equality under each.
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537-40 (1980);
American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767, 780 (1974); Police Department
v. Mosely, 408, 92, 94-96 (1972); Williams v. Rhodes, 23, 30-31 (1968).
A fundamental conclusion which follows from these propositions is that
the major parties can not exclude minor parties from either the campaign or
the election process.

Mandel v. Bradley, 432 U.S. 173 (1977); Storer v.

Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 742 (1974).

The first amendment protects the public in

the event that it should decide that the two major parties do not serve or
address their needs.
In Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 32 (1968), the Court wrote "There is,
of course, no reason why two parties should retain a permanent monopoly on the
right to have people vote for or against them.

Competition in ideas and

governmental policies is at the core of our electoral·· process and of the First
Amendment freedoms."

The Court reiterated that language in Buckley v. Valeo,

424 U.S. 1, 71n (1976) and Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 802 (1983).
(The preeminent example of the importance of third parties is the birth of the
Republican party -- a third party born of the failure of the Whigs and
Democrats to address slavery.

The Progressives did not survive as a national

third party but their impact on national politics was substantial.)
Thus, campaign funding legislation must treat the parties in the same
way.

Funding roughly proportional to support for the parties without

excluding third parties from the contest has been held to be acceptable.
Commensurate treatment of candidates raises particular difficulties with
respect to primaries.

The impact of funding is exaggerated where
5

contributions --

even small ones -- are used as the basis for matching funds.

Organizational independence

These fundamental first amendment principles of robust debate, vigilance
toward government and neutrality also support the independence of political
associations, including political parties, from governmental interference.
The Court has recognized that political associations promote first amendment
objectives by allowing the public to pool resources, define, negotiate and
promote common positions.

See TashJian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,

107 S. Ct. 544 (1986); Democratic Party of the United States v. Wisconsin ex
rel La Follette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975).
Political organizations are entitled to strong first amendment protection from
governmental intervention into their membership base, their organizational
structure and their decisionmaking processes.
The eventual impact of the line of cases from Cousins through Tashjian
remains to be defined.

The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth

Circuit has recently found that political parties have the right to make preprimary endorsements.

San Francisco County Democratic Central Committee v.

Eu, No. 84-1851, August 18, 1987.

These decisions call into question the

constitutionality of New York Election Law 2-126, which prohibits pre-primary
expenditures on behalf of any primary candidate.
The cases defining the right of association have concerned party
nominations.

The principles established raise questions about some aspects of

campaign finance legislation as well.

It is important to recognize that

federal campaign finance legislation has had significant effects in
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channelling public support among various organizations.

That channeling is

hard to square with the first amendment requirement of neutrality.

See

Gottlieb, Fleshing Out the Right of Association: The Problem of the
Contribution Limits of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 49 Albany Law Review
825 (1985).

The federal election laws encourage people to treat different

political organizations differently.

Thus the laws steer funds among

candidates, parties, and a variety of organizations including independent,
coordinated, corporate, labor, industrial, trans-industrial, employee, and
issue organizations.

The proposed New York City plan most obviously steers

funds between candidates and parties.
balkanization of the electorate.

I have referred to this as the

Campaign finance laws which encourage the

electorate to fractionalize necessarily make it harder for the public to unify
behind common goals.

For those reasons such balkanization of the electorate

limits the marketplace of ideas and conflicts with the first amendment.
Thus the challenge in drafting constitutional election finance
legislation is to augment and enhance the public discourse without
governmental control over what the public hears.

Limits on campaign costs

There are two different levels at which we must evaluate campaign
finance: relative and quantitative.
been discussed earlier.

The obligation of relative equality has

Quantity is equally significant.

Some restraints on

campaign finance reduce the amount that can be raised and spent on
campaigning.

Other approaches increase the amount raised and spent on

campaigning.

There are many who would like to reduce the figure. The figure
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is not incidental.

Without enough dollars candidates will not be able to get

their story to the voters, and may not even be able to achieve name
recognition let alone a responsible evaluation by the public.
of dollars may significantly affect who wins the contest.

Thus the amount

Because of that

possibility all of the basic first amendment values are implicated.
In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 US

(1976), the United States Supreme Court

approved expenditure limitations for those who accepted public funding and
approved the contribution limitations imposed on all other candidates by
federal election campaign law.

Except as a condition on public funding, the

Court held limits on expenditures
freedom of speech.

unconstitutional as a major constriction of

The Court held that contributions could be limited because

the statute treated all candidates and contributors alike.

"

. . [T ]he Act

applies the same limitations on contributions to all candidates regardless of
their present occupations, ideological views, or party affiliations." 424 U.S.
at 31.

Thus the first amendment requirement of neutrality toward speech was

not offended.
rr25e The Court then clarified the factual basis of its holding: "Absent record
evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a class, a court
should generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its fact
imposes evenhanded restrictions."

Id.

The Court found no evidence and

"little indication" that the limitations on contributions to candidates or
organizations would give incumbents an added advantage, id. at 32-33, and
denied that the statute would disadvantage fledging parties in their search
for seed money, id. at 34.
The factual nature of the Buckley holding, however, suggests the
possibility that contribution limitations may not survive.
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Since Buckley,

evidence has accumulated which indicates that the contribution limitations do
alter the course of political campaigns.

The crucial issue does not appear to

be the relative financial means of competing candidates, but rather the
ability of challengers to meet significant thresholds of public awareness.
Jacobson, on the basis of an elaborate study, concluded that many candidates
had been and would be, deprived of the opportunity to achieve adequate funding
by the contribution limits of the Federal Election Campaign Act.
Money in Congressional Elections, 157, 194 (1980).

G. Jacobson,

The Court has not

confronted the significance of the research showing the importance of the
level of funding and the tie between the levels and the limitations on
contributions.

(For a fuller treatment of Buckley v. Valeo and the first

amendment status of contribution limits, see Gottlieb, Contribution Limits,
above, 49 Albany Law Review 825).
Even if the amount is adequate, however, we still have to determine
whether the sums are apportioned equitably.
impact of money?

Of early contributors?

Do they merely reinforce the

Or do they reflect support

independent of dollars?

Justifications for Regulation

As described above, the Supreme Court has been unwilling to accept
regulation that constricts speech in what it considers significant ways.
has permitted what seem to it minor constrictions of speech: i.e.,
contribution limits if enacted for sufficiently good reasons, but not
expenditure limits.

The question, then, is whether there are sufficient

justifications for campaign regulation.
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It

In Buckley, the Court accepted the appearance of corruption as a
rationale justifying that portion of the federal scheme as it held
constitutional.

I would hope that the courts would outgrow deference to

appearances since it implies that the first amendment can be overruled by
opinion polls.

I would hope that we would come to demand that means/ends

relationships be carefully thought through and substantiated and not merely
believed.
Buckley also recognized actual corruption as a justification for campaign
regulation.

Corruption defeats the expression of popular will through the

election process and the obligation of the representative to serve the public.
For reasons discussed above, campaign finance legislation may also implicate
those same values by decreasing campaign funding, increasing the complexity of
campaigning and thereby restricting entry into the campaign field, channeling
of dollars among organizations and subjecting the entire process to
administrative supervision.

The question is whether we sacrifice more or less

than we gain.
That problem is cast in bold relief by the next justification the Court
has used to justify some electoral regulation, the mitigation of factionalism.
See Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974).

Campaign finance legislation can

significantly increase factionalism.
Proposed public funding is directed at the candidates.

By specifying

candidate control over public funds, public funding increases factionalism.
The problem is more difficult than merely shifting the locus of funding.

Were

we to give the funds to the parties, they might be (or become) inappropriate
agents of largess by misusing the power given them.

First amendment

principles counsel letting the people determine whether to give their support
10

through the candidate, the party or other institutions.
To the extent one analyzes New York City politics as undermined by
factionalism, campaign finance reform is unhelpful at best. The problem of
factionalism is compounded by primaries.

Primaries are important in one party

cities, but they also encourage splintering and discourage unity.

The line of

cases from Cousins to Tashjian supports considerable party control over its
nominating procedures.
Hofstra Law Review 191.)

(On conventions see Gottlieb, Convention, above, 11
Whether it will support a party decision to nominate

for local or state offices by convention is not yet clear.

The answer to that

question may depend on progress in our understanding of the benefits of
primaries in allowing voters control over nominations and the weaknesses of
primaries in encouraging factionalism and making it difficult for voters to
unite.

The current exclusive dependence on primaries creates an additional

problem about which political scientists have been quite concerned: the lack
of political responsibility has meant that party governance is relatively
unconstrained.
A nonpartisan petition nominating system, if it remained coupled with the
existing constraints on parties in the pre-primary campaign, or a system of
proportional representation, would also encourage factionalism.

The problem

with respect to factionalism is the dominance of incentives for competitive
over cooperative strategies.
Interparty competition is an important goal of election reform.
Tashjian v. Republican Party,

U.S.

, 107 S.Ct. 544 (1986).

election finance could be designed to aid the minority party
Republican Party in New York City.
a responsible one.

See

General
e.g., the

The notion of aiding the minority party is

Martin Van Buren, the father of the two party system in
11

this country, argued that the Democratic Party needed organized and
institutionalized opposition to maintain its purity and purpose.
was a Democrat, then, in a sense, no one was.

If everyone

See J. Ceaser, Presidential

Selection, 126, 131-32 (1979).
Proposed contribution limitations might accomplish that objective in the
following way.

If the Republican Party receives the bulk of its funds from

people who donate from one to three thousand dollars and the Democrats receive
the bulk of its funds from people whose contributions are at the extremes,
then contribution limits will benefit the Republican Party at the expense of
the Democratic Party even if the Republican Party is the party of the wealthy.
This effect is compounded by the expense of fundraising.

If solicitations

cost a dollar, which is common, but only one percent of those solicited
respond, which is also common, then donations less than one hundred dollars
actually cost the campaign money.

Thus if this state of affairs turned out to

reflect reality, then the Democratic Party would lose its givers at the high
end and would not be able to benefit substantially from its donors at the low
end.
Two problems, however, may frustrate the objective.

It is not clear that

people would accept the partisan impliations of such a proposal.

And finance

legislation might well accentuate majority party dominance in New York City by
diminishing the funds available for challengers' campaigns.
Providing the public with better information about the political process
is certainly supported in the caselaw.

See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,

395 U.S. 367 (1969) (approving the fairness doctrine) and CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S.
367 (1981) (holding that the networks were obligated by the reasonable access
provision to air the Carter/Mondale announcement of candidacy).
12

•

So long as campaigns are grounded only on money and brief debates,
however, the public will continue to receive a very incomplete picture of the
candidates.
problem.

Public funding and financial regulation will not solve that

If such measures reduce financial support for campaigns they lessen

the discussion.

If they add financial support the results may nevertheless

prove an unsatisfactory extension of existing practices.
It would be possible, consistent with the first amendment, for a city or
state to buy air time or to air debates on public stations.

It would be

consistent with the first amendment to ask Congress either to abolish the
equal time restrictions on private broadcasters or to alter the equal time
provision so that it would be satisfied by an offer to all candidates of time
to participate in a debate scheduled months in advance, regardless of who
appeared.
A public opportunity not only to debate but for something akin to
hearings at which each candidate could be questioned at length might be a more
fundamental improvement.

Does campaign finance legislation matter?

The recent revelations of financial abuses by public officials may be an
indication not of the failure but of the success of the current system.
Abuses are being located and dealt with.

We could celebrate instead of

wringing our hands.
When we consider the efficacy of election finance legislation, it is
important to ask the question what else is there?

In New York State we have

by statute all but eliminated the party nominating convention, NY Elect. L.,
13

Art. 6, and then have prohibited the parties from any and all spending in the
primaries on behalf of any nominee, NY Elect. L. sec. 2-126.

Thus, outside of

contributors and spenders, one wonders what other resources exist with which
to get one's record, image or stand to the public.
That in turn leads to a bootstrap question.

Do the legal restraints that

we have already placed on the political parties justify further manipulation
of the electoral process?
about going too far?

Is the first amendment sensitive to an argument

Or do the problems with prior tinkering justify more?

It may be that the courts would currently accept the kind of campaign
finance legislation proposed.
constitutional ground.

No parts of that package however are on firm

The developments in first amendment jurisprudence

suggest that the costs of government control over the spending of campaign
funds may be too great in substituting official rules for public will and in
denying the public the opportunity to join behind the banner of common
interest.

14
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FECA, among other things, limits campaign contributions and expenditures. The statute was first challenged in Buckley v. Valeo. 3 In
Buckley and its progeny, the Court has perceived the right of association as a right of individuals;' and the first amendment as a guarantee that individuals may pool their political resources without governmental interference. 11 When the Court focuses on individual
citizens as the only relevant political actors, however, it overlooks the
distinctive contributions made by various kinds of political associations. 6 A closer look at the operations of these political associations
and the consequences of federal campaign funding restrictions would
lead to a better understanding of associational rights. Armed with
such an understanding, the Court would be far less sanguine about
the constitutionality of the provisions of the FECA. 7 Due to its limclosure by candidates for federal office of contributions to and expenditures by their campaigns.
See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-455 (1982); 18 U.S.C. § 600 (1982); 47 U.S.C. §§ 312, 315 (1982)).
Following Watergate, Congress revised the Act by establishing contribution and spending limitations, creating the Federal Election Commission to enforce the Act, and providing for public
financing of presidential campaigns. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-441, 451-455 (1982);
26 U.S.C. §§ 9002-9012, 9031-9042 (1982)). In Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), the Supreme
Court invalidated certain provisions of the FECA, and the statute was again amended. See
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475 (codified
as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-432, 434, 437a-447j, 455j (1982); 26 U.S.C. §§ 9002-9004, 90069009, 9012, 9029, 9032-9035 (1982)). The most recent amendments were added in 1979. See
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339 (1980)
(codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-433, 435-441j (1982)).
• 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
• See Gottlieb, Rebuilding the Right of Association: The Right to Hold a Convention as a
Test Case, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 191, 203-08 (1982).
• Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 16-23.
• For the role of political parties, see J. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION (1979); and for the
role of media based organizations, see L. SABATO, THE RISE OF POLITICAL CONSULTANTS 24-34,
274-97 (1981).
7
For demonstrations of the Court's support of the Act, see FEC v. National Right to Work
Comm., 459 U.S. 197 (1982) (sustaining limitation of solicitation to members), and Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14-38 (sustaining the Act's contribution limitations). In addition, the Court
has rejected challenges to the limitations of the FECA either summarily or without discussion
of the associational issue. See Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577 (1982) (rejecting on procedural grounds a challenge to limitations on solicitations by trade associations);
International Ass'n of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092, 1105 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (sustaining
diverse rules for separate segregated funds under 2 U.S.C. § 441b), aff'd without opinion, 459
U.S. 983 (1982); Republican Nat'! Comm. v. FEC, 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.) (sustaining limitations
on contributions to publicly funded presidential campaigns), aff'd mem., 445 U.S. 955 (1980);
Martin Tractor Co. v. FEC, 460 F. Supp. 1017 (D.D.C. 1978) (dismissing as nonjusticiable in its
current posture a challenge to limitations on corporate solicitation), aff'd, 627 F.2d 375 (D.C.
Cir 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 954 (1981). But see FEC v. National Conservative Political
Action Comm., 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985) (holding unconstitutional the limitation of 26 U.S.C. §
9012(0 (1976) on independent expenditures in presidential campaigns); Co~mon Cause v.
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ited perspective on political association, the Court has failed to identify the FECA's infringement on the right of association and has ignored the Act's unintended restructuring of the American political
landscape.
This Article develops a more complete exposition of the dimensions of the right of association by exploring the effect of the campaign funding laws on political participation. The first section explores the background of the disputes concerning the FECA. The
second section develops the function of the right of association in
terms of first amendment theory. 8 The Article then examines the
provisions of the Act as construed by the courts, beginning with
Buckley. It demonstrates that the application of these provisions has
divided voters within and among political associations, has shaped
the structure of those associations, and has altered political expression in ways which have led to a "balkanization" of the American
electorate. The final section examines the justifications for the regulation of campaign contributions and considers whether the end fostered by such regulation outweighs the burdens placed on the exercise of the right of association.
I.

BACKGROUND

The Federal Election Campaign Act was passed in 1971 and was
later amended and enlarged to reduce the potential for corruption of
political candidates by large campaign contributions. 9 The Act was
also designed to curtail the disproportionate political influence of
wealthy citizens 10 and to curb the rapidly increasing rate of campaign
Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980) (same), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S.
129 (1982).
• See Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 194-221 (identifying values of political association as defined
by purposes of first amendment); D. Dodson, The Federal Courts and American Political Parties: Legal Constraints on the Development of a Responsible Party System (paper presented at
the 1984 annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois (Apr.
11-15, 1984)) (unpublished manuscript).
• See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 838-40 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 424
U.S. 1 (1976); SENATE SELECT COMM. ON PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES, FINAL REPORT, S.
REP. No. 981, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 563-77 (1974); S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 77-78
(1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1773, 1801 (supplemental views of Mr.
Hart); Fleishman, The 1974 Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments: The Shortcomings
of Good Intentions, 1975 DUKE L.J. 851, 852; see also T. SCHWARZ & A. STRAUS, FEDERAL REGULATION OF CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND POLITICAL ACTIVITY 1-34 n.144 (1982).
0
'
S. REP. No. 96, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 21-23 (1971), reprinted in 1972 U.S. CooE CONG. & Ao.
NEWS 1773, 1774-75; see S. REP. No. 689, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 5, reprinted in 1974 U.S. CooE
CoNG. & Ao. NEWS 5587, 5591 (discussing public funding); see aiso Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d
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spending. 11 To accomplish these goals, the FECA severely restricted
the amount of money an individual or organization could contribute
to, or otherwise spend on, candidates for federal elective office. In
addition, aggregate "ceiling" limitations were placed on the amounts
which could be spent on election campaigns.
The constitutionality of the FECA was challenged on first amendment and equal protection grounds in Buckley v. Valeo. 12 In Buckley,
the Supreme Court overturned the ceilings on candidate spending13
and struck down the limitations on independent expenditures. 14 The
FECA's contribution limits were sustained, 111 however, and the Court
rejected the appellants' objections concerning the unequal impact of
the statute's provisions on different classes of political organizations.16 This section explains the reliance of the Court in Buckley on
certain factual assumptions, and argues that the factual underpinnings of these assumptions are crumbling.
The FECA that has emerged after Buckley includes important distinctions among different political actors. The Act now favors political organization along industrial lines by permitting corporations and
unions to provide unlimited funding for the administrative expenses
of their political action committees (PACs),1 7 but denies a similar
privilege to any other organization. This same provision of the Act
encourages divisions among citizens who work for different corporations or belong to different unions. The statute promotes the proliferation of large, ad hoc organizations controlled by individual candidates, but limits the political activities of virtually all other
organizations, including political parties. Groups willing to forgo the
benefit of consultation or coordination with a candidate are allowed
to make unlimited expenditures on that candidate's behalf while
other organizations are not. 18 The activities of, and contributions to,
such groups, however, are severely restricted by the statute.
The Buckley Court's conclusion that the FECA treats all contributors alike was central to its decision to sustain the statute's contribu821, 837-38 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
11
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 837 (D.D.C. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
11
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
13
Id. at 51-59; see also 2 U.S.C. § 44la (1982).
u 424 U.S. at 39-51.
1
• Id. at 23-38.
1
• Id. at 30-36.
17
See 2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)(2)(C) (1982).
18
See id. §§ 431(8)(A), (17), (18), 44la(a)(l)-(3), (a)(7)(B)(i).
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tion limitations. 19 On the basis of this conclusion, the Court rejected
appellants' claims that the limitations discriminated among candidates, parties, and political committees. 20 The Court correctly noted
that no constitutional principle requires that all political committees
or organizations receive the same amount of support from the public, 21 and therefore looked to the treatment of the individual voter as
the proper standard of equality for equal protection analysis. 22
While the choice of this standard may make sense in principle, the
Court's conclusions do not necessarily follow from application of this
standard. The FECA's contribution limits not only affect the overall
level of political campaign funding, but also interact with the economic system in ways which create and perpetuate inequalities
among groups. Whether that fosters individual equality among voters
is a relatively complex matter. Similarly, the standard of individual
equality does not justify provisions which determine not only who
may give how much, but to whom, and under what circumstances. 28
Some PACs may solicit funds only from members, corporate shareholders, or administrative personnel; 24 some committees may make
larger contributions to candidates than others;u and some committees may spend without limit while others may not. 26 Such results,
created by the FECA constraints, are not logically required by imposition of equal contribution limitations on individual voters.
The Court's interpretation of the first amendment in Buckley was
based on the Court's misunderstanding of the relevant political science. The Court in Buckley held that the FECA provisions which
channel contributors into different types of organizations are consistent with first amendment guarantees. 27 Logically that position had
to rest on the conclusion that these provisions have no practical effect in the political arena, that the differences which may result are
See 424 U.S. at 31. The Court stated that "the Act applies the same limitations on contributions to all candidates regardless of their present occupations, ideological views, or party
affiliations. Absent record evidence of invidious discrimination against challengers as a class, a
court should generally be hesitant to invalidate legislation which on its face imposes evenhanded restrictions." Id.
•• Id. at 30-36.
21
Id. at 48-49.
11
See id. at 28-29.
•• See J. Gora, Money and Politics: A Response 5-9 (paper prepared for Biennial Conference
of the ACLU, at Mount Vernon College, Washington, D.C. (June 19-21, 1983)) (unpublished
manuscript).
•• See 2 U.S.C. § 441b(b)(4) (1982).
20
See id. § 441a(a).
•• See id. §§ 431(17), 441a(a)(l)-(3), (7)(B), 441a(d).
27
See 424 U.S. at 23-39.
10

.,
•
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constitutionally irrelevant, or that the infringement on the exercise of
first amendment rights is insignificant as compared to the benefits of
campaign regulation. In sustaining portions of the FECA, the Court
explicitly endorsed two of these positions-that the statute creates
no practical difficulties, and that any difficulties would be balanced
by benefits. 28 To the extent that the Court used a balancing test, its
evaluation was necessarily affected by its underestimation of the
practical difficulties involved.
Appellants introduced evidence showing that popular political
movements depend on large financial contributions and that opposition candidates depend on significant contributions made early in the
campaign. 29 The appellants charged that the FECA makes it more
difficult for opposition candidates to succeed when challenging incumbents by limiting the funds that may be contributed to a candidate. While the Court was aware of the financial advantages of incumbents, 30 it nevertheless found no evidence 31 and "little
indication" 32 that the limitations on contributions to candidates or
2
• Id. at 28-29 (finding an insignificant burden on first amendment interests). The Court
addressed the question of balancing by stating: "[T]he weighty interests served by restricting
the size of financial contributions to political candidates are sufficient to justify the limited
effect upon First Amendment freedoms caused by the $1,000 contribution ceiling." Id. at 29.
•• See Brief for Appellant at 116-39, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
30
See 424 U.S. at 31 n.33. Incumbents enjoy several advantages over challengers which enable them to convey their campaign messages to the public more easily. First, incumbents receive a franking privilege, which allows members of Congress to mail without charge any correspondence pertaining to the "official business, activities and duties of the Congress." 39 U.S.C.
§ 3210(a)(l) (1982). A federal court has held the franking privilege to be constitutional. Common Cause v. Bolger, 574 F. Supp. 672 (D.D.C. 1982) (the court denied challengers' first
amendment and equal protection claims and recognized that legitimate interests furthered by
franking privilege justified slight infringement on challengers' rights), aff'd, 461 U.S. 911 (1983).
Second, incumbents have better access to the media by virtue of their office. See 47 U.S.C. §
315(a) (1982) (all "legally qualified" candidates must receive equal opportunities to use broadcasting stations, but excepts from the definition of equal opportunities a candidate's appearance in any "bona fide newscast . . . interview . . . documentary . . . or . . . news events").
Both Houses of Congress provide broadcasting studios for the use of their members. 2 U.S.C. §
123b (1982); see also SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., SENATE MANUAL CONTAINING THE
STANDING RULES, ORDERS, LAWS, AND RESOLUTIONS AFFECTING THE BUSINESS OF THE UNITED
STATES SENATE, S. Doc. No. 1, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 71 (1979) (Rule 40.6). Third, incumbents
may use the services of their full office staff. 18 U.S.C. § 607(b); W. BROWN, JEFFERSON'S MANUAL AND RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H.R. Doc. No. 398, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 635,
653-54 (1981) (Rules 43(8), 45); SENATE COMM. ON RULES AND ADMIN., supra at 68-69, 72-74
(Rules 38, 41). Incumbents must finance and report all campaign related travel out of campaign
funds, but travel between Washington, D.C., and the incumbent's home state need not be
treated as campaign travel. 11 C.F.R. § 106.3(d) (1985); see Winpisinger v. Watson, 628 F.2d
133 (D.C. Cir.) (dismissing for lack of standing challenge by political opponent to outlays for
office staff and travel), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 929 (1980).
31
424 U.S. at 32.
31
Id. at 33 n.38.
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organizations would give incumbents an added advantage. The Court
also failed to accept the assertion that fledgling third parties would
be disadvantaged in their search for seed money. 33
The factual nature of the Buckley holding, however, suggests the
possibility of a stronger attack in future cases. The question of the
overall imbalance between challenger and incumbent has been
presented to the Court since Buckley only in the context of the 1980
presidential election campaign, which was hardly an auspicious context in which to raise the issue. In Republican National Committee
u. FEC, 34 the Republican National Committee argued that it should
be allowed to contribute to the presidential campaign despite public
funding, lest their candidate, a challenger in 1980, be placed at a disadvantage. 35 The Second Circuit disagreed, 36 and the Supreme Court
declined to hear argument on the issue. 37 Whether the Supreme
Court will continue to treat the issue as a factual question subject to
the acquisition of pertinent evidence is not clear from that result.
Since Buckley, evidence has accumulated which indicates that the
contribution limitations do alter the course of political campaigns.
The crucial issue does not appear to be the relative financial means
of competing candidates, 36 but rather the ability of challengers to
meet significant thresholds of public awareness. Jacobson, on the basis of an elaborate mathematical model, concluded that many candidates will be deprived of the opportunity to achieve adequate funding by the contribution limits of the FECA. 39 Their chances of
election will therefore be substantially weakened. 40 Such evidence appears to undermine the opinion in Buckley. Jacobson's evidence also
suggests the need for a closer look at the ways the FECA may affect
•• Id. at 34 n.40.
•• 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.), aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
•• Brief for Plaintiff at 23-29, 42-45, Republican Nat'! Comm. v. FEC, 616 F.2d 1 (2d Cir.),
aff'd, 445 U.S. 955 (1980).
•• 616 F.2d at 2; see also Republican Nat'! Comm. v. FEC, 487 F. Supp. 280, 287 (S.D.N.Y.)
(stating that "[a]s long as it has a legitimate public purpose a public campaign funding law
should not be required to remedy pre-existing inequalities between candidates"), aff'd, U.S. 955
(1980).
•• See Republican Nat'! Comm. v. FEC, 445 U.S. 965 (1980) (denying certiorari before judgment); id. at 955 (affirming the lower court decision).
38
Passage of 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982) has not stilled the substantial pressures toward disproportionate support of incumbents. K. Brown, Campaign Contributions and Congressional Voting 7-18 (paper presented at the 1983 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, (September 1-4, 1983)) (unpublished manuscript).
39
G. JACOBSON, MONEY IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 157, 194 (1980).
0
'
Id.; see also Parker, Incumbent Popularity and Electoral Success, in CONGRESSIONAL
ELECTIONS§ 249, at 269-74 (L. Maisel & J. Cooper eds. 1981) (describing advantages enjoyed by
incumbents).
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the level of funding of many varieties of campaign positions.
In practice, the campaign contribution limits of the FECA have
had an important impact on the formation and functioning of political associations. In fact, they have contributed to the balkanization of
the American electorate. 41 Interests and perspectives that reflect the
industrial landscape are reinforced and promoted, but interests and
perspectives which cross the industrial context are hindered. Any
given number of voters sharing a point of view among themselves,
but not sharing that view with top management in their profession,
may find it more difficult to express themselves politically.• 2 Any
given number of voters, no matter how small a percentage of the public, who nevertheless share a view with others in their own profession,
will find it relatively easy, vis-a-vis another group of the same size
not joined by industrial ties, to express their point and pursue their
objectives.
Voters who view their interests as defined more broadly than the
support of a given candidate or issue will find it relatively difficult to
pursue their objectives because of the restrictions on political parties.
Voters are encouraged to put their energies into candidates, not
parties, and to concentrate on issues, not offices. Any effort to focus
on the broad spectrum of issues is discouraged by the special interest
view of politics entrenched by the cases and the FECA. To some extent, those results would occur even in the absence of the FECA, but
the effects are clearly compounded by the operation of the financial
restrictions.
Although this Article criticizes the balkanization of the American
electorate, it does not endorse a particular shape for the political
landscape. The people have the right to divide their political loyalties
in any manner they choose. The right of association guaranteed by
the Constitution protects the right of the people to adopt a desired
form of political association. It does not grant government the authority to impose on the people a specific form of political association. It is not balkanization per se that is criticized here, but the statutorily required balkanization engendered by the FECA that denies
the freedom of association protected by the Constitution.
" See infra notes 63-119 and accompanying text.
See Gottlieb, supra note 4, in which the author discusses the difficulty voters face in working through candidates and parties under current primary laws. The ability of candidates to
contribute to public debate is affected by the milieu encouraged by the FECj\ .
0
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THE FUNCTION OF THE RIGHT OF ASSOCIATION

It is impossible to determine what is important for first amendment decision-making without determining what the first amendment requires. The Court, however, has not articulated a clear theory
of the first amendment as it applies to associations.
The Court has traditionally interpreted the first amendment as a
guarantee that the government may not discourage or favor speech
because of the content of its message. 43 The Court's use of this content-neutral theory has not included any clear statement defining its
relevance to the rights of associations. 44 Nevertheless, the content•• See Bezanson, The New Free Press Guarantee, 63 VA. L. REV. 731 (1977) (developing the
theory as growing out of protection for the press); Redish, The Content Distinction in First
Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981) (advocating abandoning the content distinction as defined by the Court); Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 189 (1983) (examining the limitations and merits of the analysis used by the
Court to determine the constitutionality of content-based and content-neutral restrictions) .
.. Some of the cases dealt only with commercial speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-66 (1980) (applied to corporate commercial
speech); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 533-35 (1980) (applied
to inserts in utility bills). In Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95-96 (1972), the
Court employed the content-neutral theory in finding a statute unconstitutional, but did not
discuss the impact on the right of association. The case involved a city ordinance which prohibited nonlabor picketing at primary or secondary school buildings. Id. at 92-93. While Justice
Marshall treated analysis under the first amendment and the equal protection clause as thoroughly "intertwined," id. at 95, he formally based his decision on an equal protection analysis.
The Court also recognized distinctions based on the function of government property in Perry
Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). In Perry, the Court upheld a
provision in a collective bargaining agreement between a teachers' union and a school board
that allowed the designated union representative access to the interschool mail system and the
teachers' mail boxes, but excluded access to rival unions. Id. at 39-41. The Court found that the
state has the right to restrict the use of public property, even if that use involves first amendment rights, "as long as the regulation on speech is reasonable and not an effort to suppress
expression merely because public officials oppose the speaker's view." Id. at 46. The Court dealt
with discrimination among associations in Regan v. Taxation With Representation, 461 U.S.
540 (1983), but it treated the neutrality obligation as irrelevant to the tax advantages. Id. at
545-46. In Regan, a nonprofit organization, Taxation With Representation (TWR), was denied
the use of tax-deductible contributions to finance lobbying activities, a privilege enjoyed only
by veterans organizations. Id. at 541-47. The Court held this did not violate TWR's first
amendment rights since TWR could still finance its lobbying activities with nondeductible contributions. Id. at 545. The Court distinguished benefits from burdens and held that benefits for
favored groups, in this instance veterans organizations, were permissible so long as the legislation did not distinguish on the basis of the content of the speech. Id. at 548. Insofar as Regan
rests on the distinction between benefits and burdens, it plainly does not govern the legitimacy
of the restrictions embedded in the federal election laws. Insofar as Regan rests on the distinction between neutrality among ideas and neutrality among groups, it would appear relevant.
The Court added a factual observation in a manner reminiscent of Buckley: "We find no indication that the statute was intended to suppress any ideas or any demonstration that it has had
that effect." Id.; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 32, 33 n.38 (1976). Regan, like Buckley,
would therefore appear vulnerable to contrary evidence. The id~ological or substantive implica-
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neutral theory does suggest a viable theory of political association.
Because each kind of political association has a different impact on
public debate, neutrality would condemn government interference
with the public's choice among different messages.
The Court has not required strict scrutiny where there is neither a
substantial impact on public discussion, nor manifest bias in the
terms or demonstrable intent of the challenged rule. 411 In the absence
of bias, the Court46 and many commentators47 have frequently insisted that the proper way to accommodate all legitimate interests is
to balance the injury to interests protected by the first amendment
against asserted governmental interests. 48 Balancing, however, is not
a theory, but an invitation to identify important factors on some
other basis. 49 The Court's concept of neutrality has inconsistently
disapproved of distortion of public debate, and neutrality should at
least be considered in this balancing context. 110 Beyond that, the identification of relevant factors requires consideration of the purposes of
the first amendment.
Several commentators have explored the purposes of the first
amendment. 111 Blasi summarized the basic objectives as preserving intions of the distinctions in the FECA then become significant. It is difficult to understand how
the Court could have believed that such discrimination would have no impact on the content of
ideas. Lobbies are well-known in Washington. It is usually possible to anticipate their positions,
and the veterans organizations discussed in Regan were well established as lobbying organizations. The Court's position may therefore camouflage a firmer reluctance to bar Congress from
such favoritism. This plainly was not the understanding on which the neutrality position was
based. Despite Regan, the Court has treated discrimination among groups as a violation of the
obligation of neutrality. In Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), the Court noted that "[i]t is
clearly unconstitutional to enable a public official to determine which expressions of view will
be permitted and which will not or to engage in invidious discrimination among persons or
groups either by use of a statute providing a system of broad discretionary licensing power or,
as in this case, the equivalent of such a system by selective enforcement of an extremely broad
prohibitory statute." Id. at 557-58. Cox illustrates the close connection between neutrality
among ideas and discrimination among groups, for ideas can be inhibited by barring designated
speakers as well as by direct censorship of the positions involved. The conventional wisdom
that benefits and burdens are in fact indistinguishable would render the Court's rationale in
Regan a rejection of the neutrality idea itself. That approach to the first amendment would
require the abandonment of substantial controls on government action, or a return to a focus
on the nature of expression and its associated freedom. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 173, 432-33, 684-96 (1970).
0
See Stone, supra note 43, at 221-23.
'" Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961).
47
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-2, at 581-83 (1978) (citing articles).
•• Id. at 581-82.
•• T. EMERSON, supra note 44, at 16; see also Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 713 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
•• See Stone, supra note 43, at 198, 217-27.
•• See T. EMERSON, supra note 44, at 14-20; F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL IN-
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dividual autonomy, maintaining a marketplace of competing ideas,
ensuring self-government, and enhancing public scrutiny of the excesses of public officeholders (the "checking value"). 52 Any understanding of the first amendment requires an examination of the activities of associations needed to realize these objectives.
Of the values cited by Blasi, autonomy best explains the Court's
decisions concerning the Federal Election Campaign Act. The object
of autonomy is individual, not associational, behavior. Individual
freedom is satisfied if each person can contribute to the party, group,
or candidate of his choice. The treatment in Buckley v. Valeo 53 of
contributions as largely symbolic gestures of political speech54 flows
naturally from this perspective. If the focus of the first amendment's
concern is with the values that associations can serve in achieving a
political system which serves the people in more than a symbolic
manner, however, preserving autonomy is not sufficient. To understand the full impact of the first amendment, it becomes necessary to
explore not merely the freedom of people to join associations, but
also the impact of the Court's interpretation of the first amendment
on the way associations affect the political process.
The other values underlying the first amendment impose more
stringent requirements on the interpretation of the first amendment
in this context. Self-government is, by definition, hostile to the distortion or self-perpetuation of thought by government. Achieving a
healthy marketplace of ideas requires contributions from associations. Application of checking value theory would also bring into
question the regulation of political financing by the FECA because
the government's choice of means of financial support is too likely to
confirm and entrench existing power relationships, instead of permitting these relationships to vary. A good argument can be made that
the FECA recognized changes in the political landscape that had already taken place. Having recognized those changes, however, the
FECA further encrusts them on the electoral future. Checking value
theory, therefore, would require greater respect for the impact that
(1982); Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
J. 521.
•• Blasi, supra note 51, at 529-67.
•• 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
"' Id. at 21. The Court stated:
A limitation on the amount of money a person may give to a candidate or campaign
organization thus involves little direct restraint on his poli~ical communication, for it
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a contribution but does not in
any way infringe the contributor's freedom to discuss candidates and issues.
Id.
.
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the FECA has on different types of associations.
The Court has identified the importance of a healthy marketplace
of ideas, 611 self-government, 116 and the checking value, or a critical review of the exercise of governmental power, 117 as preeminent functions of the rights of speech and press. Nevertheless, the Court has
not developed the relationship of those ideas to the right of association. Nor has the Court examined the functions of associations except
to recognize the extent to which some pooling of resources is needed
to achieve the level of publicity essential to sustain a political
campaign. 118
A functional approach is derived from the inquiry into the purposes of the first amendment. It is necessary to work out the role
associations can or must play if goals such as self-government and
the checking value are to be achieved. While this inquiry may concern a question of fact, it is central to the realization of constitutional
purposes. 119
Associations do more than pool financial resources. They also pool
memories, reputations, and opportunities for sharing, collaborating,
and negotiating. As a result, associations can contribute to the public
discussion of ideas in ways individuals cannot. Associations make important contributions to the creation, refinement, and promotion of
ideas and provide a vehicle for aggregating the diverse perspectives of
the electorate. In addition, associations facilitate public choice in the
electoral process through familiarity with well-known political organizations, and representation of the public by the parties in the nom•• Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969) (the Court upheld governmental restraints on speech of radio broadcasters "to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of
ideas . . . rather than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by the
Government itself or a private licensee").
•• Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 14.
01
Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218-19 (1966) (finding that major purpose of first amendment is protecting "the free discussion of governmental affairs"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 275 (1964) (recognizing that "[t]he right of free public discussion of the
stewardship of public officials [is] ... a fundamental principle of the American form of government" (footnote omitted)); see also New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 717
(1971) (Black, J., concurring) (role of the press in censoring government was recognized by
allowing two newspapers to print Pentagon Papers).
•• See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 19-21.
•• This involves a fundamental shift of first amendment perspectives. A functional approach
does not define protected speech by reference to the nature of governmeq.t action thought to
abridge it, as does the neutrality approach, which protects speech if government has observed
certain rules of restriction. Rather, a functional approach focuses on the nature of protected
expression, and defines abridgement by reference to what is protected. This is the approach of
jurists such as Justices Black and Douglas and commentators such as Emerson. See T. EMER·
SON, supra note 44.
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inating process. 60 Since the major purposes of the first amendment
focus on the effectiveness of speech in achieving the objectives of
self-government, marketplace or individual choice, and governmental
oversight or the checking value, restrictions on associations which diminish their contribution to public debate must be interpreted as restrictions on the freedom of speech.
As the succeeding section demonstrates, the provisions of the
FECA which divide contributors and political action committees into
separate islands of influence affect all of the contributions that associations make to public debate: the creative, aggregative, recognitive, and representative functions of parties and other political associations. They interfere with the creative functions of political
associations by making association in groups organized around broad,
newly emerging or non-occupational bases more difficult to achieve
than it was before, and more difficult to achieve in relation to other
forms of organization supported by the Act. Groups which find it
more difficult to identify common interests and to arrange to pool
resources will be less able to work out appropriate public presentations of their positions.
The FECA interferes for many of the same reasons with the aggregative functions of political associations. It is not enough for a system
of discussion to generate ideas. It is necessary for the public to have
some means of winnowing those ideas. It is more difficult under the
Act for individuals to band together in associations which broaden
and compromise the perspectives of their members than it is for individuals to organize in distinct enclaves with narrower foci. The bargaining that occurs naturally among people with diverse interests is
thwarted by the organizational demands of more narrowly focused
groups. Thus, the discussion of ideas which compromise and transcend different interests becomes more chaotic.
The purpose of the creative function of association is to develop
positions for presentation to the public. The role of the aggregative
function is to compromise and transcend individual interests for
eventual presentation of a joint position to the public. Parties perform additional functions for the public. People rely in some degree
on the reputation of associations in making their political decisions.
"" Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 208-21. The Democratic Party recently challenged Wisconsin's
open primary system, arguing that it had a right to screen " 'out those whose affiliation is ...
slight, tenuous, or fleeting,' and that such screening is essential to build a more effective and
responsible Party." Democratic Party of United States v. Wisconsin ex rel. La Follette, 450
U.S. 107, 123 (1981). The Court held that neither a state nor a court could "constitutionally
substitute its own judgment [on that issue] for that of the Pa.rty." Id. at 123-24.
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Yet it is more difficult under the Act for associations to function as
agents of choice, since it is more difficult for people to coalesce into
organizations that present a full agenda and reflect a fair cross section of the public. Broader political structures not only permit the
development and presentation of combined arguments, they also permit identification of combined choices. Under existing rules, the parties have largely been denied the freedom to act as deliberative bodies by the primary laws. 61 The FECA compounds that loss.
Associations are also expected to represent the wishes, desires, and
views of their constituents. It is, however, more difficult for the public to obtain the representation it seeks from political associations because of the encrustation by the FECA of a specific parochial viewpoint in the organization of PACs. 62 This analysis does not disparage
divisions that the public finds efficient, but does condemn the statutory encrustation of those divisions on what could otherwise be more
fluid politics.

III. THE FECA AND THE BALKANIZATION OF THE ELECTORATE
As the discussion of the cases below will illustrate, the Federal
Election Campaign Act has contributed to a balkanization of the
American electorate which is in direct conflict with the first amendment principles previously reviewed. Such balkanization threatens to
change the political landscape and affect the aggregate results of the
political process.
1
•
See Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 232-33 n.248.
•• The argument that this is acceptable as a form of permissible government speech is totally
misplaced. First, for a critique of the proposition that government has a right to speak, see M.
YuooF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 42-50 (1983). Second, subsidies for favored speakers are
coupled with restrictions on disfavored speakers. Whether or not benefits and penalties can be
philosophically distinguished, such an approach would extinguish the first amendment as a restriction on government. See supra note 42. Third, this does not reflect government speech.
Others say what they wish; the government merely chooses the speakers. Fourth, the FECA
would reflect too comprehensive a definition of governmental speech rights under either a balancing or absolutist approach. Given a balancing model of defining permissible government
restraints and protected speech, and whatever the justification may be for government speech,
it cannot extend to means which reorganize the marketplace of ideas and minimize the checking value of discussion. While government speech may be justified by its contribution to public
discussion, see M. YuooF, supra, at 241, any extension of that privilege into the rules of behavior for potential opponents undermines the reason for the governmental privilege. Assuming
instead a more categorical approach, the FECA interferes with the rights of association previously discussed .
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Buckley: Individual Candidates Favored Over Political Parties

The FECA restricts the size of both contributions to, and expenditures by, political parties. 63 The FECA which the Court reviewed in
Buckley v. Valeo 64 also restricted the expenditures which could be
made by candidates and independent organizations. 65 In addition, the
statute requires that each candidate authorize his own separate election committees, and channel campaign expenditures through those
committees. 66 Similarly, the public funding provisions are designed to
support the campaigns of individual presidential candidates in the
primary and general elections. 67
In Buckley, the Court upheld limitations on the contributions and
expenditures that could be made by political parties, 68 but struck
down similar limitations on candidate committees, holding that they
could spend funds without limit. 69 The Court's holding is now reflected in the FECA. 70 The result has been to channel funds through
the separate campaign organizations of the candidates and away from
the joint campaign efforts of the parties. 71 Admittedly, the tendency
•• See 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a), (d) (1982) .
.,. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
•• Id. at 39-59; infra note 137; see also FEC v. National Conservative Political Action
Comm., 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985); Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980),
aff'd by an equally divided Court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982). In both National Conservative Political
Action Committee and Schmitt, the courts invalidated an expenditure limitation of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, and held that the governmental interest in discouraging
electoral corruption did not justify an infringement on the contributor's political speech.
88
The requirements for authorized committees are delineated in 2 U.S.C. § 432(e) (1982).
Attempts to channel funds through a political party may run afoul of the statute. Expenditures
on behalf of a candidate which are coordinated with that candidate are considered to be contributions. See id. § 431(17). Parties in any event have not been considered capable of making
independent expenditures, 11 C.F.R. § 110.7(a)(5), (b)(4) (1985), and are subject to specific
dollar limitations for expenditures made on behalf of federal candidates. Sections 431(8) & (9)
define contributions and expenditures, and section 441a sets the contribution and expenditure
limitations. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(8)-(9), 441a (1982). Any effort to raise funds for a candidate
would require that the fund be channeled to his or her authorized committees, or they would
implicate the contribution and expenditure limitations. Moreover, political clubs which are not
willing to change their names to incorporate the name of the candidate, and to restrict all of
their club's activities to the single-minded support of that one candidate, cannot be authorized
committees of that candidate for campaign purposes. Thus, at every level that funds might go
through organizational channels, they are routed to the candidates' personal campaigns or independent committees by the structure of the FECA.
87
See 26 U.S.C. §§ 9003, 9004, 9006, 9032-9034 (1982).
•• 424 U.S. at 14-51.
•• Id. at 54-59.
70 See 2 U.S.C. § 44la(a)-(d) (1982).
71
See INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, JOHN F. KENNEDY SCHOOL OF Gov'T, HARVARD UNIV., FOR THE
COMM. ON HOUSE ADMIN., 96TH CONG., lST SESS., AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF THE FEDERAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGN AcT 1972-1978, at 12-13 (Comm. Print 1919) .
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toward the personal organization of politics dates at least to the institution of primaries. 72 Direct mail solicitations and the growth of the
regional and national mass media have contributed to the shift toward candidate control.7 3 Nevertheless, the FECA has strengthened
the financial barrier to a significant role for political parties. The provisions of the Act thus contribute to the balkanization of the political
process.
Whether the public is represented by political parties, or by a diverse congery of "proxy" speakers, affects the quality and direction of
the way the public is represented. It is a question of whether the
people will be able to consider, evaluate, and take advantage of the
positions of organizations which blend and compromise a broad spectrum of views to achieve common positions and select candidates, or
whether the public must be limited to the benefits of a public debate
dominated by specialized PACs. 74 It is not just a question of whether
the contributor is allowed to donate to a mouthpiece. It matters very
much which one.
B.

Independent Expenditures Favored over Coordinated Ones

The Court in Buckley held unconstitutional the limitations on
spending by candidates and independent organizations in political
campaigns. In FEC v. National Conservative Political Action Committee,71'> the Court voided a related prohibition in the Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act76 which prohibited expenditures over
$1000, except by candidates, if the candidates favored by those expenditures elected to receive public funding. In addition to the effects of these decisions, the FECA permits contributions to independent committees five times larger than contributions to committees
authorized by candidates for political office. 77
Though the Act was originally designed to steer funds through the
candidates, these rulings and provisions encourage donors to channel
their funds elsewhere, perhaps to special interest groups. The FECA
72

See generally V. 0. KEY, AMERICAN STATE POLITICS 169-96 (1956); Gottlieb, supra note 4,

at 230-37.

,. See J. KIRKPATRICK, DISMANTLING THE PARTIES 13-14 (1979).
74

Public dependence on PACs is a feature of the expense of speech. See Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. at 19-20. The Court wrote that "virtually every means of communicating ideas in
today's mass society requires the expenditure of money." Id. at 19.
1
• 105 S. Ct. 1459 (1985).
70
See 26 U.S.C. § 9012(f) (1982).
77
See 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982) .
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therefore sets up a hierarchy. Candidates and independent committees can spend more than the parties, but the independent committees can accept more than the candidates. Once again, the effort to
present a coordinated perspective is frustrated by existing law.

C. CALPAC: Corporate and Labor Organizations Favored Over
Unincorporated Associations and General Public Organizations
Political Action Committees (PACs)s are not permitted to accept
more than $5000 from any donor. 78 Corporations and unions are not
permitted to spend for, or contribute to, political campaigns. 79 They
may, however, establish PACs, known as separate segregated funds,
which may solicit, as appropriate, the stockholders, officers, and
members of the parent corporation or union. 80 In turn, the parent
corporations and unions may pay the entire cost of the administration and solicitation of their separate segregated funds. 81 Those funds
and their parent sponsors, therefore, are the only donors and PACs
permitted to receive or give more than $5000. In contrast, unincorporated associations are not permitted to pay the administrative or solicitation costs of any PAC, including a separate segregated fund. 82
The California Medical Association, an unincorporated association,
sued the Federal Election Commission to gain exemption from the
prohibition against full funding of its political action committee,
CALPAC. 83 The Supreme Court, in California Medical Association
v. FEC, 84 denied relief and concluded that the California Medical Association had not suffered any denial of equal protection vis-a-vis
corporations and unions. 811 The Court reasoned that the Medical Association could solicit from the general public and make contributions to political committees, while corporations and unions could solicit only from their own shareholders or members. 86
For the Medical Association to take advantage of its right to spend
or contribute directly, however, it would subject its entire financial
dealings to the reporting provisions of the FECA, 87 and would have
78

2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(l)(C) (1982).
Id. § 44lb(a).
80
Id. § 44lb(b)(4).
81
Id. § 44lb(b)(2)(C).
81
Id. § 44la.
8
' California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 641 F.2d 619 (9th Cir. 1980), aff'd, 453 U.S. 182 (1981).
84
453 U.S. 182 (1981).
•• Id. at 200-01.
•• Id. at 201.
87
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(4), 434 (1982) .
1

'
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to fund its political activities out of contributions subject to the
$5000 maximum.ss Having established instead a separate PAC, CALPAC's costs per contributor will be greater than a comparable corporate or labor separate segregated fund.s 9 That will prove true both
with respect to solicitations of its own membership and of the general
public.
The inability of CALPAC to fund the solicitation costs of its separate segregated fund was mitigated somewhat by the Act's provision
which permits a membership organization to communicate with its
members concerning any subject, without restriction under the Act,
except for the reporting of expenses. 90 The principal differential,
therefore, may be the expense of administering the segregated fund
itself. To the extent that the reporting obligation discourages political communications, and to the extent that the administration of the
separate segregated fund is expensive, the provisions of the Act make
solicitation of preexisting corporate or union membership more productive than solicitation of association membership. A larger proportion of every dollar received by corporate and union PA Cs can be
turned to political advantage. Moreover, the association PAC would
have to use a significant part of the contributions it receives in order
to finance the solicitations necessary for its own growth. The FECA,
therefore, makes it more difficult and more time consuming for the
association PAC to reach the membership of its unincorporated
parent.
..
Neither an association PAC, such as CALPAC, nor a corporation
may solicit contributions from the general public on the same terms
under which they solicit internally pursuant to the FECA. If CALP AC seeks to communicate to any given segment of the public, therefore, it must do so through advertisements, direct mail, and similar
mechanisms. By contrast, either a corporation or an unincorporated
association acting on behalf of its separate segregated fund can use
certain preexisting internal channels of communication for some of
its solicitation. 91 Since adding information to preexisting channels of
communication, such as a newsletter, is less expensive than establish•• See id. § 441a .
.. ·See E. Epstein, PA Cs and the Modern Political Process 58-59 (paper presented at the
Conference on the Impact of the Modern Corporation, sponsored by the Center for Law and
Economic Studies, Columbia University School of Law, The Henry Chauncey Conference
Center, Princeton, New Jersey (November 12-13, 1982)) (unpublished manuscript). Epstein attributes some of the corporate advantage to efficiency.
00
2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(iii) (1982).
11
Id. § 441b(b)(2)(C), (4)(A)(i) .
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ing a separate and independent means of communication, corporations and unincorporated associations, acting on behalf of their separate segregated funds, enjoy a distinct advantage in this area. The
FECA compounds this advantage by subjecting independent communications to the full burden of compliance,92 while exempting internal
communications. 93 The additional expenses of compliance are added,
therefore, only to the more expensive form of communication. In addition, for internal solicitation, the corporate sponsor of the separate
segregated fund is permitted to pay the administrative expenses of
the PAC, unrestricted by the contribution limits. 9 " Yet, no PAC soliciting the general public can take advantage of any such donor. Administrative and all other expenses of such PACs, excluding only
compliance costs, must be paid out of restricted funds. The FECA,
therefore, encourages the PACs established by both corporations and
unincorporated associations to solicit internally. At the same time,
the Act makes it more expensive for the association PAC to solicit
contributions than it does for the corporate PAC.
The additional expense will engender increased difficulties when
organizing potential voters and contributors by way of independent
PACs rather than separate segregated funds. Amassing a large treasury is likely to be more difficult for comparable independent P ACs
than for separate segregated funds. Although it is possible for an independent fund to solicit from more people, separate segregated
funds can coordinate resources along industry, trade, or union lines.
The advantages the Court suggested, therefore, may not materialize.
Each separate PAC, moreover, acquires a separate contribution limit.
Hence, a number of small PACs linked by a common communication
system within an industry could make a much larger impact than the
single fund. Either way, any given number of voters will find it less
expensh;·e and less difficult to associate along industrial lines than
across industrial lines. That encouragement of special interest representation is the heart of the problem: the balkanization of the voting
public by the FECA. 911
•• Id. § 431(9)(A) (defining a political expenditure as "anything of value"). This invokes provisions relating to independence, id. § 431(17), content, id. § 431(18), disclosure, id. § 434, and
contributions, id. § 441a(a)(l)-(3), (7)(B); see FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197 (1982) (holding that provision of FECA requiring that a corporation without capital stock
solicit contributions only from its members, executive and administrative personnel, and their
families is constitutional because corporations' associational rights are overborne by congressional intent to deter corruption).
•• 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(3), 441(b)(2)(A) (1982).
•• Id. §§ 431(9)(B)(v), 441b(b)(2)(C).
•• These conclusions are somewhat ironic in view of the Court's conclusion that special re-
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The same difficulty infects the Court's first amendment analysis in
CALPAC. Although the Court split on the free speech issue, neither
opinion dealing with that issue found more at stake than "speech by
proxy" of each individual voter. 96 Neither opinion treated the limitations as a significant burden on that right. The unstated assumption
seems to have been that any voter barred from contributing to CALP AC, whether by law or by CALPAC's lack of resources to solicit the
voter, could simply contribute els~where. If that were not true, the
burden on individual contributors would have been great. A corollary
of that idea is the assumption that it makes little difference whether
the potential contributor finds and works through CALPAC or some
other organization. Yet, as we have explored, there is a significant
difference in the cost per solicitation through independent PACs, and
the cost of solicitation through separate segregated funds. Such a difference in cost affects the coalition of voters each committee reflects
and consequently affects the committee's position.

D.

BREADPAC: Industrial Associations Favored Over TransIndustrial Associations

The facts in Bread Political Action Committee v. FEC 97 posed the
problem of balkanization within industries. Plaintiffs were the separate segregated funds of trade associations with corporate and individual members which sought to solicit contributions from the shareholders and top management of member corporations. 98 Subsequent
to the passage of the FECA, however, many of the member corporations refused to permit such solicitation, despite the fact that solicitation was a right given to the member corporations under the Act. 99
Indeed, no corporation was permitted to authorize more than one
trade association to solicit its shareholders and employees. 100 Although the trade associations could have solicited individual members, they could not have mentioned the PAC in the context of that
solicitation. 101 Prevented from soliciting their most likely supporters,
strictions of corporate power are justified. See FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459 U.S.
197, 208 (1982) .
.. 453 U.S. at 196; id. at 202-03 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
17
635 F.2d 621 (7th Cir. 1980) (en bane), rev'd, 455 U.S. 577 (1982).
•• See id. at 623-24.
" Id. at 639 (Pell, J., dissenting).
100
2 U.S.C. § 44lb(b)(4)(D) (1982).
1 1
635 F.2d at 639 (Pell, J., dissenting).
•
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plaintiff PACs dwindled. 102 They sued the Federal Election Commisssion, seeking to overturn the prohibition.
The Seventh Circuit justified the restrictions as necessary "to prevent a proliferation of trade associations and solicitations which
would in turn undermine the very purpose of the Act's restrictions on
the use of corporate treasuries in federal elections." 103 It must be
noted, however, that trade association PACs soliciting within the
same member corporation would share a common limit on the contributions they could make to candidates or other political committees.104 The court of appeals dismissed as "tenuous" 1011 a claim by the
PACs that the statutory right of the corporate members to prohibit
solicitation by the trade associations represented a governmental
prior restraint in violation of the first amendment. It also dismissed
an equal protection challenge on the ground that the trade associations were inherently different from the corporations and unions to
which they tried to compare themselves. 106
The Supreme Court did not reach the merits, but reversed on the
ground that the trade associations had employed an expedited procedure under the FECA that was not available to them. 107 Neither the
court of appeals nor the Supreme Court discussed the implications of
the statute in dividing potential supporters among a variety of political committees which are statutorily required to remain separate
from one another. 108 The result, however, is that except for trade association PACs which have the unanimous support of the corporations in their industry, supporters of a given position will be split
among a variety of political committees or excluded from participating by barriers to identifying and locating like-minded PACs which
they could support.

E. International Association of Machinists: Corporate
Shareholders and Management-Divided From Employees
The FECA permits separate segregated funds established by corporations to solicit shareholders and management extensively, and al10

Id. at 637.
Id. at 628.
1
. . Id. at 642 (Pell, J., dissenting); see also 11 C.F.R. § 114.8(g)(l) (1985). Independent expenditures, however, are not limited.
10
• 635 F.2d at 629.
100
Id. at 629-31.
101
Bread Political Action Comm. v. FEC, 455 U.S. 577, 585 (1982).
10
• See 2 U.S.C. §§ 44la(a)(5), 441b(b)(4)(D) (1982) .
10

•
,

•

•

846

Albany Law Review

[Vol. 49

lows funds established by unions to solicit from their members. 109
The International Association of Machinists became concerned about
the potential growth of corporate funds compared with the more limited potential for growth of union funds, and sued to require a more
balanced rule. Unlike corporate PACs, union PACs were not authorized to solicit from non-member management of their parent union.
Nevertheless, the Machinists' attack was not leveled against that categorical difference, but rather against the actual and potential imbalance in resources. 110
The court of appeals identified the problem as the evenhandedness
of the treatment of corporate and labor funds. m The court reasoned
that the Act treated similarly situated people in the union and corporate context in commensurate ways. It sought to measure equality of
treatment by examining the similarity between the categories of people union and corporate funds were permitted to solicit. In the
court's view, the community of interests among corporate shareholders and upper management approximated the community of interests
among union members. 112 On that basis, the court of appeals sustained the challenged provisions of the Act. The Supreme Court affirmed without opinion. 113
Neither court, however, considered the balkanization of the electorate by these categories. Both corporate and labor funds share a similar restriction insofar as they are limited to soliciting largely from
their own membership. In that respect, the statute encourages both
corporations and unions to focus on internal perspectives, rather than
to structure their own messages to appeal to a broader segment of the
public. The statute encourages a narrowing of perspective in a twofold sense: first, a narrowing of focus to the industry; and second, a
narrowing of focus to the particular labor or management component
of that industry. Stockholders, officers, directors, and employees are
encouraged to "give at the office" rather than give to organizations
seeking a broader perspective which cuts across industrial or union
lines. In these respects, they share a disability. This disability is compensated for by the advantages the separate segregated funds gain in
funding. That compensation is inadequate, however, because all the
advantages and disadvantages reinforce a single overarching disadId. § 441b(b)(4)(A).
International Ass'n of Machinists v. FEC, 678 F.2d 1092, 1105 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane), aff'd
mem., 459 U.S. 983 (1982).
111
Id. at 1106-09.
111
Id. at 1107-08.
.,. International Ass'n of Machinists v. FEC, 459 U.S. 983 (1982) .
10
•

110

.
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vantage. That is, the rules make it more difficult to develop a broad
and inclusive appeal than a narrow and parochial one. That does not
cure the injury; rather, it aggravates it.
F.

Citizens Against Rent Control: Issues Favored Over Candidates

Although the facts in Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of
Berkeley 1 u did not specifically involve the FECA, the case reflects
the same difficulty. The Supreme Court held that contributions to
causes other than the election of candidates for office could not be
subjected to the restriction of contribution and expenditure limitations. m The Court's conclusion was based on the expectation that
large contributions to causes and ballot issues would not create the
type of harm that the Court feared would emanate from large contributions to candidates. 116
The Court's decision, however, may have changed the proportion of
funds spent on the discussion of issues and candidates, and the proportion of time and space made available to discuss those issues. 117
The specific funds, of course, may not have been eligible for contribution to candidates if the donor had reached the contribution limits of
section 441a of the FECA. 118 The combination of the prohibition
against contributing funds in one area, with the opportunity to make
those contributions in another, tends to rechannel money in the permitted direction.
There is obviously nothing wrong with a full discussion of ballot
proposals. Moreover, one can easily make the argument that election
campaigns in this country are considerably underfunded. But the
problem is that, in comparison to the campaigns over ballot issues,
the candidates and parties labor under substantial disabilities. Time
or space that might otherwise have been directed through the representative process may now be channeled through a competing process-a process that contributes to the balkanization of the political
landscape.
The same result was inherent in the Court's decision in Buckley, in
that the statute's restriction of expenditures "relative to" a candidate
must be construed narrowly to avoid squelching all political
454 U.S. 290 (1981).
Id. at 297-98.
110
See id. at 296-97.
117
See Lowenstein, supra note 1, at 595-96, in which the author argues that money flows
where it can make a difference among well financed and poorly financed issue campaigns.
11
• 2 U.S.C. § 441a (1982) .
114

110

-
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speech. 119 To have ruled otherwise would have assimilated virtually
all political speech to campaign rhetoric, and would have required
that all political speech meet the criteria of the FECA. Having made
the distinction, however, the Court encouraged people to avoid
"politics," that is, avoid supporting or opposing candidates. Instead,
the Court encouraged people to stick to "statecraft," that is, stick to
the issues.

IV.

BALANCING BENEFITS OF CAMPAIGN REGULATION AGAINST
BURDENS ON FREE AssocIATIONS

The preceding analysis implies either that the Court, in this line of
cases, was unaware of the practical effects of the FECA or that it
determined that those effects do not matter. If the Court's analysis
was based on the conclusion that the practical effects were of no significance with respect to the first amendment, the Court runs headlong into the first amendment purposes previously discussed. First
amendment considerations make the practical issues the Court
slighted quite significant. If one were an absolutist, one could derive
a rule from the foregoing premise: legislation which interferes with
the legitimate functions of political associations, or discriminates
among the legitimate functions of competing political associations,
should be proscribed. In Buckley v. Valeo,1 20 however, the Court employed a balancing test. Thus, there is another side to the consideration of the campaign finance law: whether the burdens of the FECA
on the exercise of the right of association can be justified by sufficiently important governmental interests.
The federal campaign finance laws were designed to limit corruption, 121 halt the spiraling costs of campaigning, 122 lessen the distractions of campaign fund raising, 123 and equalize the political contest.124 Congress was concerned about the impact of large campaign
contributions on the independence of elected officials 1211 and the bur424 U.S. at 40-44, 76-82.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
111
See supra note 9.
111
Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1975), rev'd on other grounds, 424 U.S. 1
(1976).
111
Id. at 838; 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1773, 1774-75. But see S. REP. No. 689, 93d
Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1974), reprinted in 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEws 5587, 5591 (low
contribution limits alone would compound problem for challengers).
114
See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
111 Id .
m

11 •
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geoning expense of election campaigns. 126 The cost of campaigning
had made it increasingly difficult for incumbents to concentrate on
the crucial task of governing, 127 and had apparently made it more
difficult for a challenger to raise sufficient funds to take on an
incumbent. 128
It now seems that the time lag involved in raising large campaign
chests from small contributions has increased, rather than decreased,
the distractions of fund raising. 129 The limitations on the amount of
contributions that may be solicited may have made it more, not less,
difficult to defeat an incumbent. 130 The statute can not be defended
as an equalizing measure partly for that reason, and partly because
equalization would not explain the statutory differentiations among
donors and recipients. In any case, the Court has refused to treat
equalization of political resources as a valid goal. 131 The Court's approach in Buckley was based entirely on the risk of corruption, undue influence and the appearance of corruption. 132
The Court's willingness to base a major restriction on the marketplace of ideas on the appearance of corruption is puzzling. The
Court's rationale appears to sanction restrictions based on rumor and
common misconceptions. Corruption, of course, is a serious problem.
It dilutes the effectiveness of the public election decision by permitting office holders to make decisions which directly or implicitly contradict the public will or damage the public interest. 133 Measures
countering corruption, therefore, implement compelling constitutional purposes. 134
ue 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & Ao. NEWS 1774-75.
See M. FIORINA, CONGRESS - KEYSTONE OF THE WASHINGTON ESTABLISHMENT 39-50 (1977).
12
• See G. JACOBSON, supra note 39, at 195.
... Id. at 70; see also INSTITUTE OF POLITICS, supra note 71, at 52, 53-60.
0
"
G. JACOBSON, supra note 39, at 157, 194. Congress may have intentionally provided that
the FECA limit funds to be raised by the challenger so as to make it more difficult for the
challenger to defeat the incumbent. Id. at 183-90. When the Supreme Court reviewed the statute in Buckley, it declined to base its rationale on the difficulty or inequality of fundraising.
See 424 U.S. at 48-49 .
... See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 48-49.
1
"
Id. at 26-27.
ua See Banfield, Corruption as a Feature of Governmental Organization, 18 J.L. & EcoN.
587, 587-88 (1975) (defining corruption as agent's knowing sacrifice of principal's interests to
agent's).
u• The existence of a right to vote which is diluted by corruption was denied by the Court in
San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78, 34-36 (1973) (stating that
"the right to vote, per se, is not a constitutionally protected right"). But the Court has consistently treated the right to vote as a fundamental interest requiring the strictest scrutiny of any
abridgement. See Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 626 (1969) (stating
that " 'any alleged infringement of the right of citizens to vote .must be carefully and meticu117

.
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Nevertheless, the struggle against corruption cannot be infinitely
valued. 1311 If the FECA's purpose is to protect the integrity of the
vote and the political process, it makes no sense to combat corruption by diluting the vote or distorting the electoral process in other
ways. This is particularly true if the Act has little impact in forestalling corruption.
As Congress had constructed the FECA before it was brought to
the Court in Buckley, campaign funds were carefully channeled
through the authorized campaign committees of the candidates, and
their expenditures were restricted. 136 Only the candidates and their
parties were permitted to spend more than nominal sums in the campaign.137 Even under that original version of the FECA, some significant influence was still possible. Contribution limits were set low
enough to bar multimillionaires from single-handedly funding election campaigns, but still high enough to be out of reach of the ordinary citizen. 138 The limits applied to each family member, so that
those disposed to exceed the $1000 limitation on contributions to a
single candidate, or $25,000 to a party, could arrange to contribute
through spouses and children. The combined limit could still yield a
substantial sum. Moreover, the likelihood that wealthy candidates
had wealthy friends increased the probability that these candidates
could arrange for much larger contributions. 139 The statute permitted
significant communications between management and employees, unions or other organizations and their members by way of internal
lously scrutinized" (quoting Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562 (1964))); Harper v. Virginia
Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 664-70 (1966) (holding unconstitutional a poll tax as violating
equal protection clause despite rational but not compelling grounds); J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND
DISTRUST 116-25 (1980).
130
Banfield, supra note 133, at 589-91.
,.. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § lOl(a),
88 Stat. 1263, 1264-65, reprinted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 190-94 app., § 608(c)-(e),
repealed by Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201(a),
90 Stat. 475, 496.
m See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, § 203(a), 86 Stat. 3, 9
(1972) and Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § lOl(a),
(b), 88 Stat. 1263, 1263-66, reprinted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 187-95 app., repealed by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat.
475, 496.
,.. See Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § lOl(b),
88 Stat. 1263, 1263-64, reprinted in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 189-90 app., repealed by
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, § 201(a), 90 Stat.
475, 496.
u• See Smith, Federal Election Law Part/: Ways Around the $1,000 Ceiling, 3 CAMPAIGNS
AND ELECTIONS, Summer 1982, at 16; Smith, Federal Election Law Part II: What You Can Get
Away With!, 3 CAMPAIGNS AND ELECTIONS, Fall 1982, at 10.
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channels of communication. 140 Newspapers and broadcasters were
also permitted to editorialize without restriction by the FECA. 141 Finally, and most importantly, the FECA pierced the limitation on
campaign advocacy by corporations and unions directed to a public
beyond their respective employees and members. 142 These political
action committees (PACs) have become a significant part of political
life since the passage of the FECA. 143
The Supreme Court added significantly to the possibilities for continued influence under the FECA by striking down the limitations on
expenditures for candidates and independent organizations. 144 The
Court increased the opportunity for influence by defining contributions and expenditures to exclude a large part of political speech. 1411
Only express advocacy of a clearly identified candidate would invoke
the limitations. The Court recognized that the liberty to participate
in the political debate was dependent on the ability to pool funds. 146
The Court, therefore, promptly exposed the inherent contradiction
between combating corruption by placing limitations on campaign financing on the one hand, and the constitutional and democratic imperative of freedom of speech on the other. Under the FECA as restructured following Buckley, therefore, independent organizations
can play a significant role in the campaign without limitation on their
expenditures. 147 These include citizen organizations, corporate and
union PACs, lobbies, trade associations, and other special interest
groups.
In addition to the constitutional barriers to a more comprehensive
statute, there are structural barriers as well. The existence of great
wealth and the fluidity of money make restriction quite difficult. After Buckley, political scientists promptly sought to identify and catalogue the new paths which money would follow in approaching
See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431(9)(B)(iii), 441b(b)(2)(A) (1982)).
141
See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(B)(i) (1982).
1
"
See id. § 441b(b)(2)(C); see also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (corporate right to speak).
143
U.S. LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, POLITICAL ACTION COMMITTEES: THEIR EVOLUTION AND GROWTH AND THEIR IMPLICATIONS FOR THE POLITICAL SYSTEM 55-56,
83-87 (1981) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE).
144
See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. at 39-59.
14
• Id. at 40-44, 76-82 ..
14
• Id. at 19-20, 22; see also California Medical Ass'n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182, 203 (1981) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
m PACs may not, however, increase the percentage of special interest money in all aspects of
politics. See Malbin, The Problem of PAC-Journalism, Pusuc OPINION, Dec./Jan. 1983, at 1516.
140

..
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trivial interests.
When alternative means are considered, the FECA becomes even
less defensible. The use of disclosure to control corruption in the political process was never tested on a full presidential election campaign, and only briefly implemented during a congressional election,
before it was combined with an extensive panoply of restrictions on
contributions and expenditures. m Proposals were developed in Congress for tax incentives to encourage more people to contribute more
money to campaigns in an effort to limit from the opposite direction
the impact of particularly large donations. 166 Such proposals would
have increased the potential competitiveness of challengers as against
incumbents. 166 Finally, proposals to alter the equal time provisions of
,.. The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 became effective in April 1972, and thus was
already within the 1972 election cycle. See Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No.
92-255, § 406, 86 Stat. 3, 20 (1972); 1972 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 23 (providing that Act be
effective sixty days after date of enactment, February 7, 1972, thus making Act effective April
8, 1972). The Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974 became effective on January
1, 1975. Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, § 410(a), 88
Stat. 1263, 1304; 1974 U.S. CODE CONG. & An. NEWS 1486. The 1976 amendments became effective upon approval on May 11, 1976, thus completing the change before the 1976 elections.
Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, 502 .
... See CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, supra note 143, at 206-07. For a discussion of the
variety of plans introduced in Congress, see id. at 185-220.
,.. Increasing the amount of the tax deduction, as opposed to its accessibility, may impose
substantial expense in proportion to the new money generated. Lowenstein, supra note 1, at
603. One commentator maintains that tax incentives have had a de minimus effect. See Jacobson, supra note 39, at 199-200. Political consultants might not have a difficult time devising a
system more fully utilized than this tax deductible system which separates the writing of the
contribution check, the keeping of records, the tax accounting, and the eventual repayment.
See L. SABATO, supra note 6; Comment, The Federal Election Campaign Act and Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act: Problems in Defining and Regulating Independent Expenditures, 1981 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 977, 1003-05 (proposing vouchers).
A completely different approach advocated by a substantial number of political scientists is
to abandon the weak party approach, which has dominated legal thinking since the Progressive
era, and to permit stronger parties to deal with the importunities of the moneyed. See AMER!·
CAN POLITICAL SCIENCE Ass'N, COMM. ON POLITICAL PARTIES, TOWARD A MORE RESPONSIBLE TwoPARTY SYSTEM (1951). Contra E. GRIFFITH & F. VALEO, CONGRESS: ITS CONTEMPORARY ROLE 157
(1975); C. ROSSITER, PARTIES AND POLITICS IN AMERICA 182 (1975); Turner, Responsible Parties:
A Dissent from the Floor, 45 AM. PoL. Sc1. REV. 143, 143-52 (1951). Under the weak party
approach, the parties are unable to maintain cohesive positions and are unable to require their
office-holding members to adhere to party position. For more recent work espousing the strong
party thesis, see D. Thelen, Two Traditions of Progressive Reform, Political Parties and American Democracy and E. Ladd, Jr., Party "Reform" Since 1968: A Case Study in Intellectual
Failure, in THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM UNDER STRONG AND WEAK PARTIES 37-59, 8193 ( F. Bonomi, J. Burns & A. Ranney eds. 1981). See also J. CEASER, supra note 6, at 339-53; J.
KIRKPATRICK, supra note 73. The strong party thesis advocates that parties can maintain cohesive positions and can require members who held office to adhere to such positions. For the
argument that the weak party rules departed from constitutional requirements, see Gottlieb,
supra note 4, at 196-208.
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the communications law1117 would significantly increase the flexibility
of the campaign without restraining the activities of public political
organization. 1118

V.

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has been sensitive to fears concerning the impact of political groups, but has failed to explore the functions of
political associations in any systematic way. A Court which reflects
only popular prejudice does a disservice to our political system. The
FECA has severely restricted the roles parties and other political
groups perform in the electoral process. It is not many years ago that
such interference in the functions of private political associations
would have seemed unthinkable. 1119 Now that it has become thinkable, a reconsideration is in order.

See 47 U.S.C. § 315 (1982).
See Gottlieb, The Role of Law in the Broadcast of Political Debate, 37 FED. B.J. 1, 13-23
(1978).
'"" Note, Freedom of Association and the Selection of Delegates to National Political Conventions, 56 CORNELL L. REV. 148, 152-53 (1970). But see Gottlieb, supra note 4, at 196-200
(examining the limits of that perspective).
m
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for a panel on
ROLES OF ELECTION AGENCIES
at a forum on election laws
held in New York City on October 21, 1987
and sponsored by the New York State
COMMISSION ON GOVERNMENT INTEGRITY

•

Thank you Mr. Chairman for the opportunity to make a presentation before
this Commission as it studies the issue of government integrity and
makes recommendations for the improvement of the system and image of
New York.
I am currently an Assistant Staff Director of the U.S. Federal Election
Commission (FEC) in Washington, D.C.

I am in charge of a division

which has the responsibility to disclose to the public federal campaign
finance reports from candidates for the offices of President, U.S.
Senator, and U.S. Representative, as well as their supporting political
committees.

We also make public the personal financial statements of

the presidential candidates.
sentin~

This afternoon however, I will be pre-

my own personal views on the roles of election agencies.

These

views are not official statements of the FEC and have not been reviewed
or discussed with them.
I have worked directly in the field of money in politics since March
1972, one month before the implementation of the Federal Election
Campaign Act.

During these last fifteen years I have seen many new

laws passed in the area of campaign finance, ethics, and lobbying.
I have seen many new types and forms of federal and state commissions
established.

I have assisted many reporters writing of new avenues

of political money being created and built.
cry of

un~ntended

I have heard individuals

consequences of the new laws.

I have read countless

arguments about the constitutionality of various systems.

I have

heard candidates, political party officials and other regulated persons
screRm for a level financial playing field.

1

No doubt you will hear

recounted much of the same history from your staff and other witnesses.
I would like to concentrate this afternoon on only one major area of conern
Disclosure.

This area has been the one constant continuing success

throughout the many federal and state efforts to improve the integrity of
government.

It also has provided the necessary documentation of the

movement of money in politics to make additonal improvements and amendments in campaign finance, ethics, and lobby laws.
Even the U.S. Supreme Court has periodically emphasized the basic need for
this type of disclosure.

In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court reminded us

that
"informed public opinion is the most potent of all
restraints upon mis-government."
As this study commission looks at the causes of mis-government in New Yolk
I hope it will also heed a second reminder from the same Supreme Court
case.
"disclosure increases the quality of information
reaching the body politic and furthers the first
amendment goal of producing an informed public
capable of conducting its own affairs."
In highlighting the topic of disclosure this afternoon maybe a few new
ideas or suggestions will be brought out and adopted by this study
commission and then passed in laws which will increase the quality of
information reaching the New York body politic - especially the voters.
The voters need to be informed about money in politics in order to solve
the government integrity problem in New York.

2

Even with the passage

of this year's ethics law there still appears to be only token efforts
advanced to improve the public's cynical view of government.

Some

even say New York government integrity is a contradiction in terms.
It appears that the legislative efforts assume that the public does
not need to see all the financial disclosures.

It appears that

government, or advisory bodies it appoints, will take care of it for
the poor uneducated public.
My strongest recommendation to this panel is to go far beyond the
ethics law recently passed and far beyond earlier campaign finance
and lobby laws and require full disclosure of money in politics.
This disclosure should be to the voters and the public.
only an attitude or administrative procedure.

It is not

It is a duty that

cannot be left to the whim or decision of governments or their appointed
individuals.

The obligation and duty of full disclosure must be

weaved into every section of the campaign finance, ethics and lobby
laws.

If it is not, the disclosure dreams that once were thought to be

mandated will be slowly but surely watered down by regulations, advisory
opinions, lack of enforcement, and budgetary concerns.
In my presentation I would like to outline ten major roles which an
overall combined state disclosure agency should be mandated to carry
out.

Each of these are disclosure efforts and would drastically improve

the integrity of government in New York.

3

EDUCATION OF THE PUBLIC

The first major role I would suggest is to educate the public about
money in politics.

Now this may seem like a rather mundane basic step

but I will explain how it is a deep and involved topic

one that is

usually left out of legislation in favor of other policy changes such
as public financing, contributions limits, outside income, etc.
However, disclosure and education do
all these other changes.

provide a basic foundation for

Without that foundation your efforts in the

more interesting "hot" topics will fail.
When I say 'educate the public' I am considering the public to include
the general public, the press, the legislators, the judges, the executive and civil servants, the issue groups, lobbyists, corporations,
unions, and others.

And the phrase 'money in politics' is meant to be

a broad one covering all areas of money in politics - campaign finance,
ethics, lobbying, political party activity, personal financial data, etc.
This broad approach is much more realistic than just talking of campaign
finance or lobbying expenditures.

When one looks at one of these

pockets of money it is only because previous legislative efforts or
scandals occurred in that one area.

Examples include the Federal

Election Campaign Act which passed the House of Representatives on the
day Nixon resigned; and the federal Ethics In Government Act which was
passed

a~ter

and gifts.

numerous Congressional scandals involving outside income
To look at only one area is an arbitrary limitation.

And in some ways forces a person to miss other pockets of money.
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If one goes out and talks to an official or someone who is trying to
influence public officials in New York they will probably laugh at your
interest in just one area of concern.

Even after passing an ethics

law for personal financial income, the officials and lobbyists are
still unconcerned.

For each of them has many more pockets from

which to pull out funds or into which to put funds.

They are the ones

who know which pocket the money is coming from and through which
account it is moving.
If you regulate campaign funds in one pocket, they simply shift to
using honoraria funds from another pocket.

If you regulate that, they

shift to lobby expenditures from another pocket.

If you regulate that,

they shift to using extra party funds from another pocket.

If you

regulate that, they shift to providing additional outside income from
another JDCket.

If you regulate that, they shift to spending on ballot

issues or non-profit organization activity from another pocket.

If that

is regulated, they shift to hiring a family member of a legislator,
paying for a free trip or holiday, paying unearned legal fees to a
I

legislators law firm, or giving the official a financial stake in a
business deal from another pocket.
After awhile the loopholes are widely known and the movement of funds
in and out of other pockets becomes almost blatant.

The most recent

federal example is the $1 million gift from Joan Kroc to the Democratic
National Committee - when the contribution limit to political parties
is currently only $20,000.

So $20,000 goes into the DNC's pocket for

their regulated federal account and $980,000 goes into various other
unregulated pockets.
5

The education of the public, especially the voter, to what is in the
pockets of candidates, officials, or organizations as well as who put
it there or where it came from

may tell them more about who they are

or who they represent. · However, it is almost impossible to educate
someone on the role of money in politics by looking only at the
campaign finance reports at the Board of Elections, or lobbyist
reports at the Temporary Commission on Lobbying, or at personal
financial disclosure statement at an ethics office.
discloses one pocket of funds.

Each office only

No one sees the whole candidate,

lobbyist or organization - with all of its pockets of money.
I would suggest the creation of a single combined disclosure commission,
possibly with your same name - Comr.iission on Government Integrity.

In

a way it would follow your lead by looking into all areas of money in
politics.
also.

You have the power to look into all the pockets.

It should

You are trying to educate with these forums and it should also.

This new Commission ought to receive and disclose, at one central
location, the following types of documents:
1.

The Commission should disclose personal financial reports of
legislators, executive office holders, state employees,
judicial members, and candidates for these offices.
would include the spouse's income as well.

This

ALL parts of the

report and all income and wealth should be made public
including values of funds.

To hold something back and say

the person doesn't feel it's of interest is to still leave
the impression that something is hidden.

Even if you have an

advisory committee view the document and decide if it should
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Documents disclosed by new Commission (continued)

be public you still leave the impression that his/her political
friends have

~elped

their pal and kept it hidden.

If the

person claims it has no relevance than it should be the first
and easiest thing disclosed.
At the federal level it is all disclosed.
U.S. Senator to U.S. Representative.

From President to

If you look at a New

York presidential candidate's recent presidential filing it
covers a wide range of financial data and is easily accessible
to review or copy
Washington, D.C.

in our store front disclosure office in
To see it you don't have to ask for the

public part and fight for the private part, or force a legislative meeting to see the whole thing.

If you want to see any

of the New York Senators' reports they are available.

If you

want to see any of the reports from the New York House delegation you can look them up in this public document. All of
their reports are diclosed.
2.

No parts are hidden.

The Commission should disclose lobby activity.
Many of the states have done a better job than the federal government in this area.

These states have general reports of employers

and lobbyists employed for certain efforts.
p~ess

If legislators, the

or the public want to see who someone is working for,a call

to these offices can find the answer.

Some of the states have

even computerized their records and provide numerous cross
references.

The states of Washington, Massachusetts, California,

Florida, and New York are good examples.
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Some have also published

Documents disclosed by new Commission (continued)

data.

A publication of the Secretary of State of California even

includes photos of the lobbyists.

It is interesting to note that

a match up of the names of lobbyists and clients with the unknown
political committees filing campaign finance reports often provide;
solid clues to why the committee registered.

If one had access

to a political contributor list it may help explain why a certain
lobbyist works well with certain legislators.

It is this cross

indexing with other types of information which should be the next
step for New Yorl<.•. If these lobby records were in the same office
as other records the comparisons would be easier.

3. The Commission should disclose both state and federal campaign finance
reports.
The candidates for executive, legislative, judicial offices, political
parties, and other interest groups should be filing reports.

But to

simply make the reports available in file cabinets doesn't do much
for disclosure or education.

The new combined Commission must turn

these reports around and make them understandable to the general publi:.
It should help people cut through the mountains of paper showing
endless transactions and find the key data requested.
a mandated duty not an administrative desire.

This should be

To illustrate some

ways to disclose and educate about money in politics I have brought
with me several examples of computerized cross referencing and
indexing which we use at the FEC.
One type of printout indexes all the records available which mention
a candidate's name.

The computer searches through every report
8
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received from every filer and searches for references to that candidate.
Here are printouts for both the current U.S. Senators.

These printouts

shows their receipts, expenditures, all their PAC money, party money,
and several other areas of spending reported by others involved with
their elections.
Another type of printout deals with all the PAC or political committee
money which is given out by a single corporation, or·union's PAC.
This printout shows all the funds they have given out and identifies
each candidate who received it along with the aggregate amount received.
Another printout dea!s with individual contributions and indicates to
whom contributions were given, the amount, and the date,

This

printout lists in alphabetical order each contribution of $500 or more
given by persons with New York state addresses to any federal candidate,
PAC, party committee, or other entity. You can easily look up your rich
uncle or the person who was indicted last week for some activity. You
can look up a contractor or someone recently appointed to a political
position.
We also provide summary volumes of data so that one can see where their
candidate or committee fits into the larger picture.

This volume

provides statistical campaign finance data on House and Senate campaigns
in 1984.

We even issue press releases indicating the top candidates and

committees in various categories such as receipt, expenditures, cash on
hand and PAC money.
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Many states have also broadened the public knowledge of campaign money
by regularly publishing their own statistical information.

The states of

Missouri, Washington, California, Oregon, Hawaii, Nebraska, New Jersey,
and Idaho are good examples.
These are the things that New York could be doing right now.

I realize

New York is starting to enter into its computer certain base line items
from campaign reports but there is much left to do.
the state Board of

Twelve years ago

Elections developed the software program for a

statewide contributor list similar to the federal list I just showed you.
The knowledge is there but more support is necessary.

Mandating these

responsibilities in the law would be a start.
This disclosure of state campaign finance reports should also be complemented with the disclosure of copies of the federal reports of political
committees moving funds into New York State.

More and more party funds

at the federal and state level are being comingled and washed so that
it is almost impossible to tell where the funds came from or whom they
will benefit.

By disclosing them at the same location, it may be

easier to cross index and trace transfers and money movements.
My last comment on the campaign finance reports is that the law should
require the reporting and disclosure of the adminstrative costs of
operating the political committee or
These

cos~s

corporate or union political fund.

should be known and understood by the public and legislators.
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4.

The new Commission should disclose all political party activity.
And here I define political party to be broader than just the one
of two reportin& accounts to the state or federal government.

We

are starting to see more and more subaccounts which do not
report but yet are directed by or controlled by the staff of the
political party.

All of these funds should be disclosed.

This

should cover accounts for redistricting (which will be growing
in the next two years), get out the vote activity, voter registration efforts, building funds,

litigation and legal services,

recount efforts, ballot security or voting programs, and all other
accounts under the direct or indirect control of the political
party.
I would also like to make a brief comment on the recent news
stories about New York State employees and facilities being used
for political purposes.

I strongly encourage this Conunission to

recommend an instant and complete break of political activities
from government payrolls and facilities.

Judges who state it is

too commonplace an infraction to warrant punishment or prosecutors
who fail to carry out their responsibilities to halt this very
blatant mis-use of taxpayers funds, should be brought before a
legal standards panel.

Why public officials or citizens aren't

filing law suits to recover state funds I don't know.

It may be a

sign of how bad the New York system really is - and how apathetic
its guardians of justice appear to be.

It certainly indicates how

big a task is in front of this study Commission.
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5.

The new Commission should disclose all legislative or leadership
accounts.

More and more legislators, especially those in

leadership positions or who are seeking leadership positions,
are setting up their own political committees or legislative
accounts.

These accounts should be abolished or fully report

to the new Commission.

On the federal level they are a way

around the contribution limits of PACs and individuals.

Rules

on group affiliations and contribution limits should be tightly
written so that lobbyists ,

other interest groups, and those

in leadership positions do not make a mockery of the law.
6.

The Commission should disclose the payrolls of the legislature,
the executive offices, the judiciary, and the regulatory agencies.
All of these should be made public at the new Commission.

One

should not have to subpoena records just to see who is on what
payroll with government funds.

At the federal level the Congress

prints a public document listing those on the legislative payroll.
If one wanted to look up the salary or name of any staff member
belonging to the New York delegation in Congress, open up this
book.
7.

Even reimbursed expenses to individuals are listed.

The new Commission should disclose spending on referenda and
ballot issues.

Here is another area where the same company which

has a paid lobbyist, or gives out honoraria, or campaign contributions, may also be spending thousands of dollars to send mailings
or advertising to New York constituents supporting or opposing a
ballot issue.

This is a public policy area and the voters ought to
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know who is backing which proposal.

It is another pocket of

money in politics.
8.

The new Commission should disclose certain summary figures from
fundraisers and tax-exempt institutions.

Hore and more states are

moving into the area of regulation of professional fundraisers and
the reporting of the activities of non-profit organizations
operating within their state.

In the case of fundraisers there is

a growing concern over the level of administrative costs associated
with the services provided when only a fraction of the income is
left after expenses.

Fraudulent fundraising schemes often deter

potential givers from contributing to real charities and turn them
off from political giving.
In

tax-exe~pt

areas more and more questions are being raised over

the political and quasi-political activity of these groups.

Some-

times it may only be the timing or coordination of those groups'
activities with the political goals of others, or it may be in the
use of tax subsidized postal rates.

A U.S. Postal Rate Commission

study released two weeks ago indicated that more than 20% of the
10.9 billion pieces of third class mail sent last year carried
some political message.
It is, however, a quagmire to legislate in.

The federal government

keeps trying to define lobby activity and fails.

There is even a

Congressional subcommittee now looking into political activity of
foundations and religious organizations.
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I don't think one can
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legislate too deeply in this area, but one can call for
reportirig of certain summary financial figures which after
numerous years may show some kind of pattern that will call
for legislative action.

Without base information however,

nothing is known of this pocket of money.

A small step

may be the disclosure on the federal level of a tax-exempt
organization's full IRS Form 990, only part of which is now
available under the Freedom of Information Act.

On the

state level, a step might be to simply require a copy of that
full Form 990 to be filed and disclosed in the state where
it has activities.

This full financial form would be disclosed

at the new Commission.

c

9.

The new Commission should disclose additional cross-referencing
of funds as they are developed with other documents or agencies.
During a recent visit to the District of Columbia Off ice of
Campaign Finance I saw a good attempt to develop new comparisons.
The off ice had obtained from another city agency a list of every
city contractor and vendor.
list with

~hose

Their plan is

to cross check this

appointed to .clty boards. and .. commissions.

Each of these nine areas represent pockets of political money.

They must

be disclosed at one location so that a person can easily see the whole
picture -

all of the pockets.

Mandated cross-referencing and indexing

should prove invaluable to understanding the movement of money in·
politics.

Audits, investigations, or inquiries of one type of fund in

one organization should be vital to the next audit, investigation, or
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inquiry into another type of fund in the same organization.

Over time

experience builds up and questionable activity of an organization can be
reviewed more quickly and more

completel~.

Questions about related funds

and other pockets of money will be thorough and enlightening. ,
At present several states have a central conunission to consolidate some of
these basic types of information.

Although some are small in size their

operations and coordination give them an excellent chance for success.
These state conunissions are the California Fair Political Practices
Connnission, the District of Columbia Office of Campaign Finance, the
Oklahoma Ethics Commission, and the Washington Public Disclosure
Commission.

Alaska, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Minnesota, Nebraska,

and New Jersey have commissions which .combine most of the core data as well.
In several other states some of these doucments may be located in the
office of the Secretary of State.
varied duties.

These offices usually have many

However, it can generally be stated that efforts, funds,

and interest are usually first put into other areas such as registering
corporations and election adminstration.
quite

These offices are usually

underfunded and understaffed.

Still other states have some of these documents filed with an agency
which also has election administration responsibilities, such as a
state Board of Elections •

In general, these offices consider their

election administration duties to be paramount to their smaller efforts
and budgets for campaign finance or other disclosures.
The new Commission should pull together as many types of disclosure
documents as possible under new combined commission.
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ANALYSIS OF INFORMATION

The second major role of a new combined disclosure Commission should be
to analyze the information on money in politics.

Just as this study

Commission is trying to find out the trends and costs involved in the
election process, the new Commission ought to do this on a continuing
basis.

Then as public demand grows for alterations and amendments

people will have the data in front of therJ. to make the proper decisions.
It is a disappointment that New York information is not available now.
If one is concerned about the high costs of campaigns we ought to
know what has been spent by candidates.

If one is talking of limits

for individuals contributions we ought to know how many and how big
contributions have been made.

If one is talking about expenditure

limits on campaigns we ought to know the rising areas of costs that
are in campaigns - high TV, high mail, high consultants, or even
poor spending habits of candidates.
In the recent debate in the U.S. Senate over changes to the Federal
Election Campaign Act we finally saw the development of regular
comparisons and trend analysis on federal races.

At the beginning of

the debate various Senators were using all sorts of figures, some
stated correctly, some mangled beyond belief.

But halfway through

the debate the Library of Congress came out with several reports
which laid out a whole series of basic statistical data for all to use.
They prodUced comparison figures in almost every imaginable way.
Therefor these neutral factual figures could be used by any side if
they felt they proved their case.

It was a tremendous improvement

in the quality of the debate.
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Hopefully, this type of longitudinal data can be updated after each
election cycle and ready for instant use whenever campaign finance
legislation is brought up again.
several reports from

t~e

As examples of this data, here are

Library of Congress and some from other states.

Of particular interest might be the study on developing an index of
campaign costs in the state of Washington, a trend analysis from a
combination of groups in West Virginia, and the massive report from
Bob Stern's study commission in California.
On the federal level there have been many other studies which utilize
basic data from the FEC.

All of these studies can be produced because

the raw data is available to the public on an easily accessible basis
from the FEC.

I would hope that this study Commission would recommend

this same accessibility for New York data. The resulting analysis
could be very helpful to the public, the legislature, and others.
All it takes is a true desire for disclosure to make it available in
forms that can be utlized.

To simply open the doors of a records office

and say here it is certainly is not enough.

It must be a mandated duty

of a central disclosure cor.nnission.
Earlier I mentioned the various computer printouts and listings that the
FEC provides, but

there are several other methods that should be

mentioned regarding analysis of data.

For example, the FEC makes its

entire disclosure data base available to the public through direct
communications between a person's or organization's own computer and
the FEC's computer.

This material can be transmitted in the formatted

printouts I showed you earlier or in unformatted streams of data into
one's own storage equipment.

The FEC also makes the formatted data
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available free to each state in the office of the Secretary of State,or
state Board of Elections, or other disclosure commission.

We now have

eleven states tapping our data and then providing it to their constituents and public in their state.

Fourteen more states are in various

stages of hooking up their equipment and training their staff. As of
today New York State is not one of those states which has requested or
showed interest in this effort to provide federal campaign finance data
more quickly and convienently to the voters, the public, or the press.
The FEC also makes computer tapes available to the general public.
If someone has a large computer facility or access to one, tapes can
sometimes be more economical to obtain data and thus analyze vast amounts
of data.

DISCLOSURE POLICIES AND PROCEDURES

The third role of a new central disclosure Commission should be to set
an example of disclosure in its own policies and procedures. I think
the FEC does a good job in this area and I would encourage this study
Connnission to mandate the same for the new disclosure Commission.
-Hold open public hearings before writing regulations
-Hold normal open meetings with all agenda documents and material
public prior to the meeting.
-Make available tapes or transcripts of the meetings, as well as
meetings involving completed compliance cases.
-Hake requests for advisory opinions public, as well as the resulting
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advisory opinion.
-Make public all audits and compliance actions when completed.
-Release the names of completed compliance cases on a regular basis.
-Make

court actions and other agency litigation material public at

the Commission at the same time it is filed in court.
-Make public a topical index of compliance actions and opinions.
All of these steps help to insure those on all sides of issues that
there is a level playing field and that actions are not being taken
in secret.

They help to produce an attitude of trust and fairness.

I certainly understand that individual enforcement cases would be
confidential until completed, but the general policy, regulation,
and procedural activities of the Connnission ought to be public. How
it has set up its priorities, how it has divided its budget, discussions
or needs of internal improvements, all should be on the public record.
On the federal level, the public's ability to see the products and
procedures of the Commission have been very beneficial.

ASSISTANCE TO THE PUBLIC AND PRESS

The fourth major role for the new Commission should be to set an
example of disclosure in its assistance to the public and press.
In general, most candidates, reporters, and voters don't know what
the rules and regulations state.

This new Commission must take

very aggressive>positive steps to inform the public and press.
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These might include educational pamphlets, brochures, training
courses, guidebooks, and even videos.

At a recent meeting of the

Council on Governmental Ethics Laws, the participating representatives
from campaign finance, ·ethics, and lobby commissions throughout the
country saw a video produced by the Ontario Commission on Election
Contributions and Expenses.

It was prepared with the help of the

legislature's TV and Recording Studio.

It was an excellent show

on the duties and steps which a campaign treasurer should follow
to comply with their law.
that topic interesting.

It had to have been excellent to make
These are the kinds of new ideas a new

Commission should be developing or seeking out - and yet no one
from New York's agencies was at this group's annual conference.
This last year the FEC came out with a new citizen's quide to the
federal law on campaign financing.

It is meant to reach out much

farther that ever before - to persons on the periphery of campaigns
and elections - hopefully enlightening them on permissible activities
for them to particpate in during next year's election.
The FEC also has a toll free phone line which is available to anyone
if they want to get information or materials from the agency.

This

can be used by a potential candidate, a treasurer, a party leader,
a press person, a student, or anyone.
themselves.
getting

~t

They do not have to identify

In this way we really are trying to assist people in
right the first time.

If they fully understand the rules,

they will fill out more accurate reports, write correct press
stories, and help avoid false acqusations based on a poor or mistaken
understanding of the law.
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The FEC also provides a large research area for the public to view
reports and enough copiers

to obtain quick copies.

Although we use

the computer for indexine,the printouts utilize English for a language not computereeze.

We fill requests which we receive in the

mail and over the phone from around the country.

The types of

requesters include the press, candidates, party researchers, staff
of political action committees, acadereics and political scientists,
and many others.
year.

Over 10,000 requests are received and filled each

As a result thousands of persons are looking at each others

reports.

Another simple yet very important element of the FEC Public Records
operation is that we do not force people to identify who they are
or which reports they are looking at.

The Commission has found that

there is nothing more harmful to the free flow of inf orrnation than
the intrusion of government into the freedom to look and read what is
on the public record.

There is no need for such identification.

New York has such an identification requirement and I strongly
encourage you to have the legislature repeal it.

The only reason I

can see for such a statement is one left over from years past when
the records were kept by political lackies of the incumbents in power.
These so called public officials would then forward copies of these
forms back to the legislators to show them who was looking at their
records and might be doing research or a news story about them.

The

record keeper would score points with the legislator and the leg!slator
would have advance word on the resarch.
public record keepers.
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So much for neutral impartial
>

The question to ask in this age is,MWhy is this provision still in
effect? •• My suggestion to persons who don't want to change is to say,
"Assume everyone in the world is looking at your records."
be your opponent, the press, your worst enemy, or anyone.

It could
Kno~ing

that they are looking should not change anything on the forms unless
they weren't complete or accurate in the first place.

COOPERATiml
The new Comnission should fully cooperate with other agencies in
disclosing info!'l':'lation.

I am constantly amazed at the number of

federal and state agencies which contact the FEC for information and
don't understand that, of course, we provide it and that we make it
public every day of the week in Washinf:ton, D.C.

Many of these agencies, departments, or government investigative units
do not really have a background or expertise in the doucnents available or the nany avenues of money in politics.

What they do have,

however, is a lead to follow up or acqusations which might involve
money in politics and their own area of interest or jurisdiction.
I think they have tended to follow those leads further and more
thoroughly when they can get soQe basic assistance or advice from a
good disclosure cor:nnission.
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At the federal level requests for copies of reports cone from a
wide variety of governmental bodies such as the following:
-Department of Justice (Criminal Division, Organized Crime
Strike Force, Public Integrity Section)
-Various U. S. Attorneys
-Chicago Strike Force, Organized Crime & Racketeering Section
-FBI, U.S. Secret Service, Watergate Special Prosecution Force
-IRS, SEC, FTC
-Inspector Generals of the Departments of Agriculture, Labor,
HEW, HUD, GSA, SBA, and U.S. Postal Service
-Off ice of Government Ethics
-Merit Systems Protection Board
-General Accounting Office

-u. s.
-u.s.

House Committee on Standards of Official Conduct
Senate Committee on Government Affairs

-U.S. Senate Select Committee on Secret

}~ilitary

Assistance to

Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition.
-Various state election boards, ethics agencies, and campaign
finance commissions
-New York examples:

U.S. Attorney, Eastern District of New York
U.S. Attorney, Southern District of New York
State of New York, Commission on Investigation
State of New York, Deputy Attorney General
for Medicaid Fraud Control
State of New York, Department of Labor
City of New York, Department of Investigation
Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor
Various District Attorneys
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ENFORCEMENT OF DISCLOSURE

The sixth major role of the new Commission should be to set the
example of disclosure bv its solid enforcement of the basic disclosure
rules and regulations.

The new Commission should have the following:

-Set mandatory fines for late filers of reports.
-Random audits of political comr.iittees to insure that they are
disclosing all they should.
-Require campaigns and political committees to have an annual audit
prepared by a Certified Public Accountant and filed with the
Commission.

The government would reimburse the committee for

soMe part of the costs.

These audits would be like the ones

required by this years NYS Governmental Accountability, Audit,
and Internal Control Act.
-Use of Administrative Law Judges in disputes over disclosure
matters.
-Impose civil fines high enough for violations that they create
a detenent for others.

If fines are too low they simply

become a cost of doing business.
amount of funds in question.

Fines should be equal to the

There should also be a token

fine for the recepient of illegal funds or undisclosed funds.
Although the dollars won't create a detenent,the possible use
of the candidate's name in the next campaign may encourage
·recepients to take stronger steps to insure compliance with
the disclosure provisions.
-Knowing· and willful violations should have criminal penalties
above the misdemeanor level.
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-Funds or contributions from individuals who, are not completely
identified should he returned and prohibited from campaign
accounts •. Now here is an exaMple of what appears to be a small
matter yet it goes to the core of knowing about money in politics.
The federal law requires the full identification of contributors
with the name, address, occupation or principal place of business,
if any.

The FEC rules simply call for a committee to make

'best efforts'.

It has now developed that 'best efforts' could

be as little as once for the information.

This token effort may

also be done with a wink or in a joking manner.

As a result,

more and more disclosure reports are being filed with very
little identifying data.

All you have to do is look at some of

the recent filings of the presidential campaigns to see how
badly they disclose the identification of contributors.

My

suggestion to this commission is to force conmittees to get
and disclose the information or not accept the funds.
-The candidate ought to be required to sign the campaign finance
report of his/her political coTTll!littee.

At the federal level

we have let this slip a hit by siMply having the candidate
designate a treasurer who then files reports.

With the candidate

signing the actual reports I think you will have a better chance
to hold the candidate responsible for the actions of the

treasure~

The candidate will think twice about putting his/her name on the
report.
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INDEPENDENCE AND NON-PARTISANSHIP
The seventh major role of the new Commission should be to be viewed as
a separate independent non-partisan agenc:.Y_.

I would hope that your

recommendations for action include the establishment of this new
Commission.
mistakes.

It must be new, not tainted with earlier history or
It must be viewed as covering all problems of the judicial,

legislative and executive branches.
of

su~h

Sadly enough the first impressions

an agency will be set by the selection of the first Commissioners

It is important to put into the legislation some solid descriptions
of the types of persons who you want to fill those Commission positions.
Although the Governor may make the appointments, the legislature should
agree to them.

The Commission should not be viewed as the arm of any one

branch of government.
The new Commission should not have to send its rules, regulations, or
forms to the legislature for approval. Care ahould also be taken to
prohibit the behind the scenes agreements to forward drafts of certain
Commission opinions, compliance actions, or policies to any particular
branch of government.
The new Commission should be mandated to do random audits of all
three branches political accounts.

The FEC and most other agencies

feel this is a standard way to seek compliance with the laws and
provide a deterent to others.
was forced to stop by Congress.

However, when the FEC tried this it
As a result it is the chief example

brought up when discussing the Commission's independence.

Had it been

mandated the FEC might have been viewed as more independent.

26

I would also suggest that if you have a six or seven member commission
you try and have not more than two from each of the two major parties,
and two or three others which are somewhat neutral and agreed upon by
both parties.

The non-partisan members might have backgrounds in the

judiciary, minor parties, the press, or other civic activities.

The

non-partisan nature of the Commission is essential when dealing with
public funding questions, investigations of party committees, or
issues of first amendment rights such as freedom of speech.

DEMOCRACY FUND

07·

The eighth major role for a new disclosure commission should be \t.Q ..
to establish a base line budget figure which would be free from
legislative control.

This budget figure should be set by a calculation

of the voting age population times some dollar amount.

This dollar

figure would be the base cost of maintaining a system of democratic
fair elections of public officials with integrity.

ihe overall

budget would include the operations of the current state Board of
Elections, the new Ethics Agency, the Temporary Commission on Lobbying,
and various other sub-units of agencies auditing, insuring voting
rights, and prosecuting government integrity violations.

It may come

down to .only $1 per voting age person but it would establish a basic
democracy fund for the people.
This fund or budget would be increased automatically by a cost of living
factor and would be untouchable by the executive or legislature •. No
matter who or what group was in power the funds would be there to do
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The idea of a budget which could not be reduced came from the state of
California

where their commission was created by a referendum and their

constitution was amended to incorporate the budget insulated from the
two branches.
At the federal level the FEC must continually

seek funds from the

same legislators we are supposed to regulate.

FINANCIAL PLANNING
The ninth major role I would suggest for a new disclosure commission
is to encourage private industry, especially those in family financial
planning services, to assist in improving the integrity of government.

To require certain disclosures and create agencies to enforce disclosure
laws means that tremendous new pressures will be placed upon persons
thinking of running for office or working in government.

There will

be some who choose not to place themselves or their finances in such an
open position.
requirement.

For those who do I think it is a reasonable and necessary
However, I also feel that the government which imposes

the~

rules must also provide the educational assistance needed to those who
wish to comply.
provided before.
can

prov~de

This means extra assistance, more than has ever been
I have already outlined some of the ways a Commission

this assistance.

within the mind which

However, there are some personal freedoms

preclude an individual from relating every dream

and family financial desire to some government agency.

These plans are

often very personal and emotional when it comes to money.
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I would suggest the new Commission actively encourage private family
financial planning services to enter the world of money in politics.
These groups could provide various financial services and trust type
assistance to those in the executive, legislative or judicial branches.
The Commission might coordinate training programs on the various laws
relating to campaign finance, personal financial income, and all the
various pockets of money in politics.

These groups might help persons

fill out disclosure forms, set up blind trusts, or explain how to
sell conflicting stocks or bonds.

These groups may assist persons

burdened with financial debts, family needs for college funds, or
other expenses.

Such an effort would provide a confidential place

to go and talk to someone about their financial problems or plans.
These might include the financial realities of surviving with a
government salary or the government retirement or health plans.
Post government employment could also be reviewed.
It is my guess that most persons who come into government, especially
the legislature, have just come off an incredible roller coaster
type of life.

When they take their seat in the legislature they

are still recovering. Needless to say they are inunediately off on
another roller coaster life.

They do not make time to think about

their financial plan for the next years or how they might have to
change their types or sources of income.
get their laundry done.

They hardly have time to

They also do not have the advisors they

need to force them to think about their finances.

Their close advisors

have been campaign aides, volunteer workers or law partners who have
done double duty during the months of campaigning.
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Of course, the spouse or family is not in a mood or condition to
think about proper financial planning.

They are the ones who have

had their lives turned upside down with that roller coaster ride.
They are still dizzy. They need professional guidance on finance&

Again, by fostering groups to provide financial planning services
to candidates, officials, and other regulated persons, the new
Commission would be reducing the chances of an official being forced
into income enhancing schemes outside the law or in apparent conflict
of interests.

This type of assistance should make it easier and

less of a burden to comply with the disclosure and other laws.
It should be this vast majority of honest officials who bring the
slow steady pressure on others by stating how easy it was to comply
and since they have complied everyone should comply.

DECENT REWARDS

The tenth and last major role for the new Conunission should be to
routinely
regulated.

review and report on the proper compensation for the officials
There may be some minimal level of income below which it

is unreasonable to assume that one can survive without being beholden
to others or compromising one's office.

The Commission should balance

the income restrictions on public officials with
compensation for the services provided.

a decent reward in

The Commission may even want

to consider full time legislators and full time salaries.
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CORRUPI'ICN AND PSEUOO CORRUPI'ICN
IN AMERICAN CAMPAIGN_ FINANCINJ
Larry Sabato
university of virginia
The disturbing statistics and the horror stories about campaign finance at
the national arrl the state levels seem to flow like a swollen river, week after
week, year in and year out.

outrage exterrls across the ideological spectrum,

and in more and more recent congressional and state campaicps, political action
committees have teen portrayed as the central corrupting evil in American
politics.

Candidates from Maine to California have scored p:>ints by forswearing

the aca:!ptance Of PAC gifts earlier and more fervently than their OJ:PC>nents.
PAC-bashing is undeniably a :i;x>pular campaign sp:>rt, but the "big PAC
attcck" is an opiate that pleasantly obscures the more vital corx::ems and
problems in campaign finan<l:!.

PAC excesses are merely a symptom Of other

serious maladies in the area of p::>litical money, and the near-obsessive focus by
public :interest groups and the news media on the purported evils of PACs has
diverted attention away from these fundamental matters.

This essay will first ...
,
briefly sketch the dimensions of the PAC controversy and rev-iew the dlarges most •

frequently made against :i;x:>litical action committees:

The balance Of the essay

will rev-iew and evalwte a numter Of reforms in campaign financing, pro:i;x:>sing an
agerrla of dlange for states and nation that targets real, not pseuCb,
corruption. 1

State and Local PACs: "New Federalism" In
Campaign Finance
While a g:>od number of PACs of all p:>litical persuasions existerl prior to
the 1970's, it was during this decade - the decad= of campaign reform - that the
modem PAC era l:egan.

Spawned by the Watergate-inspired re.risions of the

campaign finan<l:! laws, fed:!ral PACs grew in numl:er from 113 in 1972 to 4,157 by
1

f '

'

"
the erx:1 of 1986, and their contributions to congressional candidates multiplied
more than fifteen-fold, from $8.5 million in 1972 to $130.3 million by 1986.
But American politics, :p=rhaps even more than American government, is
derentralized, and the PAC canmunity reflects fully this fecerated arrangement.
The growth of PACs at the national level has been matched, and in some cases
exreeded, by the increase in PAC numter and size recorded in states and
localities across the country.

Almost a third (32 percent) of all

multicandidate PACs have associated state-level committees;

most PACs have one

or two, but the large trade associations usually have PACs in most or all of the
fifty states.

Labor PACs have traditionally teen the most active in the state

arena, and 42 :p=rcent have at least one separately registeroo PAC at the state
level.
There is little question that PACs contribute a growing pro:r;ortion of
campai91 money in states and localties, i;:articularly in races for the state
legislature.2 In Washington state there were 114 PACs with receipts of $2
million in 1978; just two years later, 200 PACs raising a total of $4.3 million
were on the scene.

In Illinois the number of PACs registeroo with the state

board of elections grew quickly from 54 in 1974 to 372 in 1982, with a record
number of new entrants in the latter year.3 In Michigan the number of active
state PACs rose from 325 in 1978 to 478 in 1982; six local Chamter of Commerce
PACs were in existence in 1980, and fifty-four two years later.

In california,

state PACs accounted for 45 :p=rrent of all over $100 contributions in 1980
candidates for the state legislature, and by 1982 eight different PACs were
pouring more than $200,000 apiece into races for the state House and senate. 4
The growth of state-level committees is only p:irt of the "new federalism"
of PACs.

More than four in ten of the federal multicandidate PACs also

contributed to state and local candidates in 1980-1982.

During that.:p=riod an

average of 12 :p=rcent of all PAC funds was devoted to state candid:ltes, and
2

another 6 p:!rcent went to local candid3.tes. Once again labor PACs were
especially likely to contribute to state and local candidates.

Moreoe.rer, in

toose states where it is legal to do so, 63 :percent of the µi.rent unions of
lal:x>r PACs and 31 percent of the parent companies of corporate P.ACs made
contributions to state and local candicbtes arrl µirties directly from union or
corporate treasuries.
State P.ACs, like the national variety, are not a completely new fhenanenon.
Labor unions have had active state PACs for decades, and a numl:t:!r Of trade
associations Op:!rated state P.ACs before their national PAC was formed.
Organizations like the California Public Health League (predecessor Of the
California Medical Association's CALP.AC) along with an activist group of
physicians in oreg:m "were what really g:>t the American Medical ASsociation
going" at the federal level, according to AMP.AC's executive director, Peter
Much PAC development has moved from the national to the state level,

Lauer.
however.

The major political decision for most companies and trade associations
'

seems to have teen the one to form a national PAC.

once that threshold was

crossed, it was relatively easy to expand the terrain; additional costs were not
great, the legal research had teen done, and the accounting mechanisms were in
place.

Many grou:t:S recognized that state legislatures were playing an

increasingly important regulatory role, p:i.rticularly in the late 1970s and 1980s
when the federal government was attempting to trim its sails.

Even if the U.S.

congress were still the center of a group's attention, it had g::>od reason to
look to the state capitals:

most recent congressnen first ser.ved as state

legislators, and a contribution made early in their careers was likely to be
well renemtered.

In addition, Watergate caused many states to pass laws similar

to the Feceral Election Campaign Act, and just as FEC'A stimulated the growth of
P.ACs at the national level, so too did the state statutes encourage PAC
formation at the state level.
3

Many state POCs are not connected in any way to a national PAC or group,
and are completely based in a single state or even a single locality.

Unless

they contribute to federal candidates or transfer furrls to a federal PAC, they
are not re:Juired to register with the Fed=ral Election Canmission.

other state

PACs are tied in sane fashion to a national PAC, but the strength of the
affiliation varies.

In some cases the PACs fit a "i;:arent/dlild model," and the

state PACs are mere creatures of the national PAC, smjugatoo to it with little
indep:nd=nt decision-making authority on candid:lte selection (though they can
recommerrl errlorsements to the national committee).
reports for its affiliated dlildren.
"indeperrlent adults."

The parent PAC files all

In other cases state PACs are more like

they may share fundraising and solicitations with the

national, but they retain much authority to contribute to candid:ltes of their
own choice without prior approval from aoove.5
Whatever the models of state-fed=ral relationships, most state PACs have a
numter of tasic characteristics in common with the national PAC community.
'

state as well as national PACs have grown disproportionately in the corporate
and trade categories, and have given business interests the localized political
network available before just to labor.

state PACs, like their national

counterparts, have focused their activity primarily on legislative rather than
executive offices, arrl they most often favor incumtents and legislative lead::?rs,
not challengers or freshmen.
the fed=ral level:

New directions among state PACs parallel tlx:>se at

µirticip:ltion in primary elections, extensive involvement in

ballot refererrla campaigns, more expansive and innwative fundraising
techniques, and the use of in-kind exp:mditures (though so far not to the same
extent as the more sofhisticated federal PACs).

Business and trade PACs in many

states are also developing coordinating and informational umbrella groups
similar to toose in Washington.

Examples of this kind of state PAC have

included United for California, United for Washington, Maryland Business for
4

Responsive Government, Montanans for Effective Government (MEGPAC),
Pennsylvanians for Effective Government, Texas Businessmen Are Concerned
(BACPAC), and the Louisiana Business PAC.
'!he dangers of overgeneralization are great on the subject of state PACs.
Each state's political action committees are somewhat distinct because election
laws - which d:termine the character of a state's PACs - vary dramatically from
Maine to Iowa to California.

'!he states also differ greatly about who can be

soliciata:J for PAC funds, how much PACs can give individtal candidates, to what
extent and how often PACs must disclose their sp;mding and list their
contributors, and whether corporate, union, and association treasuries can P=iY
the administrative exp;:nses of their PACs. States even disagree about what
groups can form PACs.
PAC growth at the state and loeal level will al most certainly be sustained
in the near future, and it may even outstrip the expansion rate of national

PACs, which has begun to level off.

At the same time there are limitations that

will keep state and local expansion somewhat in check.

The complicated

variations in law and regulation from state to state undoubtedly will deter some
national groups.

In some states, too, PACs are not a necessity for politically

active groups, since corporations and unions can donate money to candidates
directly from their treasuries.
The PAC Era:

Controversies and Charges

'.Ibis rapid rise Of PACs has inevitably proven controversial, yet many of
the charges made against political action committees are exaggerated and
dUbious.

It is said that PACs are dangerously novel and have flooded the

political system with money, mainly from business.

While the widesp:-ead use of

the PAC structure is new, the fact remains that special-interest mof1:ey of all
types has always found its way into politics, and before the 1970s it did so in
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less traceable and far more disturbing and unsavory ways. And yes, in absolute
terms PACs contribute a massive sum to candidates, but it is not clear that
there is prooortionately more interest-group money in the system than before.
As political scientist Midlael Malbin has argued, we will never know the truth

because the earlier record is so incomplete.6 '!he pror:ortion of campaig1 furrls
provided by PACs has certainly increased since the early 1970s, but individuals,
most of whom are unaffiliatoo with P.OCs, still supply most of
by fed=ral and state candidates.

So

the money raised

while the im{X)rtance of PAC sp:nding has

grown, PACs clearly remain secorrlary to individuals as a source of election
funding.

PACs seem rather less awesome when consirered within the entire

s:pectrum of campaign finance.
Apart from the argument over the relative weight of PN:. furrls, PN:. critics
claim that political action canmittees are making it more expensive to run for
office.

There is SQlle validity to this assertion.

Money provided to one side

funds the purchase of campaign tools which the other sioo must then match in
order to stay comp:titive.

In the aggregate, American campaign experrlitures

seem huge. Will Rog=rs's 1931 remark has never reen more true:

"Politics has

got so expensive that it takes lots of money to even get reat with." Yet our
aggreg::tte campaign sp:nding is far less than the annual advertising budg=ts of
many individual commercial enterprises.

'I.hese days it is expensive to

canmunicate, whether the message is political or commercial. Television time,
polling costs, consultants' fees, direct-mail investment, and other standard
campaign expenditures have J:een soaring in price, over and above inflation.7
..

PACs have re en fueling the use of new campaign techniques, but a reasonable case
can be mad: that such expenses are necessary, and that more, and retter,
communication is rEqui red J:etween candidates and an electorate that often
appears woefully uninformed about politics.

PACs therefore may 1:e m.aking a

positive contribution by providing the means to increase the flow of information
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during elections (though one can legitimately -question whether 30-second "IV
s:i;ots have the potential. to enlighten anyone.)
PACs are also called incumrent biased, and except for the id?ological ones,
PACs do display a clear bias for incumrents. But the same bias is apµirent in
O)ntributions from individuals.

Facing all contributors is a rational., perhaps

decisive, economic question: Why waste money on nonincumrents if incumrent$
almost always win?

Q1

the other hand, the best

challen~rs

-- those F€rceived

as having fair to cpcd chances to win -- are generously furrled by PACs.
true that PACs limit the numrer of strong challengers by giving

rt is

so much early

money to incumrents, money that helps to deter potential o:pponents from
declaring their candidacies. But the money that PACs channel to

com~titive

challengers late in the election season may then increase the turnwer of
officeholders on election day.

PAC money also rertainly increases the level of

competitiveness in open-seat races -- races without an incumrent candidate.
Ole line of attack on PACs is more justified.
of a

lar~ly

'Ihese important components

democratic political system seem themselves to be urilemocratic in

some respects.

'!he undemocratic character of some PACs' candidate-selection

process completely severs the connecting link between contributor and candidate.
AS political scientist David Adamany has noted, this unhealthy condition is most
api;arent in many of the ideological nonconnected PACs, whose lack of a p;irent
body and whose free-style organization makes them accountable to no one and ·

res:i;onsive mainly to their own whims.a
Leaders of ideological PACs insist that their committees are still
democratic sina= contributors will simply stop giving if dissatisif ied with the
PACs' candidate choices.

But these Pl'Cs, like most indeperilent committees,

raise money by direct mail.

Except for an occasional news article, if that, the

average PPC donor's only scura= of information atcut the PAC's activ_ities is the
PAC's own direct mail which, not surprisingly, tends to be upreat and selective
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in reporting the canmittee's work.

Moreover, as political scientist Frank

Sorauf has stressed, since direct mail can succeed with only a 2-5 percent
response rate, and since prospecting for new donors is continuous, decisions by
even a

lar~

number of givers to drop out will have little impact on PAC

fundraising. 9

PAC Money and Legislative 'Vote-Buying'
The most serious charge levelled at PACs is that they succeed in buying the
votes Of state and federal legislators on issues important to each PAC's
constituency. That many PACs are shopping for legislative votes seems hardly
o~ns

worth arguing. That PN:. money buys access -similarly disputed by few.

But the "Y9t:e-buying" allegation is
"~.,.,

supported by a careful exa!llil}qtigp 9J;:
\
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doors -- to legislators is

'"~
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~nerally

not
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iac::ts.10 PAC contributions do make a

• •

'
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difference, at least on some occasions, in securing access and influencing the
course of events.

But those occasions are not nearly as frequent as anti-PAC

spokesmen, even legislators themselves, often suggest.
PN:.s affect legislative proceedings to a decisive degree only when certain

conditions prevail.

First, the less visible the issue, the more likely that PAC

funds can change or produce votes on it.

A corollary of this low visibility

rule might be that PAC money has more ef feet on the early stages Of the
legislative process, such as agerrla setting and votes in st.i:>committee meetings,
than on later and more public floor delib=rations.

Press, public, and even

"watchdog" groups are not nearly as attentive to initial legislative
proceedings.
PAC contributions are also more likely to influerce the legislature when
the matter at hand is specialized and narrow, or unopposed by other organized
interests.
issues.

P/lC gifts are less likely to be decisive on broad national or state

But the more technical measures seem tailor-made for the special

8

..

interests.
~ -.~·'

Additionally, PAC influence is greater when large PACs or groups of

, ,

PACs {such as rosiness and labor PACs) are al.lied.

In rea:nt years, despite

their natural ennity, business and labor have lobbied t03ether on a numter of
issues including environmental. regulation, transportation, and nuclear power.1 1
'Ihe combination is a weighty one, checked in many instaices only by a terrlency
for business and labor in one irrlustry {say, the railroads) to combine and
optX>se their coop:rating counterparts in another industry {perhaps the truckers
and ireamste rs) •

It is worth stressing,

that most legislators are TIQt. undUly

influenced by PN:. money on most votes. 'Ibe sp:cial conditions I have outlined
simply do not apply to most

iss~s.

Other considerations -- foremost among them

a legislator's i;arty affiliation, his ideology, and especially his constituents'
needs and desires -- are the overriding factors in determining his votes.
all, PAc gifts are merely a means to an end:

reelection.

After

If accepting money

will cause a candidate embarassrnent, then even a maximum donation will likely t:e
rejected.

If an incumt:ent is faced with a choice of either voting for a PAC-

backed bill that is very unpopUlar in his district or foregoing the PJ'.IC's or
even a whole irrlustry's money, the crlds are that any politician who depends on a
majority of votes to remain in office is going to side with his constituency and
vote against the PAC's interest.
as well:

'Ibe flip side of this proposition makes sense

if a P.AC's parent organization has many memters or a major financial

stake in the legislator's home district, he is much more likely to vote the
PN:.'s way -- not so much tecause he receives PN:. money but tecause the group
accounts for an important r:art of his electorate.

When the PAC :i;:henomenon

is viewed in the broad p:rsp:ctive, and when the complex nature of the
legislative and electoral process is fully considered, the belief that merit
matters in the votes most legislators cast -- merit as defined by

th~

sp:cifics

of each case, general ideological beliefs, r:arty loyalty, and the interests of

9

..

,
district constituents -- seems soorrl.

It is ludicrously naive to conterrl that

POC money never inflLEnces legislator's decisions, but is it irred=emably
cynical to believe that POCs always, or even usually, push the voting buttons in
congress or the state legislatures.
PACs in Perspective
As this brief examination of the 'vote-buying' controversy and the other

charges made aoout political action committees has suggested, PACs are
misrepresented and unfairly maligned as the emoodiment of corrui:t special
interests.

contemporary political action committees are another manifestation

of what James Madison called factions.

Through the flourishing of competing

interest groups or factions, said Madison in his Federalist tb• .!ft, literty
would be preserved:

"Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an element

without which it would instantly expire. nl2
In any democracy, and particularly in one as pluralistfc as the united
states, it is essential that groups be relatively unrestricted in advocating
their interests and positions.

Not only is unrestricted political activity by

interest groups a mark of a free society, but it provides a safety valve for the
competitive pressures that build on all fronts in a capitalistic democracy.

It

also provides another means to keep representatives responsive to legitimate
needs.

This is not to say that all groups' interests are legitimate, nor that

vigoroosly competing interests alone ensure that the public <_Pod prevails.

'Ihe

press, public, and valuable watchdog groups sudl as Common Cause must al ways be
alert to instances in which narrow private interests can prevail over the·
commonweal -- occurrerces that generally happen when no one is looking.
Besides the press and organizations like Common cause, there are two major
institutional checks on the evils of factions, associations, and now POCs.

'!he

most fundamental of these is regular free elections with g=neral suffrage.

As

Tocqueville commented:
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Perhaps the most p:>werful of the causes which tend to mitigate the excesses of J;Olitical
association in the United states is Universal Suffrage. In countries in which universal
suffrage exists, the majority is never doubtful, t:ecause neither party can preterrl to
represent that portion of the canmunity \\hich has not voted.
The associations which are formed are aware, as well as the nation at large, that they do
not represent the majority: this is, inceed, a condition inse:i;arable from their
existerce; for if they did represI~t the prepondering power, they would change the law
instead Of soliciting its reform.
senator Rotert Dole (R-Kansas) has said,

~ere

aren't any poor PA.Cs or Food

stamp PACs or Nutrition PACs or Medicare PACs,"14 and PAC critics frequently
make the point that certain segments of the electorate are underrepresenterl in
the PAC canmunity.

Yet without much supFQrt from PACs, there are food stamps,

p01Terty and nutrition programs, and Medicare. Why? Because the recipients of
governmental assistance constitute a hefty slice Of the electorate, and votes
matter more than dollars to politicians.

Furthermore, many citizens outside the

affected groups have also mad: known their support Of aid to the FOQr and
elderly -- making yet a stronger electoral case for these PAC-less programs.
'Ihe other major institution that checks PAC influence is the two-p::i.rty
system.

While PACs represent particUlar interests, the political p;irties build

coalitions Of groups and attempt to present a national perspective on policy.
They arbitrate among special-interest claims, and they seek to reach a consensus
on matters Of overriding importance to the nation.

'Ihe i:arties are one Of the

few unifying forces in an exceptionally diverse country.

If interest groups and

their PACs are useful to a functioning democracy, then the political p::i.rties
must re considererl essential.

Yet just as PACs have reen gathering stren:Jth,

the i:arties (until the last decad= or so) have reen steadily declining in· power.
In recent years the rehabilitation of the party system has begun, but there is a
long wey to g::>. A 02ntral goal of the reform ag:mda should te to strengthen the
political :p3.rties, and to grant them a kind of "most favorerl nation" status in
the machinery of elections arx1 campaign finance.
also have a usefUl side effect:

Reforms to bolster the i:arties

they temper the excesses Of PACs by reducing
11
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their proportional. impact on the election of public officials.

THE REFORM N;;ENDA

LIMITATIONS CN PACS
Before discussing p:trty strengthening, I want to look at a currently
popular proposal. for campaign finance reform:
any legislator may

ac~pt.

limiting the amount of PAC money

Like many reforms, it has a certain sui:;erficial.

api:;eal. but the hidd:!n oosts arrl consequ=nces of the proposal are enormous and
destructive.
The effects of such a limitation on POC gifts make it a most undesirable
innovation. First of all, such limits would aid incurntents. While incurntents
as a group raise far more PAC money than do challengers, in competitive races
(where there is a g:>cd dlana= for the incurntent to lose) challengers sometimes
match or outraise incumbents among PACs, and the extra PAC money is ust.ally much

.

more useful to a little-known challenger than to a well-known incurntent.

A cap

on PPC gifts would give additional insurance to incumbents that, should they
firrl themselves in electoral difficulty, their challengers will have less dlance
to raise enoogh money to defeat them.

The "PAC cap" may in reality be a

"challenger cap. n
The most disturbing consequeoce of further limits on P!C contributions
would be an inevitable increase in indepmdent expenditures.

Indei:;endent

experrliture is the least accountable form of political sperrling, and combined
with the unfortunate fact that it often is viciously negative in tone, it is
hardly scmething the system Of campaign finance should en:::ourage.

More.ver, PACs

are establiEhed organizations with the proven ability to raise money, and if
their direct contributions are restricted they. will find other useful ways to
speoo their funds.

Reformers may be able to squeeze PAC cash out of candid:ttes'

election accounts, but they will not succeed in forcing it out of the political
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system.

Other activities will simply come to the fore, such as undisclosed

"sOft money" gifts to parties in states without restrictions on corporate or
union treasury contributions, lcbbying carnpaigis, and political education and
involvement programs galore.
Finally, an Oilerall PAC limit might increase the chances that legislative
votes could be swayed by P"AC gifts.

If toth the railroads and the trucking

industry, for instance, tried to make a contribution to a legislator, but only
the railroads sucreeded before the incurnl::ent's P"AC limit was reached, might not

the legislator be more beholden to railroad interests as a resUlt of this P"AC
limitation scheme? Allowing the legislator to accept donations from roth the
railroads and their natural competitors maintains sQne talance among competing
interests.
Strengthening The Political Parties
As we have seen, one sure way to lessen the importance of PACs is to shore

up competing institutions and to increase the pool of alternative money.

while

individt:als and PACs represent particuJ.ar interests and further the atomization
of public policy, the µirties encompass more g:neral conrerns and push the

system toward consensus.

Their role is absolutely central to American

democracy's future health and success, and for that reason if no other, the
parties should be acoorded

s~cial,

preferential treatment by all national and

state carnp:iign finance laws.
Beyorrl 100 percent tax credits for small gifts to parties and other forms
of public funding channelled through the µirties, it would be wise for congress

to reclaim a portion of the public:s airwaves and require that television and
radio stations -- among the most profitable corporate ventures in the country turn Oiler a Cbzen five-minute blocks of prime time each year to ooth the state
parties and another dozen blcx:::ks to l:Dth national parties (rather than to
individual candidates) so that more g=neric, institutional advertising can be
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aired even

~

the relatively und:!rf inanced Democrats.15

(Politicians would

still be free to make unlimited additional purchases to promote their own
individual candidacies.)

'Ihe :i;arties should have wire discretion in cetermining

the uses to which the time is put.
~neral

They may wish to conserve it all for the

election or they may allocate some Of it to the :i;arty's primary

candidates to assist their efforts to become known before the party selects its
naninees.
Public Financing and Tax Credits
Most states do not have any form of pt.t>lic financing, but whenever and
wherever public financing is passed, however, it should be designed in wcrys that
benefit the political 5)7stem.
floors rather than as ceilings.

Public funds should be given to candidates as
Under this eystem, every candidate who can

qualify by raising a certain amount in smal1 contributions will be eligible for
matching funds from the state treasury for all similar small gifts, up to an
agreed up:::m public funds maximum per candidate. Then in the general election,
each naninee of a major :i;arty would receive a certain flat amount (a floor) in
pt.t>lic funds to ensure that he reached the minimal financial threshold necessary

to conduct a modern campai.91. Beyond that, in l::oth the primary

and general

election, he should be permitted to raise as much as he can in unrestricterl
famion fron PACs and individuals.

'Ibis approach gi:arantees at least basic

competition in each district and augments the ability of candidates to
canrnunica.te with voters while preserving for individuals, PACs, and interest
groups a rightful and legitim:ite role in elections.

A ceiling on expenditures,

by contrast, almost Q:!rtainly benefits incuml:ents ·since challengers must usually
s~rrl

more than average to upend an incumbent.

Moreo\Ter, a ceiling restricts

the flow of canmunica.tions l:etween candid:ltes and voters, and unfairly minimizes
the direct p::irticipation of PACs in the
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political process.

And as is true of

other limitations on PN:. contributions, a public-funds ceiling would squeeze PAC
money into less accountable and less desirable dlannels, such as indep:mcent
sperrling. A beneficial state public-fuming scheme would also filter treasury
money through the state political p;irties, fermitting them to keep a 02rtain
percentage for their own administration and party-building activities, and
perhaps also allowing them some degree of flexibility in allocating funds to
their nominees.
Realistically, these reform measures do not have a <pod chance Of
enactI1EI1t.

Legislators are unlikely to give their :plrties any cilditional

leverage to use CNer them, nor are they going to do any favors for their
opponents by enacting public-funding floors that favor dlalleng:rs rather than
ceilings that favor themselves.

Probably the best form of public financing with

a reasonable dlanoo Of passag: is the tax credit option, wheret¥ a taxpayer can
be given a 50 or 100 percent tax credit for all contributions to candidates,

PAcs, and political committees Of up to $50 for an individual and $100 on a
joint return.
Disclosure:

PACs in the Sunshine

The most universally supported and oortainly the most sucressful asP=ct Of
campaign finance laws is disclosure, whereby PACs and candid:l.tes are required at
various intervals to reveal their contribUtors and their experrlitures.

Not only

do the disclosure prCNisions eXf(>se the motives and decisions of PACs and

politicians but they alert comfeting interests to the need for mobilization.
Disclosure is no cure-all, however.

'!he volume Of financial disclosure reports

'·

in many states is cruEhing, and it is usually well after election day l:efore any
thorough analysis of the d:l.ta can begin -- too late to affect the election
results.

Still, disclosure serves many useful purposes, from i:;errnitting post-

election enforcement of the laws to allowing corn:plrisons to be mace l;::etween
campaign contributions and legislative votes cast.
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Disclosure itself generates

pressure for more reform.

When campaign finance was out of signt, it was out of

rost p:ople's minds; now that the trail of money can be more easily followed,
indignation is only a press release away.
Disclosure is the single greatest dieck on the excesses Of campaign
finance, for it eocourages corrective action, whether judicial (prosecution in
the courts) or political (retribution bf the voters at the polls).

It is such

an essential and welcome device in American democracy that it should be
broadened to bring to light a nurnb=r Of abuses or p=rceived abuses in the PAC
community.

No PN:.

practice is so distasteful as the distortion and reception

found in many direct-mail solicitations, especially from the id:ological
committees.

P~s

using any form of direct-mail furrlraising should be required

to enclose a CX>P.f of all letters with their periodic reports.
Just as private charities must do in many states, PAC.s using direct mail
should also be forced to disclose in each letter and on each contributor card
how mudl of all money raised is devoted to fundraising and administrative costs.
Granted, prospecting for direct-mail donors is a necessary and expensive first
step in the process, but it takes only a couple of p:i.ragraphs to explain this to
letter recipients.

'.Ibey may not like what they read and consequently may refuse

to give, but they are entitled to kn<M how their money will be sp::mt if any
degree of accmmtability is to exist.

Furthermore, all PACs, not just those

using direct mail, should be required to report their list of candidate
selections to their contributors.

Most PACs already do this, but the

ideological PN:.s, which frequently use direct mail and are far remaved from
their donors, are usually exceptions.
Honoraria and other Fees
Those who fear the vote-buying potential of PAC money might better direct
their attention to the millions awarded

~

interest groups directly to

legislators, not as camp:.lign contributions but as "si;x=aking fees" and honoraria.
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While PAC and other campai91 contributions are devoted to the legitimate public
purpose of democratic elections, honoraria are placed directly in the pockets of
lawmakers for their private enrichrrent.

Also disturbing is an enticement

interest groups sometimes of fer legislators:

all-expense paid trips to resorts,

possibly including family memters. PAC contributions may receive the media
attention, but honoraria and free trips ought to be the focus of toose worried
about urrlue influerce and corruption in the legislatures.

Conclusion
PACs are not the chaste and innocent political dleerleaders or selfless
civic roosters that their proponents often contend they are.

Neither are they

cessp::>ols of corruption and greed, modern-day versions of Tammany Hall.

PPCs

will never be popular with icealistic reformers because they represent the
rough, cutting edg: of a democracy teeming with different -peoples and
a:mflicting interests. Inceed, PACs may never be hailed even

~

natural allies;

it was the business-oriented Wall Street Journal, after all, that editorially
comp:i.red Washington, D.C. to "the mutants' saloon in 'Star wars' - a place where
politicians, PACs, lawyers, and

lob~ists

for unions, business or you-name-it

shake each other down full time for political money and political support."16
Viewed in perspective, the root of the problem in campaign finance is not
PN:.s, it is money.

Americans have an enduring mistrust Of the mix of money

(particularly business money) and politics, as Finley Peter Dunne's Mr. Dooley
revealed:
I niver knew a pollytician to go wrong ontii he 1d been contaminaterl be contcct with a

business man ••• rt seems to me that th' on'y thing to do is to keep pollyticians an'
business men apart. They seem to have a tad infloonce on each other. Whiniver I see an
alrerman an' a banker walkin' down th' street together I know th' Recordin' Angel will
have to ordher another lx>ttle iv ink.17
As a result of the new campaign finance rules of the 1970s political action

ccmmittees superceded the "fat cats" of old as the public focus and symbol of
17

the role of money in politics, and PACs inherited the suspicions that go with
the territory.

'!hose suspicions are valuable l::ecause they keep the sr:otlight on

PACs and gt.:ard against urrlue inflLEnce. It may be regrettable that such
s~rvision

is rEquirerl, but human nature -- not PACs -- demands it.
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Albany, New York.

A

8

John Kenneth White
Lectures
Continued

"Party Realignment: What We've
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Political parties have a unique and important role in the
American polity.

For nearly tour decades, political scientists

have passionately argued their case.
Schattschneider wrote:

In 1942, E.E.

"The political parties created

democracy .... Modern democracy is unthinkable in terms of
parties."1

Eight years later the Committee on Political Parties

of the American Political science Association declared:

"The

party system ... serves as the main device for bringing into
continuing relationship those ideas about liberty, majority rule
and leadership which Americans are largely taking for granted."
The committee, which counted Schattschneider among its members,
described the parties as the "indispensable instruments of
government."2

The same year Herbert Agar spoke of the parties in

like fashion:

"These [American] parties are unique.

be compared to the parties of other nations.
purpose in a new way.

They cannot

They serve a new

Unforeseen and unwanted by the fathers,

they form the heart of the unwritten constitution and help the
written one to work." 3
The weakened condition of the political parties, a
diminution that began in the late 1960s and accelerated during
the 1970s, has enhanced the long-standing view that the parties
perform vitally important functions.
moribund organizations was issued.

A call to strengthen the
Among the first to sound the

alarm was the Committee for Party Renewal, a group formed in 1976
and for which I currently serve as Executive Director.

In its
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first position paper, "Strengthening the Political Parties," the
Cammi ttee warned:
coherent politics.

"Without parties there can be no organized and
When politics lacks coherence, there can be

~

no accountable democracy.

Parties are indispensable to the

realization of democracy.

The stakes are no less than that."4

The vigorous defense of parties given by its students is not
simple emotion, but a recognition of the important functions they
have historically exercised:

(1) assimilating new voters into

the political life of the nation; (2) extending democracy; (3)
simplifying voter choices by presenting alternative programs and
candidates; (4) enhancing the accountability of government; and
(5) organizing the government and providing order to it.

An

elaboration of each of these functions follows.

Assimilating New Voters
Throughout our history political parties have educated
voters, particularly newcomers, in the ways of American politics.
The stories of the immigrants are replete with illustrations of
how the parties helped families find food, clothing, and shelter.
Beginning with the Irish in the 1840s and later with the migrants

from eastern, central and southern Europe, the parties-especially the Democrats--pertormed the essential task of
assimilating the new citizens into the political
parties exacted their price tor their generosity:
ballot box.

p:roc-~~.:;:;.~ ...

Ji'!<.~·lt&

support at the
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The establishment of social service agencies during the New
Deal era resulted in the parties ceding this function to career
civil service bureaucrats.

The current weakened condition of the

political parties limits their ability to assist the new
immigrants, particularly the Hispanics and the Asians, who are
arriving on our shores.

While social service agencies can help,

progress toward the assimilation of the newcomers into our
political way of life is stunted.

Extending Democracy
In his famous 1942 work Party Government E.E.
Schattschneider observed:

"Parties are not appendages of modern

government; they are at the center of it and play a determinative
and creative role in it."5

The Constitution of the United States

does not mention political parties.

Its framers hoped that their

appearance would not be necessary and actively sought to prevent
it.

Shortly after he was inaugurated president Thomas Jefferson

wrote:

"Nothing shall be spared on my part to obliterate the

traces of party and consolidate the nation, if it can be done
without abandonment of principle."6

But Jefferson later changed

his position and together with Madison used the party apparatus

as a means of expanding popular participation.

The Electoral

College was democratized by the parties; the United States Senate
was subjected to direct popular election; women were given the
right to vote.

Each of these developments was

unfors~en

by the
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Founders, and in each case the political parties were a catalyst
tor the extension ot egalitarianism.
Since the constitutional changes ot the nineteenth and early
twentieth centuries, the parties have continued to serve as
democratic agents.

Interest groups win only a traction ot

support from the citizenry, but political parties remain the only
broad-based, multi-interested organizations we have that can
nominate candidates tor office, mobilize popular support behind
them, and organize the elected into a government.

Simplify Voter Choices
Political parties have historically simplified voter choices
through the presentation ot nominees tor elective off ices who
advocate programmatic change.

Thomas Jefferson and Andrew

Jackson were the first to use them to articulate policies that
would alter the direction ot government.

The subsequent

development ot party platforms served to establish the party

program, thus allowing voters to choose among sometimes stark
alternatives.

Parties continue to perform this important task.

In 1984, tor example, the Democratic and Republican Party
platforms painted very different pictures ot the United States
and ottered voters a clear choice between Walter Mondale and
Ronald Reagan.
Parties determine the organization of the ballot and make
selections regarding its candidates.7

By simplifying.and

defining alternatives the party becomes an important instrument
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of the people's will.

Senator Ernest Hollings (D-S.C.) says that

political parties exist "not just to win elections but to move a
country.

Its purpose is not to placate a cacophony of voices,

but to attract diverse groups to a common purpose.

It is built

not on television, but on a national vision."8

Enhancing Government Accountability
Political parties are the primary institutions in our
electoral system that can be held accountable for what
governments do.

If a national, state, or local government

performs well in the eyes of the majority, the party in charge
will be rewarded at the polls.
consequences.

If not, it will suffer the

That lesson, perhaps the oldest in American

politics, was relearned by the Democrats in 1980.

After four

years of what the public perceived as ineffective presidential
leadership and a general sense of national malaise, voters tossed
the Democrats out of the presidency and the senate.

Reagan won

in a landslide and brought to Washington freshly elected
Republicans committed to the party's platform of tax cuts and
budget reductions.

Four years later an overwhelming majority

judged Reaganomics a success--keeping Reagan in the White House

and retaining a Republican majority in the U.S. Senate.

The

Reagan experience of 1981-1984 illustrates what can happen to a
political party when the public approves of its performance.

The

GOP, which had been reduced to half-party status after Watergate,
rebounded to a position of near-parity with the Democrats.
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Organizing the Government
In our complex system of divided and shared powers it is
difficult to bring coherence to the operations of government.
The check and balances built into our federal and state
constitutions institutionalize conflict, thus making
accountability difficult to achieve.

During the 1980s voters

have added another check and balance:

large majorities prefer

divided government, with the executive branch controlled by one
party and the legislative branch by another.

The politics of

personality enhances that trend, as voters make decisions about
individual candidates.

But today's discriminating voter has also

concluded that the Democrats and Republicans have certain
strengths and weaknesses, with neither winning a decisive vote of
confidence.

Twenty-nine states presently have divided

government, with the executive held by one party and the
legislature controlled by the opposition.

In 1952, by contrast,

only eight states were similarly divided.

This makes "party

responsibility"--namely, the ability of a party to articulate a

program, capture the governmental apparatuses, and enact its
platform planks--an immeasurably more difficult task.

Party

accountability also suffers.

PARTY DECLINE

Beginning in the late 1960s political parties we.akened
considerably, and with the ebbing of their strength they became
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increasingly unable to perform their traditional functions.

The

Committee tor Party Renewal declared that the decomposition of
the parties was responsible tor a new politics characterized by
excessive media influence, political tad-of-the month clubs,
massive private financing by various 'fat cats' of state and
congressional campaigns, gun-tor-hire campaign managers, lowered
concern tor policy, and maneuvering and management by self-chosen
political elites.9

The clanking of the engines of government

resulted in part from the parties inability to supply the oil.
George Washington Plunkitt predicted what would happen in the
parties collapsed:

"First, this great and glorious country was

built up by political parties; second, parties can't hold
together if their workers don't get offices when they win; third,
if the parties go to pieces, the government they built up must go
to pieces too; fourth,
they did falter,

then there'll be hell to pay."10

government suffered.

columnist David Broder wrote:

When

In 1972 Washington Post

"The governmental system is not

working because the political parties are not working."11
George Washington Plunkitt's defense of the parties is one
tew Americans agree with.

Most do not like political parties.

From time to time, voters have endorsed party "reform" efforts-the overhaul of presidential nomination procedures after the 1968
Democratic National Convention is the most prominent and
troubling ot these.

Each of the reforms eras have been aimed at

reducing the inf 1 uence of the "party bosses" and air i.ng out the
"smoke-filled rooms."

Not all of the reforms have hurt the

9
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parties.

But many have and to paraphrase George Washington

Plunkitt, "There has been hell to pay."
This is not to say that some modest reforms are not needed.
They are.

But the well-being of the political parties should be

-

uppermost in the minds of the reformers, remembering that in the
final analysis how the parties are doing their jobs is an

excellent barometer of how government is performing its job.

SOME MODEST REFORMS

1. Public Financing of the Political Parties
Since 1977, the Committee for Party Renewal has advocated
public financing of the two major political parties.

The

committee reiterated its stand in a 1984 position paper:

No service to candidates is more important than the
provision of money, and there should be few restraints
on the ability of parties to raise and spend money in
campaigns .... Limits on annual individual contributors
to parties that qualify for a full tax deduction or
credit should be raised significantly.

Statutory

limits on group contributions to candidates and parties
should be retained.

Parties themselves should be able

to make unlimited contributions to the campaigns of
their candidates for offices at all levels.of
government.

If a system of public financing of
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elections is adopted, it should use the parties as
channels through which to distribute these funds as
they see fit.12

Sixteen states provide some type of public financing for
their election campaigns, either a $1.00 income tax check-off
system or a $1.00 tax surcharge.

Of these, nine states

distribute the collected monies to the political parties.
parties use the funds for a variety ot purposes:

The

administration,

financing primary elections, and providing funds to their general
election candidates.
I advocate a $1 income tax check-oft system tor New York
State.

The resultant funds would greatly strengthen party

organizations and promote accountability.

The political parties

of this state are currently engaged in a losing battle for scarce
funds.

Some of that competition comes from the national parties

themselves--not only the national committees, but the
congressional campaign organizations established by the
Democratic and Republican parties.

More importantly, the state

parties fare poorly at home as party loyalists are beseeched by
individual candidates for funds.

With the infusion of public

money, the state parties would be able to bolster their largely
moribund organizations.

Ruth Jones notes that the hiring of

additional staff "is viewed by most party leaders as the key to
expanding the influence of the party."13

More importantly,

parties would be able use the funds to assist their nominees.
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This would enhance the party's traditional function of providing
accountability among its officeholders.

Too many candidates

believe, often quite rightly, that they owe little to their party

for securing an election victory.

In many instances it provided

them with almost no money and little else in the way of support.
The parties could also use the additional funds and staff to
improve voter turnout.

Historically, parties have exercised

their mobilization functions in "get-out-the-vote" drives.

But

as their resources have dwindled, their ability to enhance voter
turnout has also suffered.
The dollar check-oft would significantly alter the rules of
the political game.

Candidates could call upon the party tor

funds, and in some cases staff members from the state
organization could be dispatched to help.

The result would be to

increase the winner's sense of obligation to his party and, not
incidentally, cause an ofticeholder to think twice before
abandoning the party's platform.
Funding of state parties would also remove the issue of
candidate surpluses.

As you are aware, the successful candidates

in the last statewide election in New York State amassed large

sums of money, not all ot which they were able to spend.
raises an important question of ethics.

This

These monies can be

applied by the candidates toward their next political campaign;
they ,may be

purpose.

..----~

used~sist

other candidates; or for some:::>other

Elected officials, however, have the resour.ces of their

incumbency that they can use to communicate with constituents or
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enact their legislative program.

Governor Cuomo, to cite one

example, has nearly unlimited access to the news media.

He also

has the tools of a rather large state bureaucracy to assist him
in carrying out his legislative agenda.
Political parties do not have such automatic access to such
resources.

Yet theirs is an important and unique function in our

society, one that is not merely limited to a particular election
cycle.

Therefore, should a candidate receive public funds from a

political party.

Should that candidate not spend all of the

allocated funds I recommend that the money be returned to the
political party so that it may continue its full-time job of
party-building.
from surpluses

This eliminates the ethical questions resulting
accumul~ted

by individual campaigns.

Jesse Unruh coined the phrase:
of politics."

"Money is the mother's milk

The dollar check-off would provide important

sustenance to the parties.

It is far more preferable than a $1

tax surcharge that is law in six states--largely because the
revenues generated from the check-off are far greater.
Consequently, I oppose a proposal for public tinancing of
candidates tor elective office now under consideration by the New
York City Council.

Aside from its dubious constitutional

standing, this law would institutionalize the trend toward
..,/""'

t:' /.
~

J'

i,..AY
~ f

candidate-centered campaigns.
the parties.

'',,.f~eng~:ed
f~

It would do nothing to strengthen

The law would also provide funds for candidates

in pr ima~x,_:_~c~ Primaries are intra-J!.arty squabbles.

State law implicitly recognizes this by allowing only registered
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party members to vote in a primary.

This is as it should be.

I

am most uncomtortable with funds trom the city's treasury being
used to settle intra-party disputes. Finally, by giving aid to
the candidates the proposed law is a device tor the preservation
of incumbents.

Elected officials, thanks to voter name

recognition and the tools of their office, begin their campaigns
with an enormous advantage over their opponents.

The relative

lack of turnover in the state offices and legislature reflects
this.

To say that candidates tor Mayor of New York,

for example,

can spend no more than $3 million apiece if they receive public
funding wrongly implies that each begins the contest on an equal
footing.

They do not.

usually means

Incumbents, and in New York City that

Democrats~

built-in advantages.

begin their campaigns with several

This law would institutionalize the one-

party-Democratic system already in place in New York City.
partyism of any kind inevitably leads to bad government.

OneThe

relative weakness of the Republican party in the city that has
contributed to the recent scandals there.

Abolish Cross-Endorsement
As I have mentioned, a vital function of the parties is to
provide coherence to electoral politics and the operations of
government.

New York's cross-endorsement law undercuts the

ability of the Democrats and Republicans to accomplish this task.
The power of the Conservative, Right-to-Life, and Liberal parties
to endorse Democratic or Republican candidates gives them undue

14

John K. White
influence.

From 1964 to 1980, the endorsements of the

Conservative and Liberal parties determined the winner in
slightly more than 16 percent of the races held in the state.14
For all practical purposes Democrats believe that they must have

the backing of the Liberal party to win; Republicans believe that
the endorsement of the Conservative Party, and to a lesser extent
the Right-to-Life Party, is crucial.
The result is a governing coalition composed of nervous
minorities.

Successful candidates owe some fealty to the minor

party who back them.
cross-purposes:

This can result in officeholders working at

when the positions of the major party and minor

party conflict accountability and responsibility suffer.

Given

the prevailing view that minor party support is an insurance
policy for victory, these small parties become, in Edward Koch's
phrase, "the tail that wags the dog. "15
resolution declared:

A Democratic Party

"The process has led to many cases where

the people able to disperse such cross-endorsements obtain
influence out of all proportion to the people they represent."16
Former Republican State Chairman George Clark agrees:

"I have a

problem with the fact that [the Conservatives] are the tail
wagging the dog.

My thought is if the Conservatives are so

concerned about running conservatives, they should put up an
enrolled Conservative tor office."17
Only two other states provide tor cross-endorsement:
Vermont and Connecticut.

The once dominant Republican.party in

Vermont--now being replaced by a competitive Democratic party--

15
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precluded cross-endorsement from having much effect.

In

Connecticut a minor party must receive 20% of the votes in a
gubernatorial election before it can secure a ballot position and
endorse major party candidates.
Fearing retribution from the minor parties, the state
legislature will never repeal New York's cross-endorsement law.
In a 1981 interview,

former governor Malcolm Wilson told me that

the best available method tor repealing the statute is a
constitutional convention.18

I agree.

Combine the Direct Primary for Governor and Lieutenant Governor
In its 1950 report the American Political Science
Association declared:

"The crux of public affairs lies in the

necessity for more effective formulation of general policies and
programs and for better integration of all the far-flung
activities of modern government."19

The direct primary for

lieutenant-governor has had a very negative impact when it comes

to unity in the executive branch.

I recognize, of course, that

the New York State Constitution places the lieutenant governor in
the state senate--much like the vice president of the United
states is a member of the U.S. Senate.

However, the lieutenant

governor can be a vital partner to the governor:

running mate in

a general election; liaison to the legislature; helping in the
development of the governor's legislative program; and as the
governor's emissary to the people of the state.

But

th~

direct

primary allows for the election of a lieutenant governor who was
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not the governor's choice.

In 1982 Alfred DelBello, Ed Koch's

man tor the job, won his primary while Koch lost to Cuomo.

The

Cuomo-DelBello ticket was an awkward, unworkable arrangement.
Politically, it made little sense to have two Italo-Americans
heading the Democratic ticket.

Party conventions have

historically devised slates that take both geographic and ethnic
considerations into account.

This has enhanced the

representation of all ethnic groups and regions in Albany.

From

a governing standpoint, the Cuomo-DelBello combination was doomed

from the start.

After two years of frustration, DelBello

resigned.20

Last year Cuomo named Stanley Lundine as his choice tor
lieutenant governor.

However, the Governor went to some lengths

to be sure that Abraham Hirshteld did not quality to compete in a
primary against Lundine.

Hirshteld was stricken from the ballot.

Had that not happened there was a possibility that Hirshteld
could have defeated Lundine in a primary, especially one
characterized by low voter turnout.

The result would have been

as disastrous as before.
Former governor Malcolm Wilson, who served fifteen years as
lieutenant governor, maintains that the current law is "totally
disruptive and destructive to what should be the closest
relationship:

Governor and Lieutenant Governor."21

I agree.

believe that the nominee and those who may quality to run in a
primary should name their candidate tor lieutenant

gove~nor

either at the party convention or, say, ten days before the

I
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convention is to meet.

Thus, in 1982 Koch would have named

DelBello and Cuomo would have chosen someone else.

Each team

would have been paired on the primary ballot--just as the
presidential and vice presidential candidates are joined in the
general election.

The likely outcome would be to insure a better

working relationship between the state's two top elected
officials.

It would give more coherence to state government,

while at the same time assisting the parties in their £unctions
ot accountability and government organization.

This is a modest

reform, but a much needed one.

A Word to the Parties
The major parties in New York State need to take their
responsibilities more seriously.
vital.

The functions they perform are

Ot these, choosing their nominees is among the most

important.

In 1950 the American Political Science Association

Report on political parties declared:

"A democratic internal

[convention) procedure can be used not merely to test the
strengths ot the various factions within a party but also to
resolve the contlicts."22

Party conventions are appropriate

forums tor settling disputes between competing candidates and
philosophies.

Delegates to contested conventions should not

throw their vote to a challenger in order to satisfy a demand
that the case be taken to the voters.

Sometimes conventions

cannot be the final arbiter as the division of opinion is
sufficient to warrant a primary.

But the convention has a
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legitimate role to play in this regard, and delegates should take
their responsibilities seriously.

CONCLUSION

In 1978 political scientist Everett C. Ladd wrote,
"Restoring the organized parties to vigorous health ... should be
the number one reform objective of the next decade."23

Nearly

ten years later Ladd's call carries additional urgency.

It is my

view that the recent scandals that have afflicted the politics of
New York City, and the ethical questions that have arisen from
the financing of political campaigns in New York State generally,
result from the overall weakness of the political parties.

As

the Commission makes its recommendations, I urge that it remember
the unique and valuable role that political parties have in
American society.

The Committee for Party Renewal in a 1984

position paper advised reformers to proceed with caution:

As private associations with public responsibilities,
parties should be as free as possible from state and
federal regulation to determine their own structure and
functions.

The public interest requires that parties

operate in an open, honest,

fair, and accountable way,

but these goals may be achieved through reporting and
disclosure requirements and not by detailed regulation

of party organization and activities .... The public
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interest is best served by law that complements party
self-regulation not by statues that substitute tor
it.24

I urge the Commission members to keep these words in mind in
their deliberations.

John K. White
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APPENDIX
COMMITTEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL POSITION PAPERS

COMMITTEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL

Declaration of Principles

The Committee is a voluntary, bipartisan association of
political scientists and practitioners committed to strengthening
political parties in the ~~nited States. Organized in 1976, the
Committee has sponsored panels on political parties at the annual
meetings of the American Political Science Association and issued
periodic statements on public policy questions pertaining to the
American party system. In September 1977, the Committee presented
the following declaration of principles, which was read by
Professor James HacGregor Burns at the Jefferson Memorial.

************************
We meet today, at this shrine of American democracy, to
deplore the disintegration of a basic American institution. Our
political party system, first inspired by Thomas Jefferson, is in
serious danger of destruction.
Without parties there can be no organized and coherent
politics. When politics lacks coherence, there can be no accountable democracy, Parties are indispensable to the realization of
democracy. The stakes are no less than that.
We are not speaking today in defense of the boss-ridden
parties of an earlier era. Indeed, the demise of the boss has
opened a new opportunity for a strong two-party system. Currently,
in certain states, new-style parties have already taken shape,
providing a model of broad participation, focused on issues.
But such local rebuilding is struggling against powerful
counterforces that are undermining party structures everywhere.
If these forces ultimately prevail, it would mean the end of
potentially the most powerful political organizations acting for
the people as a whole--poor people, middle class people, all those
who lack specialized political organizations of their own. It
would mean the end of a crucial link between the mass of people
and the issue-discussing and policy-making process. It would mean
the end of an organized "loyal opposition" that can keep officials
under watch and on their toes. It would mean the end of any real
hope for national party leadership with enough clout to hold
Presidents to their campaign promises and curb tendencies toward
the "imperial presidency."
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What would take the place of parties? A politics of celebrities, of excessive media influence, of political fad-of-the-month
clubs, of massive private financing by various "fatcats" of state
and congressional campaigns, of gun-for-hire campaign managers, of
heightened interest in "personalities" and lowered concern for
policy, of manipulation and maneuver and management by self-chosen
political elites.
To reverse the decline of party and reinvigorate these great
instruments of democracy, we urge the following steps:
1. Public financing of campaigns through parties.
Instead of giving money to individual candidates,
the federal and state governments should provide
funds to the parties, which would use it both to
strengthen their organizational and educational
programs and to help candidates with their campaign
costs. Public funding of parties already exists
successfully in a half-dozen states, and is a part
of the presidential campaign finance law. These
sound precedents should be taken as a model for any
proposal to finance congressional campaigns.
2. Mid-term conventions for both major parties.
We urge that each party hold a mid-term national
convention, where issues may be debated and voted
upon, and the party's platform renewed. Delegates
to the convention should include both elected
office-holders and persons chosen by the party rankand-file. Holding such a convention is at least as
important for the party out of power as for the
party in power.

J. Reverse the trend toward more and more primaries.
Primaries, in an appropriate misture with other
devices such as caucuses and state conventions, are
part of the traditional process by which the major
parties choose their nominees for President. But the
system has gotten out of balance. About threequarters of the delegates to national conventions
are now chosen in primaries. More states are planning
to adopt president~al primaries, if only to share in
the kind of media attention a small state like New
Hampshire receives. Collectively these primaries are
expensive, exhausting, confusing, and unrepresentative.
In the interest of democracy and for the sake of the
party system, we call upon state legislatures to reverse
the trend toward proliferation.
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These steps, taken together, will serve the important purpose
of helping to broaden party participation, revitalize party activity,
and hence strengthen democracy in wards, precincts, and communities
throughout the country,
It is more than three years since Watergate, We are in
danger of forgetting the main revelation of that episode: the pernicious influence that big-time campaign contributors can have over
government, The best remedy for that disease is the revitalization
of the party system, We call upon all friends of democracy to join
us in working for party renewal.

COMMITTEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL
Strengthening the Political Parties*

The Cammi ttee for Party Renewal is a voluntary group of some two
hundred political practitioners and researchers. Bipartisan in membership, we share a common concern for the survival of our political parties.
We see them as vital instruments of democracy, but as organizations which
are threatened in their very existence.
As we declared. at our founding at the Jefferson Memorial in 1977,
"Without parties there can be no organized and coherent politics. When
politics lacks coherence, there can be no accountable democracy." Without parties, we then warned, we are threatened. by "a politics of celebrities, of excessive media influence, of political fad-of-the-month clubs,
of massive private financing by various 'fatcats' of state and congressional campaigns, of gun-for-hire campaign managers, of heightened interest
in 'personalities' and lowered concern for policy, of manipulation and
maneuver and management of self-chosen political elites."
As we approach the culmination of the presidential election of
1980, the need for party renewal is even more evident. It has begun to
be recognized by respected commentators, by the voting public, and by
political leaders of both the Republican and Democratic Parties. Discontent
with the present arrangements is widespread, as evident in the low degree
of trust in our national institutions, in decreased voting turnout, and
in the widespread abandonment of party loyalties.
Rebuilding our political parties will require greater involvement
by individual citizens, but we are not content to rely on vague urgings of
participation. Effective participation requires appropriate institutional
structures, which must be deliberately designed by the parties themselves
and by formal statutory change. The actions we recommend are directed
toward three goals: increasing the membership of the parties and the
effectiveness of political participation; providing the parties with
necessary resources, particularly money; and re-establishing functions
for the political parties in the overall political system.
Toward these goals, we recommend the following specific actions:
1. Less emphasis should be placed on primary elections for
the choice of national convention delegates~ while more
delegates should be chosen through party caucuses and conventions. Increased representation for party officials is
also desirable.

*This position paper was adopted in 1980 by the Executive Committee
of CPR and presented. to both national party committees.
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2. If public financing of campaigns is adopted, these
funds should be channelled through the parties, with a
portion reserved for general party purposes. Direct
public financing of the political parties is also widely
advocated. Many backers of strengthened parties believe
that public funds should be provided for such purposes
as party organization, research, publicity, and fund
raising, and such support is now provided by a number
of states. Other analysts urge increased private support
of the parties. While acknowledging these different
approaches, we agree that support must be provided to
the parties themselves, rather than to individual
candidates.

J. The parties should be given more freedom in their
financing. Contributions to the parties should be allowed
in greater amounts than to individual candidates, and
expenditures by parties for researcfi~ation
should not be included in campaign expenditure limits.
State and local party committee expenditures on behalf
of national slates should not be included in expenditure
or contribution limits. In general, party contributions
to candidates should be preferred above those of individual
or political action committees.
4. State law should provide for party caucuses and conventions, open to all party members, to endorse candidates in
the party primary. Such endorsement should be indicaT:ed
on the primary ballot, with the endorsed candidate normally
given the first place on the ballot.

5.

Parties should consider holding periodic issue conventions (e.g., in congressional election years), on the state
and national levels. These meetings may invigorate the
organization, consider policy questions, and hold officials
elected under the party label accountable for the actions
on party platform positions.

6. State parties should establish rules that facilitate
widespread participation. These rules should include adoption of formal charters, broad public notice of nominating
procedures and dates, affirmative action to promote participation by all elements of the population, and apportionment of representation in party bodies on the basis of
population and/or electoral strength within the party.

?. Local parties should regularly hold open, wellpublicized meetings, at which current issues and contemporary problems are discussed. Positions adopted at such
meetings should be forwarded to state and national plqtform committees.

J

8. Parties should establish a dues-paying membership.
For modest fees, the parties should provide their members
with such benefits as copies of the national platform and
other policy statements, and a regular report of activities.
They should regularly determine members' opinions, and
provide information on means to influence the choice of
convention delegates and party officials.

9. Federal law should be amended to provide regular
access to television for the major political partieso In
particular, debates for President and other major offices
should be under the control of party bodies, such as the
national party committees. Access should also be provided
for third-party and independent candidates with sizeable
followings.
10. The political parties should establish commissions
nationally, and in each state, to promote joint efforts
to strengthen the parties, particularly through public
education programs and statutory change. Training and
research programs through academic institutions should be
developed.

COHMITTEE FOR PARTY RENEWAL
Principles of Strong Party Organization*

"A political party is the instrwnent of the people's
will. It exists not just to win elections but to
move a country. Its purpose is not to placate a
cacophony of strident voices, but to attract diverse
groups to a common purpose. It is built not on
television, but on a national vision. And when that
party is out of power, its charge is to provide an
alternative."
Senator Ernest F. Hollings**

Political parties are an American invention. Jefferson and Madison
devised them as means of changing the policy directions of government;
Jackson and Van Buren revised them as means of expanding popular participation in government. Since the 18JOs, they have, albeit imperfectly,
continued to serve these ends. Parties are the only broad-based, multiinterested organizations we have that can nominate candidates for office,
mobilize popular support behind them, and organize those elected into
a government. Unlike special-interest groups, parties must appeal to
pluralities in the electorate i f they are to win; and unlike singlecandidate organizations, they must win many races i f they are to govern.
Parties, moreover, give coherence to American politics. We have a constitutional system and a political culture dominated by disunifying forces:
separated powers, federalism, pluralism, individualism, Parties have been
a unifying force in this system, cutting across the branches and levels
of government as well as across voting blocs to aggregate interests,
build coalitions, and make mass democracy possible.
Political parties have always had a difficult time in our constitutional system and will always have to compete for influence here.
Historically, their influence has waxed and waned. But strong parties
and a strong party system remain the best hope for representative and
responsible democracy in an extended and diverse republic like ours.
They are the only institutions in our electoral system that can be held
accountable for what government does. Those elected to public in their
name must make policy, not just advocate it, and are answerable for their
actions to the electorate as a whole, not to a narrow constituency of
lii11ited and special interest.

*This position paper was prepared by Jerome Mileur, Executive Director
of the Committee for Party Renewal, reviewed by the Committee's executive
committee, submitted to the full membership for comment, and approved at
the Committee's annual business meeting, September 1, 1984.
HThe Washington Post (I:ational Weekly Edition), July 2J, 1984, p. 2J.
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Strengthening our political parties ultimately means making them
more representative and accountable institutions that link elections to
government, so that voters can influence the direction of public policy.
A strong party system, therefore, should be both competitive and participatory, and should structure electoral choice as to the direction of
government. A strong party should have the organization and resources
to formulate a coherent set of public policy principles, to nominate and
elect candidates for public office consistent with these principles, to
withhold party support from candidates who do not support its principles,
and to advance these principles in government. A strong party should be
open to all party members, should have active committees at all levels,
should support candidates for all public offices, should be professionally
staffed, and should have clear lines of internal authority. We believe
the following principles of strong party organization are a guide to
these ends.
(1) Political parties should govern themselves. As private associations with public responsibilities, parties should be as free as possible
from state and federal regulation to determine their own structure and
functions. The public interest requires that parties operate in an open,
honest, fair, and accountable way, but these goals may be achieved through
reporting and disclosure requirements and not by detailed regulation of
party organization and activities, Parties should define their organization
and powers formally and publicly through party constitutions or charters and
by-laws, so that all who affiliate with them may know the rules of party
governance. In our political system, parties differ organizationally and
functionally from political action committees and other special interest
groups, and they should not be treated the same in law. Indeed, state and
federal courts have regularly recognized this distinction, The public
interest is best served by law that complements party self-regulation,
not by statutes that substitute for it,
(2) Political parties should use caucuses and conventions to draft
platfonns and endorse candidates, Caucuses and conventions are avenues of
general participation in party affairs that encourage dialogue and peer
review of party programs and candidates, The quantity of participation in
them may not be as large as in primaries, but the quality of participation
is much higher. Local caucuses open to all registered party members are
useful checks on both the programmatic direction of a party and the ambition
of individuals seeking party endorsement for public office. Party conventions, representative of local caucuses and committees, should devise platforms and endorse candidates for public office, Party primaries closed to
all but party registrants can be an effective rank-and-file check on party
endorsements and should therefore follow party conventions.

(3) Political party organization should be open and broadly based
at the local level, Local politics is a basic testing ground for candidates
and the principal arena of direct citizen participation in politics, Strong
local party committees should be the foundation upon which state and
national party structures are built. They should be the principal party
instrument for defining membership, registering voters, recruiting candidates,
and conducting campaigns, They should also be central to the development of
a party platform and to public education with respect to party programs
for government.
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(4) Political parties should advance a public agenda. Parties are
the most broadly-based organizations in our democratic system and thus best
able to define priorities for government and to develop programs that serve
general interests, They serve the public interest best by developing and
defining a broad philosophy of governance that differentiates one party
from another and by giving voters a reasonable choice in the direction of
government. Parties should develop platforms at all levels of government
through open and representative procedures that begin with caucuses at the
local level in which all registered party members may participate. They
should publicize their platforms in order both to inform their members and
to educate the public, and should develop procedures through which to hold
party nominees and office holders accountable to party platforms.

(5) Political parties should endorse candidates for public office.
If parties are to present voters with a choice of policy alternatives and
if they are to be accountable for governance, they must have a measure of
control over who runs for office in their name. At the very least, parties
should be able to establish threshhold tests for candidate access to primary
ballots of 15-20% of the vote at endorsing conventions, thereby assuring
that all candidates for nomination represent significant factions within
the party. Checks may be legislated on party endorsement processes to
ensure full and fair participation of party members, but the ultimate
check will and should be whether a party's program for and performance
in government merit the support of the general electorate.

(6) Political parties should be effective campaign organizations.
Parties will be strong insofar as candidates depend upon them for election
and insofar as they are key to the success of those who seek election in
their name. To this end, parties should recruit candidates who share their
philosophy and should provide them with training and expert advice and direction in the organization and conduct of their campaigns, with research on
the district and the opponent, and with polling, media, and other stateof-the-art campaign services. Parties should also endeavor to coordinate
campaigns of all party candidates in a given election to minimize conflicts
and to maximize resources,
(7) Political parties should be a major financier of candidate
campaigns, No service to candidates is more important than the provision
of money, and there should be few restraints on the ability of parties to
raise and spend money in campaigns. Limits on individual contributions to
parties should be removed, and limits on annual individual contributions
to parties that qualify for a full tax deduction or credit should be raised
significantly, Statutory limits on group contributions to candidates and
parties should be retained. Parties themselves should be able to make
unlimited contributions to the campaigns of their candidates for offices
at ::ill le\rels of gover:r.Inent. If a system of public financL'>1g of elections
is adopted, it should use the parties as channels through which to distribute
these funds as they see fit.
(8) Political parties should be the principal instruments of governance.
Parties should be instruments of collegial governance which broaden and unite
leadership in the different branches and levels of government and by means of
which specific programs may be developed to implement party platforms. State

..
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central and national party committees should work closely with party leaders
in the legislative and executive branches of government to advance the party
platform. Party leaders in Congress and state legislatures should make maximum
use of caucuses in setting a party agenda and developing strategy, Presidents
and governors should make maximum use of party platforms and committees to
develop their programs and to educate voters. Equally important, the opposition
party(s) should be institutionalized, through question periods or in other ways,
so as to provide a more effective check on specific policy decisions of the
government. Between elections, the opposition is the key to accountability,
and the quality of democratic government turns as much on its performance as
it does on that of the party in power.
(9) Political parties should maintain regular internal communications.
Parties at all levels should keep members informed of activities, decisions, and
plans through newsletters or other house organs. This is another avenue of
accountability and also one of participation, for it facilitates an exchange
of ideas, positions, and analyses about the party and politics of the moment.
Organizationally, a good house organ can build support for party positions and
programs and also lance sores before they become cancers. It also makes for
"news" about the party.
(10) Election law should encourage strong political parties. Hore than
other forms of political organization, parties have served egalitarian and
majoritarian values and encouraged widespread citizen participation in American
politics, They are our most democratic institutions and should be sustained
and encouraged by public policy, This can be done in many ways, including
requiring voter registration by party, adopting the party column ballot, and
restoring partisan local elections, Public policy should also recognize the
difference between parties and other political groups in the regulation of
campaign finance, the making of endorsements, and access to both the ballot
and the news media. By law, parties should have a privileged position in our
political system. They should be given advantages over special interest groups
and over individual candidates.
In recent years, there have been widespread reports that our political
parties are dying. These obituaries are premature. Indeed, party organization
at the state and national levels may never have been healthier than it is today,
as the number and professionalism of staff has grown along with the financial
resources and activities of parties at these levels. Rather than on their
deathbed, our parties have been in a long transitional period from an old
politics of patronage and machine organization to a new politics of issues
and high technology, Since the 1960s, both national parties have sought to
renew themselves by adapting organizationally to the changed realities of
American politics. The two parties, however, have not taken the same approach
to renewal: the Democrats have concentrated on internal reform, while the
Republicans have focused on candidate services. But a truly strong party
should travel both these paths: it should be both internally democratic and
electorally effective, We believe that the principles outlined above will
produce the kind of party organization that can realize these goals and
strengthen American democracy as a result.
·

STATE OF MINNESOTA
STATE ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD
625 NORTH ROBERT STREET, SUITE 102
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA 55101-2520
PHONE: (612) 296-5148

October 7, 1987
TO:

John D. Feerick, Chairman
Commission on Government Integrity
84th Floor
Two World Trade Center
New York, N. Y. 10047

FROM:

Mary Ann McCoy
Executive Director

SUBJECT:

Forum on Campaign Financing

I am pleased to accept your invitation to participate in the Commission
forum on October 23 in Buffalo, New York. Your letter of September 30
arrived in the Ethical Practices Board office today, and as you requested,
I am sending you the following materials that you may wish to circulate to
the Commissioners:
Candidate and Principal Campaign Committee Handbook, with
information about Minnesota's public financing program and
spending limits at pages 5 - 8;
Public Financing Agreement, form ET-10, the voluntary agreement that
a candidate for state executive or legislative office must sign in
order to receive money from the State Elections Campaign Fund;
Leaflet: Information about Public Financing, prepared for distribution
to state candidates in election year 1986; and
Annual Report of the Ethical Practices Board for Fiscal Year 1987,
with summary data on public financing for election year 1986 at
pages 4, 5, and 12 - 16.
You may duplicate any of the enclosed for distribution before or during the
forum. Thank you for sending me information about the New York City public
financing bill, to review before the forum. I am looking forward to my
participation with Professor Ruth Jones in the public financing and expenditure limits panel, tentatively scheduled at 10:00 - 11:15 a.m. on October 23
at the Buffalo & Erie County Public Library. In the meantime, if you have
questions about the enclosed, please call me at (612) 296-1720.

y)U.~ a~.u..._'-fi;JC(3r
/
l V

enclosures (four)
copy:

Dr. Herbert E. Alexander

AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY EMPLOYER

MINNESOTA
PUBLIC
DISCLOSURE
LAW

l~~;

CANDIDATE and
PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
HANDBOOK

~"~"

(under Minn. Stat. §lOA.02, subd. 8)

Page
Registration • • • • • • • • •
Statement of Economic Interest •
Reporting
Treasurer
Report of Receipts and Expenditures
Termination
Contribution Limits
Expenditure Limits •
Tax Credit Agreement
Public Financing Agreement ••
Complaints, Advisory Opinions

.

•.

.•

.

. ..

4
4

5
6

6
8

@fmlCAL PRACTICES BOARD-M-A_v_,_ _1 _9_8_6_.....625 North Robert Street
St. Paul, MN 55101-2520

{612) 296-1721

NOTE: This HANDBOOK is intended to serve as an aid to state candidates
and their treasurers. It should be used as a supplement to Minn. Stat.
Ch. lOA and Minn. Rules, Chs. 4500-4525 -- not as a substitute. For
specific information not included in this HANDBOOK, please refer to the
law and rules, together with periodic newsletters from the Board office.
"Candidate" - an individual who seeks nomination or election to the
office of Governor, Lt. Governor, Attorney Gen.era!, Secretary of State,
State Auditor, State Treasurer, State Senato~, State Representative,
or an Elective Judgeship.
"Principal campaign coHittee" - a single political committee designated by a candidate to receive all contributions and authorize all
expenditures on behalf of the candidate.

A CANDIDATE or TREASURER must register a PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE
with the Ethical Practices Board within 14 days after receiving contributions or making expenditures in excess of $100 to influence that
candidate's nomination or election. Exception: A candidate who· spends
in excess of $100 using only that c~ndidate's own money, need not
register a committee but MUST file a Report of Receipts and Expendi~
tures with the Ethical Practices Board on or before the required filing
date. All candidates who wish to receive public financing funds or to
give their contributors the benefit of a tax credit must register with
the Board.
To register a PRINCIPAL CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE the treasurer or candidate
files a Statement of Organization and Registration (ET-00001) with ~he
Board. All forms required to be filed are available in the Board
office upon request. Each STATEMENT OF ORGANIZATION AND REGISTRATION
must list the names of the candidate, chair and treasurer of the committee, together with addresses and telephone numbers of each, the name-'
of the bank(s) in which the campaign funds will be kept, and for legislative candidates, a list of all counties in the legislative district.
Each candidate must list the office sought. Candidates, other than
those seeking judicial offices, must list political party affiliation.
The REGISTRATION FORM should be filed with the Ethical .Practices Boifd,
625 North Robert Street, St. Paul, MN 55101-2520. The form must be .•
amended within 10 days of any change by notifying the Board in writirig.
The written notice may be on a Statement of Organization form or by
letter indicating the information to be changed, and must be signed
and dated either by the treasurer or candidate.

STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST ~~~~~~-------------Once the CANDIDATE has filed an AFFIDAVIT OF CANDIDACY -- the candidate MUST file a STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST with the Ethical
Practices Board*. This STATEMENT must be filed within 14 days after
filing with the filing officer an affidavit of candidacy or petition
to appear on the ballot. The STATEMENT OF ECONOMIC INTEREST (ET-00003)
will be provided to all candidates by the filing officer or may be
obtained from the Board off ice.

* Does not apply to elective judgeships.
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• TREASURER

The treasurer of a principal campaign committee
authorizes all expenditures of the committee,
authorizes in writing expenditures in excess of $20
entities on behalf of the candidate,
obtains receipts for expenditures in excess of $100
a calendar year,
preserves all receipted bills and accounts for four years,
deposits all receipts promptly,
issues a check to the contributor for the amount by which the contribution exceeded the limit at the time of deposit of the contribution,
credits a joint check to the individual signing the check unless
otherwise specified,
records the name, address,and employer, together with the date and
amount, of each source of cash or inkind contributions in excess of
$20,
accepts no contributions in excess of $100 from an association,
political committee, or political fund unless it is registered with
the Ethical Practices Board OR it provides the recipient committee
with a Report of Receipts and Expenditures containing all information required by Minn. Stat. §lOA.20 for the reporting period "in
which the contribution was made:
• forwards an anonymous contribution in excess of $20, in its entirety,
to the Ethical Practices Board,
maintains signed agreements for each loan made or received,
reports a forgiveness or repayment of a loan by another entity as a
contribution to the principal campaign committee in the year in
which the loan was ORIGINALLY made,
records the name and address of each entity to whom aggregate expenditures in excess of $100 in a calendar year have been made, together with the date, amount and purpose of each expenditure,
records the name of each candidate, political committee or political
fund to whom contributions of $100 in aggregate in each calendar
year have been made,
timely files the Report of Receipts and Expenditures as explained
on page 4,
• is personally liable for penalties associated with failure to file.
However, the Board believes that the candidate"has the ultimate responsibility to ensure that the treasurer and the committee adhere to applicable
laws and rules.
-3-

Call the Board office, (512) 295-1711, for suggested recordkeeping
bulletin.
Candidates without committees and treasurers must report any
tures made in excess of $100 •

expendi~

. REPORTS OF RECEIPTS AND EXPENDITURES
The treasurer of a PRINCIPAL-CAMPAIGN COMMITTEE is required to file an
annual Report of Receipts and Expenditures on January 31, of each year.
In addition to the annu~l report; every candidate w~ose name is oil a
ballot du~ing an election year must file a report of receipts and expenditures 10 days before the primary election and another report of
receipts and expenditures 10 days before the general election. A Jciis
in the primary ele'ction or inactivity on the part of the committee d'oe'S
not eliminate the requirement to file a report. Reporting forms, t-;;:gether with instructions for filling out the report, will be mailed td
the treasurer of record about four weeks before a filing date. The report must be signed by the treasurer or candidate, who should make a
copy for committee records b~fore submitting the report to the Board.
Additional reporting requirements occur in the tw6 week period before a
primary or general election. Contribution(s) f~cii anf oni io~fc~ totaling $200 or more ($2;000 or more in a'ny statewide election), recE!ived
between the last day covered in the last report prior to an eleitio~
and and election must be reported to th'e Board in person or by telegram',
mail gram, or by certified mail within 48 hours after receipt. This
information must be included in the next required Report of Receipts
and Expenditures, also.

• TERMINATION
The treasurer or candidat~ of a principal campaign committee may file a
termination report for the committee at ariy time when the~e art ~o notes
or loans outstanding and the cash balance i~ $100 or less.

Limits are placed on the dollar amount of contributions which a principal campaign co~mittee may accept from entities other than the candidate.
(There are no limits on the amount a candidate may contribute to that
candidate's own campaign.) Please refer to ~he listing on page 5 to
determine the limits that apply to your com~ittee during an election or
nonelection year. The election year limits apply only to years during
which your candidate files an affidavit of candidacy.
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• 1986 CONTRIBuTION LIMITS*

The following contribution limits are applicable for 1986:
CONTRIBUTION LIMITS

Office sought or held

Governor &Lt.Governor
Attorney General
Secretary of State
State Treasurer
State Auditor
State Senator
State Representative
Elective Judgeships

From individual,
political conimi ttee
or fund:

From political
party; in
aggregate

Election
Year

Nonelection
Year

Election
Year

Nenelection
Year

$12,000
$ 2,000
$ 1,000
$ 1,000
$ 1,000
$ 300
$ 150
No limit

$300 ,000
$ 50 ,000
$ 25,000
$ 25,000
$ 25,000
$ 7,500
$ 3,750
No limit

$60,000
$10,000
$ 5,000
$ 5,000
$ 5,000
$ 1,500
$ 750
No limit

$60,000
$10,000
$ 5,000
$ 5,000
$ 5,000
$ 1,500
$ 750
No limit

Contribution limits apply to ALL candidates, except judicial candidates.
EXPENDITURE LIMITS

Expenditure limits apply to all candidates who sign either a Tax Credit
Agreement, Public Financing Agreement or both*. Expenditure limits are
established, using a formula provided in law based on the Consumer Price
Index, and published by the Ethical Practices Board by June 1 of each
election year •
• The following campaign expenditure limits are applicable for 1986:
Election
Year

Governor &Lt. Governor
Attorney General
Secretary of State
State Treasurer
State Auditor
State Senator
State Representative
Elective Judgeships

$1,418,213
$ 236,369
$ 118,185
$ li8,185
$ 118,185
$
35,456
$ 17,728
No limit

Nonelection
Year

$283,643
$ 47,274
$ 23,637
$ 23,637
$ 23,637
$ 7,092
$ 3,546
No limit

If you have questions about expenditure limits, please.call the Board
office (612) 2g6~1721.
*Does not apply to elective judgeships.

A candidate who exceeds the contribution or expenditure limit may be
liable for a civil fine up to 4 times the amount by which the Limit was
exceeded.
. TAX CREDIT AGREEMENT

This voluntary Agreement provides an income tax credit for a taxpayer ~ho
contributes to a legislative or statewide candidate or officeholder who
has a TAX CREDIT AGREEMENT in effect. This Agreement binds the candidate
and officeholder to expenditure limits in both election and nonelection
years. A Tax Credit Agreement once signed MAY NOT BE RESCINDED. A Tax
Credit Agreement may be signed through December 31 to be in effect during
that calendar year, and remains in effect until filings open for the
next election for the off ice held or sought when the Agreement was
signed, or until the principal campaign committee terminates, whichever occurs first.
Tax credit receipts in books of 25 are available from the Board to
candidates and officeholders upon receipt of a signed Tax Credit Agreement. These receipts may be provided to a contributor. The receipts
are not mandatory for a taxpayer to receive a tax credit. Only a candidate or officeholder who has an effective Agreement may issue a Tax
Credit Receipt or a facsimile thereof. A taxpayer may claim a tax
credit of one-half of the amount of the contribution to a candidate
or officeholder with an effective Agreement ($50 maximum per individual).
. PUBLIC FINANCING AGREEMENT

A CANDIDATE may also ELECT to file a PUBLIC FINANCING AGREEMENT with
the Board. This voluntary Agreement enables qualifying candidates to
receive public financing from the State Elections Campaign Fund designated by taxpayers through an income tax or property tax refund checkoff,
The money comes from the general fund of the state through a maximum
checkoff of $2 per taxpayer to either the general account or the party
account of the State Elections Campaign Fund. The Agreement may be
signed when the candidate files an affidvait of candidacy through Septem
ber l of an election year. If not rescinded by September 1, the Agreement binds the signer to the EXPENDITURE LIMITS until filings for the
candidate's office open for the next election, or until the candidate's
principal campaign committee terminates, whichever occurs first.
CANDIDATES qualify for PARTY ACCOUNT funds by -winning the primary election of a major political party; or
petitioning of a minor political party to the general election
ballot.
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The amount of this payment will vary among legislative candidates of a
political party depending on the number of tax checkoffs for that party
made by tax filers in that legislative district •
•• LEGISLATIVE CANDIDATES qualify for GENERAL ACCOUNT funds by receiving
10% of the votes cast for the office sought.
STATEWIDE CANDIDATES qualify for GENERAL ACCOUNT funds by receiving
5% of the votes cast for the office sought.
The amount of this payment will 'be the same for each candidate for a
particular office. A preliminary estimate of the amount which may be
paid out to each office is provided to the filing officer. The Board
sends to each candidate by August 15 of each election year an updated
estimate of the amount a candidate may expect ~o receive •
.• Candidates may be required to return a portion or all of the public
financing received under the following conditions:
1. The candidate receives more in public financing than the expenditure
limit for the office sought by the candidate -- the difference must
be returned.
2. The candidate receives more in public financing than the actual campaign expenditures of that candidate's principal campaign committee--·
the difference aust be returned.
3. The candidate receives actual aggregate contributions in excess of·the·
"aggregate contribution limit" (which is different for each candidate).
The following formula defines the method of calculating the "aggregate contribution limit":
ADD: Campaign expenditure
limit (for office sought)
+
Actual noncampaign disbursements
+
Actual ballot question
expenditures

ADD: Beginning cash balance
1-1-86
+
All contributions received
during 1986
+
Public financing received

= Aggregate contribution limit

= Actual aggregate contributions

Calculate:

Actual aggregate contributions
- Aggregate contributions limit
Public financing to be returned
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Example:
Expenditure limit
Noncampaign disbursements
Ballot question expenditures
Aggregate contribution
limit

$25,000
1,500

Beginning Cash Balance
Contributions received
Public Financing
received

$ 2,000
20,000
6,000

0

$26,500

Actual aggregate
contributions

$28,000

Actual Aggregate Contributions •••••••••••••• $28,.000
Aggregate Contribution limit ········~······· 26,500
Return of Public Financing •••••••••••••••••• $ 1,500
The return of Public Financing money in the form of a check or money
order, payable to the State of Minnesota, shall be submitted to the
Ethical Practices Board with the principal campaign committee's election
year-end Report of Receipts and Expenditures. Returned Pt,!blic Fin_ancing
is deposited by the Board in the General Fund of the State of Minnesota.
A committee returning Public Financing is not in violation of M.S. Ch.
lOA, the Ethics In Government Act, nor is a committee required to return
more Public Financing than the committee received.
For additional information about Public Financing, please call
Ethical Practices Board at (612) 296-1721.
COMPLAINTS

--------------------------------------------------

An individual may file a complaint with the Ethical Practices Board
concerning suspected violations of Minn. Stat. Ch. lOA.
ADVISORY OPINIONS

Individuals or associations may request an advisory opinion from the
Board on the requirements of Minn. Stat. Ch. lOA to guide their
conduct.
PUBLIC INFORMATION

Agreements, statements, and reports are available for public viewing and
photocopying at cost within 4B hours after receipt by the Board.
All legislative candidate statements or reports are photocopied and
filed by the Board in the county auditor's office in each county of the
candidate's legislative district within 72 hours of receipt in the Boar~
office.
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STATE OF MINNESOTA
STATE ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD
625 NORTH ROBERT STREET
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA 55101-2520
PHONE: <612> 296-5148

PUBLIC

FINANCING

AGREEMENT

(All the information on this form is public information.)

office sought

name of candidate

address

city

(district #)

zip

state

1.

As a general election candidate in 1986, I request my appropriate share of the State
Elections Campaign Fund.

2.

As conditions of my receipt of money from the State Elections Campaign Fund, I agree
that my principal campaign committee will abide by the following limitations, in accordance with Minn. Stat. §lOA.32, Subd. 3:

3.

A.

Campaign expenditures and approved expenditures for the period January 1, 1986,
through December 31, 1986, will not exceed the expenditure limit for the office
for which I am a candidate, as set forth in Minn. Stat. §lOA.25, subd. 2.
In a
nonelection year, campaign expenditures and approved expenditures will not
exceed the expenditure limit set forth in Minn. Stat. §lOA.25, Subd. 6, which is
20 percent of the election-year expenditure limit.

B.

Aggregate contributions accepted on my behalf, and approved expenditures made on
my behalf, for the period January 1, 1986, through December 31, 1986, including
all money in the committee's account on January 1, 1986, will not exceed the
difference between the amount which may legally be expended on my behalf and the
amount I receive from the State Elections Campaign Fund.
However, contributions
equal to the amount of any election-year noncampaign disbursements, and of any
contributions or expenditures to promote or defeat a state ballot question,
shall not count toward these aggregate contribution and expenditure limits.

C.

If my campaign expenditures are less than the amount received from the State
Elections Campaign Fund, I will return the difference between the amount of
public financing received and the total amount of my campaign expenditures to
the Ethical Practices Board by February 2, 1987, together with the Report of
Receipts and Expenditures due on that date.

D.

By February 2, 1987, I will return to the Ethical Practices Board any amount by
which the aggregate contributions accepted on my behalf, or the approved expenditures made on my behalf, exceed the aggregate contribution and approved
expenditure limit set forth in Minn. Stat. §lOA.32, Subd. 3, up to the amount
received in public financing.

This agreement remains effective until the dissolution of my principal campaign committee or the opening of filing for the next succeeding election to the office I hold
or seek, whichever occurs first .

~--d-a---te

.__s_i_·g
__n_a_t_u_r_e----------------------------------------------------''I

___________________________,

File this agreement with the ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD on or before September 2, 1986.
ET 00010-06

STATE OF MINNESOTA
ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD
625 NORTH ROBERT STREET
ST. PAUL, MN 55101-2520
Phone:
(612) 296-1721
INFORMATION ABOUT PUBLIC FINANCING
M.S.§§lOA.31 - M.S. lOA.32

PUBLIC FINANCING AGREEMENT
A CANDIDATE for executive (statewide) or legislative office may ELECT to file a PUBLIC
FINANCING AGREEMENT with the Ethical Practices Board. This voluntary Agreement enables
a qualifying candidate who has a principal campaign committee ~egistered with the Board
to receive public financing from the State Elections Campaign Fund designated by taxpayers through an income tax or property tax refund checkoff. The money comes from the
general fund of the state through a maximum checkoff of $2 per taxpayer to either the
general account or the party account of the State Elections Campaign Fund. The Agreement may be signed when the candidate files an affidavit of candidacy (July 1 through
15, 1986) through September 2, 1986.
If not rescinded by September 2, the Agreement
binds the signer to CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE LIMITS until filings open for the next election
for the office sought or held, or until the candidate's principal campaign committee
terminates, whichever occurs first.
CANDIDATES qualify for PARTY ACCOUNT funds by -winning the primary election of a major political party; or
.. petitioning of a minor political party to the general election ballot.
The amount of this payment will vary among legislative candidates of a political
party depending on the number of tax checkoffs for that party made by tax filers in
that legislative district.

Legislative Candidates qualify for GENERAL ACCOUNT funds by receiving 10% of the
votes cast in the 1986 general election for the office sought.
Statewide Candidates qualify for GENERAL ACCOUNT funds by receiving 5% of the
votes cast in the 1986 general election for the office sought.
The amount of this payment will be the same for each candidate for a particular
office. A preliminary estimate of the amount which may be paid out to each office
is provided to the filing officer. The Board sends to each candidate by August 15,
1986, an updated estimate of the amount a candidate may expect to receive.
A candidate may be required to return a portion or all of the public financing received under the following conditions:
1. The candidate receives more in public financing than the expenditure limit
for the office sought by the candidate -- the difference must be returned.
2. The candidate receives more in public financing than the actual campaign expenditures of that candidate's principal campaign committee -- the difference
must be returned.
3. The candidate receives actual aggregate contributions in excess of the ''aggregate contribution limit" (which is different for each candidate), the difference
must be returned.
The following formula defines the method of calculating the ''aggregate contribution limit" and the amount of public financing to be returned.

(continued ---;) )

ADD:
+

+

Campaign expenditure limit
(for office sought)
Actual noncampaign disbursements
Actual ballot question expenditures

ADD:
+

+

Aggregate contribution limit
Calculate:

Beginning cash balance 1-1-86
All contributions received
dur.i ng 1986
Public financing received
Actual aggregate contributions

Actual aggregate contributions
-Aggregate contribution limit
=Public financing to be returned

EXAMPLE:

Expenditure limit
Noncampaign disbursements
Ballot question expenditures

$25,000
1,500

Aggregate contribution limit

$26,500

0

Beginning cash balance
Contributions received
Public Financing received

$ 2,000
20,000
6,000

Actual aggregate contributions

$28,000

Actual Aggregate Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $28,000
Aggregate Contribution Limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
26,500
Return of Public Financing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . $ 1, 500
The return of Public Financing money in the form of a check or money order, payable to
the State of Minnesota, shall be submitted to the Ethical Practices Board with the
principal campaign committee's election year-end Report of Receipts and Expenditures,
due February 2, 1987. Returned Public Financing is deposited by the Board in the
General Fund of the State of Minnesota.
A committee returning Public Financing is not in violation of M.S. Ch. lOA, the Ethics
In Government Act, nor is a committee required to return more Public Financing than
the committee received.
For additional information about Public Financing, please call the Ethical Practices
Board at (612) 296-1721.

* * * * * * * * *
TAX CREDIT AGREEMENT

A CANDIDATE for executive (statewide) er legislative office may ELECT to file a TAX
CREDIT AGREEMENT with the Board. This voluntary Agreement provides an income tax
credit for a taxpayer who contriubtes to a legislative or statewide candidate or officeholder who has a TAX CREDIT AGREEMENT in effect. This Agreement binds the candidate
or officeholder to campaign expenditure limits in both election and nonelection years.
A Tax Credit Agreement once signed MAY NOT BE RESCINDED.
A Tax Credit Agreement may
bs signed through December 31, to be in effect during that calendar year, and remains
in effect until filings open for the next election for the office held or sought when
the Agreement was signed, or until the principal campaign committee terminates, whichever occurs first.
Tax credit receipts in books of 25 are available from the Board to a candidate of
officeholder whose principal campaign is registered with the Board, upon receipt of a
signed Tax Credit Agreement. Tax credit receipts may be provided to a contributor.
The receipts are not mandatory for a taxpayer to receive a tax credit. Only a candidate or officeholder who has an effective Agreement may issue a Tax Credit Receipt or
a facsimile thereof.
A taxpayer may claim a tax credit of one-half of the amount of
the contributions or a candidate or officeholder with an effective Agreement ($50 maximum per individual taxpayer).
July, 1986
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SMITH, Mary
Homemaker
3
Party affiliation( )

Chair**

SAMPSON, Ellen
Attorney
Party affiliation:

Vice Chair*

BOARD
Board Term:
1/84
1/88

-

Independent-Republican
Board Term:
1/85 - 1/89

Democratic-Farmer-Labor

SCHOTZKO, Judith
Attorney
Party affiliation:

Secretary*

Independent-Republican

ECKSTEIN, A. J. (Tony)
Veterinarian
)
2
Party affiliation(

Board
9/80
1/83
1/87

Term:
- 1/83
- 1/87
- 1/91

Board Term:
1/86 - 1/90

Democratic-Farmer-Labor

EWALD, Douglas R.
Consultant
1
Party affiliation( )

Board Term:
11/86 - 1/88

McGOWAN, Martin J.
Retired Newspaper Publisher
Party affiliation(3):

Board Term:
9/84 - 1/87
1/87 - 1/91

*
**

Democratic-Farmer-Labor

Elected May, 1987
Elected September, 1986, to fill unexpired term, to July, 1987
Board Term:
2/84 - 9/86

OGDAHL, Harmon T.
Retired Banker
l)
Party affiliation(

Independent- Republican

Key
Position criteria, under Minn. Stat. §lOA.02, subd. 1: (1) former legislator, party
other than that of the governor; (2) former legislator, same party as the governor;
(3) not a public official, party officer, or elected to party-designated office
for three years prior to appointment.
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STATE OF MINNESOTA
STATE ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD
625 NORTH ROBERT STREET
ST. PAUL, MINNESOTA 55101·2520
PHONE: C612l 296·5148

August 11, 1987

TO:

Honorable Rudy Perpich, Governor; Honorable Jerome M. Hughes,
President of the Senate, Honorable Robert E. Vanasek, Speaker
of the House; and the People of Minnesota

FROM:

Ethical Practices Board, Ellen Sampson, Chair

SUBJECT:

Annual Report, in accordance with Minn. Stat. §lOA.02, Subd. 8,
July 1, 1986 - June 30, 1987

During the 1986-1987 Fiscal Year, the Ethical Practices Board reviewed its
administrative rules and procedures in order to provide consistent guidance
to the thousands of individuals and associations whose disclosure of certain
economic interests, political and lobbying activities is regulated by the
Ethics in Government Act, Minnesota Statutes Chapter lOA.
Included in this Annual Report is information about the campaign finance
disclosure and public financing associated with the 1986 elections, which
marked the second time since enactment of Chapter lOA in 1974 that all
executive and legislative offices were elected at the same election.
Throughout our activities, we affirm the need for timely enforcement, disclosure, and public information, ever mindful of the depth and breadth of
volunteer and professional resources expended annually to comply with this
important public disclosure law.
We continue to note that as the interest
in political and lobbying activities rises, there is a concurrent need for
public trust in government, in candidates, in public financing of campaigns,
and in public disclosure laws.
We renew our commitment to a reasonable and balanced approach to the policies
enacted by constitutional amendment, statute, and through administrative
rules, as expressed in the Mission Statement of the Board:
To promote public confidence in state government decisionmaking through development and administration of disclosure,
public financing, and enforcement programs which will ensure
public access to information filed with the Board.
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ANNUAL REPORT - FISCAL YEAR 1987
(July 1, 1986 - June 30, 1987)
I

SUMMARY OF BOARD ACTIVITIES

The Ethical Practices Board held six regular meetings and four subcommittee meetings,
issued one Advisory Opinion, and investigated five complaints. The Board brought
seven court actions and concluded six court actions to secure required disclosure,
payment of late fees (six involving campaign finance program and one involving economic interest disclosure). Additionally, the court ruled in favor of the Board in
two cases brought against the Board (campaign finance program) . The Board adopted
amendments to rules governing campaign finance, economic interest disclosure, lobbyist registration and reporting, conflicts of interest, representation disclosure, and
hearings. The Board amended its administrative procedures in April, 1987, to hold
its annual election of officers, for one-year terms, at the first meeting of each
fiscal year. Accordingly, in July, 1987, the Board elected Ellen G. Sampson, chair;
Judith G. Schotzko, vice chair; and A. J. (Tony) Eckstein, secretary. Officers for
Fiscal Year 1987 are listed on page two of this report.

Campaign Finance Summary 1986: Principal Campaign Committees of Candidates for State Office; Campaign Finance Summary
1986: Principal Campaign Committees of Nonofficeholders; Campaign Finance Summary
1986: Political Committees and Political Funds; Lobbying Disbursement Summary 1986;
Committee and Fund List (July, 1986; December, 1986); Lobbyist Handbook (December,
1986; April, 1987); Advisory Opinions Nos. 90-95 (compilation); Index to Advisory
Opinions Nos. 1-95; Minn. Stat. Ch. lOA with 1987 law changes; and Minn. Rules Chs.
4500-4525 (1987).
Twelve publications were issued by the Board:

The initial phase of the Strive Toward Excellence in Performance (STEP) Board staff
project, in progress from December, 1985, was completed by December 31, 1986, as
planned. The project received honorable mention at the Second Annual Governor's
Award for Excellence in State Government Management in September, 1986.
Using
programs developed by the STEP volunteer partners, Board staff stores campaign finance and lobbyist report data to verify periodic reports, prepare summary reports,
including the quarterly listing of all registered lobbyists, associations represented, and lobbying subjects, under Minn. Stat. §lOA.05.
In the 1987 session, the Legislature repealed certain portions of the Ethics in
Government Act provisions regarding confidentiality of invesigations or complaints
that were declared unconstitutional by a state district court in 1982.

II
A.

CAMPAIGN FINANCE AND PUBLIC FINANCING PROGRAMS
LEGISLATIVE ACTION - 1987

Disclosure thresholds - Contributions to a political fund must be itemized at more
than $100 (was $50) ; contributions to legislative candidates and to candidates
and committees or funds under the Hennepin County Disclosure Law must be itemized
at more than $100 (was $50); and contributions to a legislative candidate from a
single source received just before an election totaling more than $400 must be
disclosed to the Board within 48 hours of receipt (was $200 and more).
State Elections Campaign Fund - checkoff amount $5 ($10, married c~uple filing
jointly); raised from $2 and $4, respectively; effective with tax year 1987.
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Tax credit for contributions to state candidates signing Tax Credit Agreement with
the Board - repealed, beginning with tax year 1987.
Expenditure limit calculations - reflecting a change in the publication date of the
Consumer Price Index (CPI) referenced in Minn. Stat. §lOA.255, beginning in 1987,
calculations will be based on the CPI in December of the year preceding the
election year for the office sought; repealed obsolete reference to population
factors inoperative since adoption of the Campaign Finance Amendment to the Minnesota Constitution by voters in 1980.
Return of public financing - amends provision for possible need to return public financing due to total contributions received. {See Legislative Recommendations - 1988, page 11)
Greater Minnesota Corporation, board of directors - eleven members; president and
each director must file a statement with the Ethical Practices Board disclosing
the nature, amount, date, and recipient of contribution to any public official,
political committee, political fund, or political party, as defined in Minn. Stat.
Ch. lOA, that was made within four years preceding appointment of the directors
or election of the president, provided the contribution was subject to the reporting requirements of Chapter lOA. This statement must be updated annually.
B.

PUBLIC FINANCING - 1986 ELECTION

In 1986, 377 candidates (79%) who filed for office signed and complied with public
financing agreements with the Board to abide by campaign expenditure limits in order
to receive payments from the State Elections Campaign Fund.
Based upon increases in the consumer price index from April, 1982, to April, 1986,
the Board determined 1986 Election Year Expenditure Limits of $1,418,213 for governor/
lieutenant governor; $236,369 for attorney general; $118,185 for secretary of state;
$118,185 for state auditor; $118,185 for state treasurer; $35,456 for state
senator; and $17,728 for state representative.
The 1986 limits are 11.6% above 1982
election year expenditure limits.
Under provisions of the public financing law, 46 candidates returned a total of
$64,946 in public financing from the 1986 election, and $194 was collected from one
candidate from the 1982 election through the Revenue Recapture Act.
All public financing returned to the Board has been deposited in the state general fund.
A summary
of the State Elections Campaign Fund for the 1986 legislative election appears on
pages 12 to 16 of this report.

C.

COMPLIANCE WITH LIMITS

All candidates for state executive and legislative offices must abide by statutory
contribution limits when accepting contributions.
From reports filed by candidate
committees for 1986, staff referred to the Board one potential violation of this
law.
Upon investigation, the case was determined to be inadvertent and was concluded
by conciliation agreement to pay a civil fine imposed by the Board. The civil fine
paid to the Board was deposited in the state general fund.

1986 - Facially-excessive One candidate committee paid a civil penalty of $352.80.
Candidates for state executive and legislative offices who choose to sign an agreement with the Board in order to receive public financing for their campaigns must
abide by statutory campaign expenditure limits.
From reports filed by candidate
committees for 1986, staff referred to the Board one potential violation.
Upon
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investigation, the case was determined to be inadvertent and was concluded by conciliation agreement to pay a civil fine imposed by the Board. The civil fine paid
to the Board was deposited in the state general fund .
. 1986 - One candidate committee paid a civil penalty of $145.93 for exceeding the 1986 election year expenditure limit of $17,728 for a
House candidate.

D.

COMPLIANCE WITH FILING DEADLINES

During fiscal year 1987 there were 1,386 political committees, political funds,
ballot question committees and funds, and principal campaign committees registered
and reporting to the Board.
Board efforts to improve on-time filings during the early 80's continued into fiscal
year 1987. During 1986-1987, $9,466 was collected in late filings from 71 delinquent committees and funds, including $4,375 from 25 candidate committees for
failure to send notice of large contributions.
For late filings other than preelection candidate committee notices or reports, written requests to waive late fees
submitted by 78 delinquent committees and funds were granted.

E.

DESK REVIEW - CAMPAIGN FINANCE REPORTS

For fiscal year 1987, approximately 3,615 reports of receipts and expenditures were
filed by political party committees, political committees, political funds, and
ballot questions committees and funds.
Also during fiscal year 1987, approximately
1,580 reports were filed by candidate campaign committees. Each report was reviewed by Board staff for compliance with the disclosure law requirements including
correct reporting of assets and liabilities, accurate accounting for expenditures
and receipts, proper use of required disclosure schedules, and adherence to applicable contribution and expenditure limits.
Less than ten percent of the reports required amendments based on the initial desk
review of the report. Corrections and amendments to filed reports assist treasurers
in performing duties required by law and promote increased user confidence in the
accuracy of filed documents.
Under the Board's 1983 amendment policy, certified
letters to treasurers have greatly improved the timeliness of required amendments.
The improved quality of reporting observed by the Board during fiscal year 1987,
and recent years, demonstrates treasurers' increased awareness of the requirements of the law as well as the effect of Board outreach to political party staff,
campaign workers, and the public, including election-year information meetings
conducted by Board staff since 1978.
In 1986, during July and August, 20 campaign
finance meetings were held at 17 locations around the state. A total of 146
treasurers, candidates, campaign workers and county auditors attended either an
afternoon or evening session of two hours.
Sessions included line-by-line explanation of reporting forms, review of record keeping and reporting requirements, and
a question-answer forum.

F.

FIELD EXAMINATION OF RECORDS

In January, 1987, the Board reviewed results of the program conducted after the
1980, 1982, and 1984 elections and noted that although no major problems with
committee or fund records were disclosed, the program assisted treasurers and the
Board in identifying reporting and recordkeeping deficiencies which have
strengthened the Board's information materials in subsequent elections.
The Board
decided to suspend the program for the 1986 election and allocate staff time toward

- 7 development of the campaign finance data entry and retrieval program so that the
system would be in maintenance mode before the beginning of the 1988 election cycle.
The Board plans to review the examination of records program for the 1988 election.
III

LOBBYIST PROGRAM

The lobbying disclosure program focuses attention on disbursements by individuals
and associations in efforts to influence legislative or administrative action.
During 1986-1987, approximately 1,275 registered individuals filed 1,925 reports
quarterly,
as compared with 1,800 reports in 1985-1986, and 1,700 reports in
1984-1985 fiscal years. Since each lobbyist files four times a year, there were
approximately 7,675 filings in 1986-1987.
A.

DESK REVIEW - LOBBYIST DISBURSEMENTS REPORTS

During 1986-1987, desk review of lobbyist quarterly reports included disclosure of
the source of additional funds over $500 for lobbying purposes, receipt of more than
$500 in a calendar year including salary, expenses, or fees for lobbying purposes,
and public officials who received a gift, loan, honorarium, item or benefit equal
in value to $50 or more from lobbyists.
The Board included notice of this information in the annual summary of lobbying disbursements published in March, 1987.
B.

COMPLIANCE WITH FILING DEADLINES

The quarterly reporting by lobbyists improved in FY87, compared with the period
1984-1986, possibly reflecting Board outreach to lobbyists, the associations they
represent, and the public.
Each quarter of FY87, the Board sent information about
lobbying disbursement disclosure to associations represented by registered lobbyists prior to the quarterly reporting dates.
During 1986-1987, $335 was collected in late filing fees from 11 delinquent
lobbyists.
Late filing fees were waived for seven lobbyists who requested the
waiver in writing, stating a sufficient reason for the late filing.
IV

ECONOMIC INTEREST DISCLOSURE PROGRAM

The economic interest disclosure program provides the public with information to aid
in evaluation of candidates and to reassure the public that public officials are
not personally profiting from their roles as decision makers.
During FY 1987,
approximately 1,950 public officials and candidates for state executive and legislative office filed an original or supplementary Statement of Economic Interest with
the Board.
Public officials are required to file a "termination statement of
economic interest" from the period of their previous statement through the last day
of their service as a public official.
In 1984, the Board approved and began distributing a simplified termination statement to assist former public officials.
A.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION - 1986

Newly-created multi-member agencies whose members, chief and deputy administrative
officers must file Statements of Economic Interest with the Ethical Practices Board:
Board of Marriage and Family Therapy (7)
Board of' Social Work (10)
Board of Unlicensed Mental Health Service Providers

(17)

- 8 Board of Water and Soil Resources (12)
Minnesota Amateur Sports Commission (9)
Minnesota Public Facilities Authority (7)
Rural Development Board (15)
Change in name of the following agencies whose public officials file Statements of
Economic Interest with the Board:

Department of Trade and Economic Development (formerly: Department of
Energy and Economic Development)
Rural Finance Authority (formerly: Rural Finance Administration)
Change in number of public officials who file Statements of Economic Interest with
the Board:

Attorney General's Office - assistant attorneys general - 35 (formerly: 16)
Minnesota Zoological Board - increased to 30 members (formerly: 15); members not
required to file Statements of Economic Interest with the Board, effective:
May 27, 1987.
Abolished

Energy and Economic Development Authority
Full Productivity Coordinator
Minnesota Humane Society
State Soil and Water Conservation Board
Water Resources Board
B.

COMPLIANCE WITH FILING DEADLINES

Timeliness of Economic Interest Statement filing by public officials improved in
FY87, compared with previous fiscal years.
During 1986-1987, three public officials
paid $55 in late filing fees.
Late fees were waived for four public officials who
requested the waiver in writing, stating a sufficient reason for the late filing.

v

CONFLICTS OF INTEREST AND REPRESENTATION DISCLOSURE

Potential Conflict of Interest Statements were filed with the Board by four public
officials.
No Potential Conflict of Interest Statements were filed by employees
of the Public Service Department under provisions of that department's law.
No Statements of Representation Disclosure were filed.

VI

HENNEPIN COUNTY DISCLOSURE LAW

Enacted as Laws of 1980, Chapter 362, this special law was codified in Minnesota
Statutes 1986 as Sections 383B.041 - 3838.058.
Under these statutes, elected
officials and candidates for elective office in Hennepin County and the cities of
Minneapolis and Bloomington are required to disclose their personal economic interests and campaign contributions and expenditures.
Required statements, registration
of political committees, and reports are filed with their filing officer: the
Hennepin County Auditor.
By terms of this law the Ethical Practices Board supplies to the Hennepin-County
Auditor all registration and reporting forms and statements of economic interest
required by the law.

- 9 The Board has directed its staff to assist the Hennepin County Auditor in reviewing
administrative procedures required by the law. Since 1986 was an election year for
certain Hennepin County offices, and 1987 is an election year for certain Minneapolis
and Bloomington city officials, the Board noted a corresponding increase in activities related to this law.

LEGISLATIVE ACTION - 1987
Disclosure threshold - contributions to a candidate, political fund, or political
committee must be itemized at more than $100 (was $50).
Minneapolis School Board - changes in the number of board members (to 9, from 7) and
in the manner of election (6 by district, 3 at-large) are part of a special law
to be submitted to the voters in 1987 for approval.
If approved by the voters
and the required certificate of approval filed with the secretary of state by
school board, candidates for school board would be subject to certain disclosure
provisions of the Hennepin County Disclosure Law, Minn. Stat. §§383B.041383B.058.
VII

PUBLIC EMPLOYEES RETIREMENT ASSOCIATION {PERA) TRUSTEE CANDIDATES

Minn. Stat. §353.03, subd. 1, as amended in 1985, provided for the election of three
PERA Trustees for staggered four-year terms. Candida~es for election as PERA
Trustee are required to file certain campaign finance disclosure with the Ethical
Practices Board, beginning with the January, 1986, election.
A Trustee candidate who (1) receives contributions OR makes expenditures in excess
of $100; or (2) has given implicit or explicit consent for any other person to
receive contributions or make expenditures in excess of $100 for the purpose of
bringing about that candidate's election as a PERA Trustee must file a report with
the Board within thirty days after the results of the election are announced.
The
report must disclose the source and amount of all contributions received.
Under this statute, the Board prescribes the reporting form and instructions for
completing the form.
Forms were distributed to 21 candidates and filed with the
Board by five candidates who filed in November, 1986, for the election of two
trustees in January, 1987. The next election under this law will be for one trustee
in January, 1990.

VIII

ADVISORY OPINIONS

The Board is authorized to issue advisory opinions on the requirements of the Ethics
in Government Act (Minn. Stat. Chapter lOA) and the Hennepin County Disclosure Law
(Laws 1980, Chapter 362).
Individuals or associations may ask for advisory opinions
about these laws to guide their own conduct.
Full texts of and an index to opinions
issued are published in booklet form, most recently in June, 1987, advisory opinions
Nos. 90-95, June, 1984 - April, 1987, and updated index to Nos. 1 - 95.
Advisory
opinions of the Board are annotated in Minnesota Statutes Annotated.
A summary of
the opinion issued in FY87 is included in this annual report, for reference.

Lobbyist Program
Re:

Lobbyist Disbursement Report

#95.
Because reference to "rate setting, power plant and powerline siting" in Minn.
Stat. §lOA.01, subd. 2, is not modified by "Ch. 116J", a lobbyist's attempts to
influence rate setting by an executive branch agency must be reported under Minn.
Stat. §lOA.04.

(Issued to David L. Sasseville on April 10, 1987.)
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FISCAL REPORT
FISCAL YEAR 1987 BUDGET - EXPENDITURES
PERIOD:
JULY 1. 1986 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1987

BUDGET

EXPEND

.. .. .. .. .. .. ..

.. .. .. .. .. .. ...

SALARY/FRINGE
Regular/Unclassified
Part-time Seasonal
Per Diem

.. .. .. .. .. .. ...

% BUDGET
EXPENDED

.........
......

$0
0
0

100%
100%
100%

$179,146

$0

100%

$11,923
2,384
3,030
1,995
9,951
1,251
3,284
2,090
445
4,680
752
164

$11,923
2,383
3,018
1,995
9,951
1,248
3,284
2,090
445
4,677
752
164

$0
0
0
3
0
0
0
3
0
0

100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%
100%

$41,949

$41,930

$19

100%

$221,095

$221,076

$166,748
11,173
1,225

$166,748
11,173
1,225

$179,146

--------

Sub-Total

BALANCE

--------

-------- --------

SUPPLIES/EXPENSES
Rent and Leases
Repair/Maintenance
Printing/Binding
Prof ./Tech. Services
Communications - Postage
Communications - Telephone
In-State Travel
Out-State Travel
Memberships & Training
Supplies
Equipment
Misc. Expense
Sub-Total
TOTAL

--------

(Al

--------

1

12

--------

100%

--------

·

Returned to State General Fund

STAFF SALARIES
JULY 1, 1986 THROUGH JUNE 30, 1987
POSITION

STAFF

SALARY

Executive Director

Mary Ann McCoy

Fiscal Manager

Jeanne Olson

28,613

Programs Assistant

Jim Maloney

20, 138

Lobbyist Technician

JoAnn Hill

22,884

Administrative Secretary

Cecilia Gerlach

24,384

Clerk-Typist

Michelle Mechtel Arcand

(50% time)

TOTAL F.Y. 1987 SALARIES

$ 45,787

9,579
$151,395
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LEGISLATIVE RECOMMENDATIONS - 1988

Annually, the Ethical Practices Board reviews the Ethics in Government Act as
part of the authority assigned to the Board by the Legislature under Minn. Stat.
§lOA.02, subd. 8 (a).
Accordingly, the Board respectfully submits the following recommendations to the Legislature for consideration.
Legislative action
on these matters will further enable the Board to perform its legislative mandate
and to serve the people of Minnesota.

1.

Prevent the use of campaign funds for personal use and provide for disposition of unexpended campaign funds.
Chapter lOA does not put any restrictions on what campaign funds may be
used for.
This allows money seemingly collected for campaign purposes
to be used for personal gain. The Board believes this is not in the
best public interest. A statutory standard for disposition of unused
or unexpended campaign funds should be enacted.

2.

Prohibit any fundraising during regular and special legislative session,
except caucus fundraisers.
The Board's study i~ 1981 of fundraising during the legislative sessions
in 1978 and 1981 and surveys conducted in 1983 support this recommendation.

Technical Reconmendation -

Minn. Stat. §lOA.32, subd. 3, as amended in Laws of
1987, Chapter 214, section 8, is ambiguous and
internally conflicting.
In preparation for the 1988 and subsequent elections,
the Legislature should clarify how the limit on the return of public financing
is intended to be interpreted or administered.
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XI

MINNESOTA ETHICAL PRACTICES BOARD
STATE ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN FUND
1986 LEGISLATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL ELECTIONS

I

CANDIDATES 1986 ELECTIONS:
A.

House of Representatives

Total

Democratic
Party

Republican
Party

281

-

100%

142

-

50%

138

-

49%

59

-

100%

11

-

19%

48

-

81%

210

-

100%

123 -

59%

86

-

40%

145

-

100%

79 -

54%

66

-

46%

28

-

100%

7 -

25%

21

-

75%

102

-

100%

61 -

60%

41

-

40%

Candidates Filing For Office

52

-

100%

22

-

42%

22

-

Candidates Not Accepting Public
Financing

14

-

100%

6

-

43%

Candidates Who Accepted And Qualified
For Public Financing

13

-

100%

6 -

46%

Candidates Filing For Office

478

-

100%

243

-

Candidates Not Accepting Public
Financing

101

-

100%

24

Candidates Who Accepted And Qualified
For Public Financing

325

-

100%

Candidates Filing For Office
Candidates Not Accepting Public
Financing
Candidates Who Accepted And Qualified
For Public Financing

B.

Candidates No Accepting Public
Financing
Candidates Who Accepted And Qualified
For Public Financing

D.

l

-

1%

l

-

1%

42%

8 -

16%

2 -

14%

6

-

43%

6

-

46%

l

-

8%

51%

226

-

47%

9 -

2%

-

24%

71

-

70%

6

-

6%

191 -

59%

133

-

40%

2

-

l%

Senate -

Candidates Filing For Office

c.

All Other
Parties

Constitutional Off ices

-

House of ReEresentativesL
?enateLCo~stitutional Off ices

(continued)
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II

PUBLIC FINANCING FUNDS:
A.

1986 ELECTIONS

Funds Available For Distribution By Account
Amount Available
For Distribution

Funds Returned
To State

Total Amount
Distributed

(General Fund)
General Account

$

728,521

1

$

$

728,521

Democratic Party Account

1,037,900

60,369

977 t 530

Republican Party Account

889,348

204,577

684,771

7,063

7,049

14

$2,655,782
(100%)

$272 I 740
(10%)

$2,390,836
(90%)

All Minor Parties
Total

1

rncluded in the General Account figure is $5,170 of Minor Party funds which were transferred to the General Account and made available for distribution, per M.S. §lOA.32,
subd. 4, due to a Minor Party not having any candidate for constitutional office on the
1986 Primary or General Election ballots.

B.

Funds Distributed By Party
General
Account
Funds

Party
Account
Funds
Democratic Party Candidates

Republican Party Candidates

Other Minor Parties Candidates

C.

s

Total

977' 531

$402,580

$1,380,lll
58%

684, 771

324,881

1,009,652
42%

14

1,059

1,073
.04%

$1,662,316
(70%)

$728,520
(30%)

$2,390,836
(100%)

Legislative Office Funds Distributed - Democratic Party
House Of
Representatives

Senate

Total Distributed

$410,225

$405,166

High Amount Distributed

$

5,878

$ 11, 024

Low Amount Distributed

$

1,800

$

3,767

Average Amount Distributed/Candidate

$

3,335

$

6,642

Candidates Receiving Public Financing

$

123

61

(continued)
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PUBLIC FINANCING FUNDS:
D.

1986 ELECTIONS (Continued)

Legislative Office Funds Distributed - Republican Party
House Of
Representatives

Senate

Total Distributed

$235,128

$255,493

High Amount Distributed

$

6,101

$ 13, 901

Low Amount Distributed

$

1,627

$

3,523

Average Amount Distributed/Candidate

$

2,734

$

6,232

86

Candidates Receiving Public Financing

E.

41

Constitutional Office Funds Distributed - Democratic/Republican Parties
Amounts Distributed
Democratic
Candidate

Republican
Candidate

Governor-Lt. Governor

$395,304

$363,321

Attorney General

$ 67,766

$ 62,284

Secretary of State

$ 33,883

$ 31,142

State Auditor

$ 33,883

$ 31,142

State Treasurer

$ 33,883

$ 31,142

General
Account

Total

Office

F.

Minor Party Funds Distributed
Minor
Party
Accounts

Legislature
House of Representatives
(1 candidate)

$

1,059

$1,059

Constitutional Office
State Treasurer

$

14

Total

$

14

$

$

1,059

14

$1,073

(continued)
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III RETURN OF STATE ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN FUNDS 1986 ELECTIONS - DEPOSITED TO STATE GENERAL FUND
A.

House of Representatives, Senate, and
Constitutional Office Candidate Committees
Democratic
Party

Total Amount Returned

Minor
Parties

Total

43,925

20,988

64,913

29

17

46

Number of Committees Returning

IV

Republican
Party

TAX RETURN PARTICIPATION RATE
TOTAL NO. OF RETURNS

TAX YEAR

I

INCOME TAX

PROPERTY
TAX REFUNDS

TOTAL NO.
OF CHECKOFFS

% OF PARTICIPATION

1974 Actual

1,669,794

372, 311

22.3%

1975 Actual

1,584,086

376,223

23.8%

1986 Actual

1,616,441

391,799

24.2%

1977 Actual

1,667,924

451,512

27.1%

1978 Actual

1,722,053

938,791

516,300

19.4%

1979 Actual

1,761,586

880,185

458,586

17.4%

1980 Actual

1,752,137

797,327

401,566

15.8%

1981 Actual

1,738,194

806,698

395,804

15.6%

1982 Actual

1,712,796

703,470

403,371

16.7%

1983 Actual

1,721,645

660,854

416,606

17.5%

1984 Actual

1,773,807

630,530

426,514

17.7%

1985 Actual

1,801,993

571,772

393,424

16.6%

STATE ELECTIONS CAMPAIGN FUND
INCOME TAX AND PROPERTY TAX CHECKOFFS(A)
OTHER
ACCOUNTS
(MINOR
PARTIES (B)

GENERAL
ACCOUNT

% OF
TOTAL

$125,169 -

33.6%

$175,259 - 47.1%

$ 68,395 - 18.4%

$ 3,488

-

0.9%

$372 I 311

-

100%

1975 - Actual

125,979 - 33.5%

164,071 - 43.6%

83,218 - 22.1%

2,955

-

0.8%

376,223

-

100%

1976 - Actual

106,303 - 27.2%

186,927 - 47.7%

89,227 - 22.8%

9,252

-

2.3%

391,799

-

100%

1977 - Actual

118,774 - 26.3%

187 I 812 - 41. 6%

132,913 - 29.4%

12,013

-

2.7%

451,512

-

100%

1978 - Actual

127,740 - 24.8%

220,116 - 42.6%

153,921 - 29.8%

14,523

2.8%

516,300

-

100%

1979 - Actual

118,454 - 24.2%

197,503 - 40.3%

160,327 - 32.7%

13, 529

2.8%

489,813

-

100%

1980 - Actual

198,028 - 24.7%

332,394 - 41.4%

258,748 - 32.2%

13 I 962

-

l. 7%

803I132

-

100%

1981 - Actual

206,640 - 26.1%

307,286 - 38.8%

262,240 - 33.1%

14,331

-

2.0%

791,608

-

100%

1982 - Actual

207,014 - 25.7%

356,800 - 44.2%

229,748 - 28.5%

13I180

-

l.6%

806,742

-

100%

1983 - Actual

208,328 - 25.0%

330,206 - 39.6%

282,790 - 34.0%

11, 888

l.4%

833,212

-

100%

1984 - Actual

230,294 - 27.0%

356 I 074 - 41. 7%

266,658 - 31.3%

0

-

0%

853,026

-

100%

1985 - Actual

241,682 -

299,904 - 38.1%

245,682 - 31.2%

0

-

0%

786,848

-

100%

TAX YEAR
1974 - Actual

30.7%

DFL
ACCOUNT

% OF
TOTAL

IR
ACCOUNT

% OF
TOTAL

% OF
TOTAL

TOTAL

-%

f

(A)
(B)

Beginning with tax year 1980 taxpayers may check off $2.00 per individual taxpayer
Beginning with tax year 1984, under a 1984 law change, no minor parties qualified for inclusion on the state
income tax blank.

f-"'

m

